COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 902, *Inspector General The Inspection System,* and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90201, *Inspector General Activities*. It provides guidance and procedures for Air Force readiness inspections, compliance inspections, and self inspections. Only this instruction may establish command wide Inspector General (IG) inspection requirements. This instruction applies to all Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), AFSOC Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units, and AFSOC gained Air National Guard (ANG) units. Supplements to this instruction will be coordinated with Air Force Special Operations Command, Inspections Directorate (HQ AFSOC/IGI) before publication and units will forward one copy to HQ AFSOC/IGI after publication. Use AF Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*, for any suggested changes to this publication and email to **AFSOC.IG2@hurlburt.af.mil.** Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located in Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) on the AF Portal: **https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm**

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Significant revisions include guidance changes to standards for no notice and minimal notice inspections, references to the AF eight step problem solving model leading to identification of root causes and solutions to deficiencies, changes to inspection graded areas, and expands AFSOC self inspection guidance. Other changes were made in reference to total force implications and emergency management (EM), and the creation of standardized Headquarters Air Force (HAF) inspection checklists, and the requirement to notify The Inspector General (TIG) when exceeding inspection frequency. This instruction combines AFSOCI 90201, *AF Special Operations Command Inspection Program*; AFSOCI 90202, *Inspector General Operational Readiness Inspection;* AFSOCI 90203, *Inspector General Compliance Inspections, Readiness Observations, And Assessment Visits*; AFSOCI 90204, *Gatekeeper Program*; and AFSOCI 90206, *Quiet Response Evaluation Criteria*.

Chapter 1

RESPONSIBILITIES

1.1. Air Force Special Operations Command, Inspector General (HQ AFSOC/IG).

1.1.1. Establish inspection programs consistent with command mission requirements to assess unit readiness, compliance, and other AF inspection program elements.

1.1.2. Reports on force readiness to the Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC/CC), and the headquarters directors.

1.1.3. Approves inspection policy and oversees the HQ AFSOC/IG inspection system.

1.1.4. Directs assessment of any AFSOC program or operation, including AFSOC gained AFRC and ANG organizations and units, as required.

1.1.5. Coordinates on all AFSOCI and HQ AFSOC assessments, evaluations, or inspections to ensure IG-directed and other HQ AFSOC efforts are mutually reinforcing.

1.1.6. Provides feedback to AFSOC units and AFSOC gained ANG units on the adequacy of their Self Inspection (SI) program as required.

1.1.7. Approves AFSOC Command Interest Items (CII).

1.2. HQ AFSOC/IG Inspections Directorate (HQ AFSOC/IGI).

1.2.1. Manages AFSOC inspection policy and provides oversight of inspection policy implementation.

1.2.2. Reports on the adequacy of AFSOC CI, ORI, SI programs to HQ AFSOC/IG.

1.2.3. Observes units self inspection program and provides feedback to the HQ AFSOC/IG and unit on the effectiveness of the unit's self inspection processes.

1.2.4. Provides a summary of inspection results to cross-flow this information to the other AFSOC units.

1.2.5. Closes AFSOC-level deficiencies after validation by the responsible AFSOC functional(s).

1.2.6. Manages and administers the AFSOC Inspectors Course.

1.2.7. Appoints an HQ AFSOC/IG POC for coordination of the Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS) with SAF/IGI.

1.2.8. Assigns IG planner(s) to plan each scheduled inspection.

1.2.9. Forwards AFSOC Voting Program report to SAF/IGI Voting Program POC.

1.2.10. Manages and administers the AFSOC CII program.

1.2.11. Provides Semi-Annual Trend Report to SAF/IGI NLT 15 Jan and 15 Jul of each year. HQ AFSOC/IG will use SAF/IGI-provided electronic template. At a minimum, this report will include the following areas:

1.2.11.1. Deficiency Overview – general summary of areas receiving deficiencies.

1.2.11.2. Deficiency Codes – top categories of factors identified in deficiencies, if available.

1.2.11.3. Trends/Analysis – brief assessment of issues and trends in deficiencies, if identified.

1.2.11.4. Summary Table – numerical totals of deficiencies and associated codes, by inspection type and major graded area (MGA).

1.2.12. Utilize HAF and AFSOC Functional Area Manager (FAM) checklists for conducting inspections.

1.2.13. Coordinate with AFSOC FAMs to develop and review inspection checklists.

1.2.14. Assist directorates in eliminating overlapping or duplicate inspection requirements.

1.2.15. Designate a Gatekeeper for notification of evaluations by all AF and non-AF organizations. See paragraph 2.11. for Gatekeeper responsibilities.

1.2.16. Submit an updated annual inspection activity schedule NLT the last day of each calendar quarter to AFIA to develop a single AF IG inspection schedule product.

1.2.17. Conduct Total Force inspections as outlined in AFI 90-1001, *Responsibilities for Total Force Integration.* With the exception of AFRC CIs, the HQ AFSOC/IG will conduct all ORIs and CIs and will collaborate with the respective Air Reserve Component (ARC) to ensure the combat readiness of all Total Force Integration initiative units. Associated Total Force units should normally be inspected as one team with personnel from each of the inspected component's units participating in the inspection.

1.3. AFSOC Functional Area Managers (FAM).

1.3.1. Supplement HAF checklists, as required, with AFSOC references and highlighted changes since last version. Where there is no HAF checklist for specialized AFSOC functions requiring inspection by the HQ AFSOC/IG, AFSOC FAMs will develop and maintain AFSOC-specific checklists.

1.3.2. When writing or updating AFSOC guidance or supplements to AFIs, AFSOC FAMs will ensure affected checklists are updated. Coordinate checklist supplements with applicable HAF functionals, AFRC, and NGB-IGD (**ngbigd@ng.army.mil**).   **Note:** AFSOC functionals will continue to develop and maintain checklists (with references) until HAF inspection checklists are published. Once applicable HAF checklists are published, AFSOC FAMs may supplement HAF inspection checklists with AFSOC-level guidance.

1.3.3. Augment the AFSOC IG inspection team as required to conduct CIs and ORIs.

1.4. AFSOC Inspected Units.

1.4.1. AFSOC and AFSOC-gained units will provide inspection team support as required by the AFSOC/IG inspection team.

1.4.2. The following units will receive ORIs: 1 SOW, 27 SOW, 193 SOW, 919 SOW, 352 SOG, 353 SOG, 11 IS, 21 STS, 22 STS, 23 STS, 24 STS, 123 STS, 125 STS, 150 SOS, 209 CES, 280 CBCS, 107 WF, 146 WF, 181 WF, and SOLEs (AFSOC and TSOC).

1.4.3. The following units will receive CIs: 23AF (11 IS, 18 FLTS, 623 AOC), 1 SOW, 27 SOW, 193 SOW, 352 SOG, 353 SOG, AFSOTC, 720 STG (including STSs), 123 STS, 125 STS, 150 SOS, 209 CES, 280 CBCS, 107 WF, 146 WF, and 181 WF.

Chapter 2

AFSOC INSPECTION PROGRAM GUIDELINES

2.1. General Guidelines. HQ AFSOC/IG will establish inspection programs to exercise headquarters oversight of subordinate and gained units consistent with mission requirements and inspection program guidelines outlined in AFI 90-201 and this instruction. HQ AFSOC/IG will conduct independent inspections to assess unit efficiency, effectiveness, combat readiness, and report results of such inspections to the AFSOC/CC and SAF/IG. AFSOC functional and directorate staffs, working closely with their IG counterparts, will develop applicable guidelines, procedures, criteria, checklists, and resolution requirements for conducting these inspections.

2.1.1. Inspection Notification. For active duty (AD) units, notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be a minimum of six months for CIs and ORIs. ARC unit notification for regularly scheduled inspections will be forwarded to; the unit IG and/or Gatekeeper and the ARC Gatekeeper with a minimum one year notice.

2.1.1.1. No-notice and minimal-notice inspections are conducted to assess the day-to-day compliance and operational readiness of units. No-notice and minimal-notice can be used for either full-scale or limited-scale inspections. Not applicable to ARC.

2.1.1.1.1. For all units, no-notice is defined as 72 hours or less; minimal-notice is less than 45 calendar days. Gatekeepers will be included in the planning of these inspections and will be treated as trusted agents. Not applicable to ARC.

2.1.1.1.2. HQ AFSOC/IG recognizes there may be limited availability of active duty and ARC unit personnel in some functional areas.

2.1.1.1.3. HQ AFSOC/IG will make every effort to minimize notification to the 352 SOG and 353 SOG when inspecting outside regularly scheduled inspections based on the host nation and NATO limitations.

2.1.2. Inspection Footprint. The HQ AFSOC/IG will minimize the inspection footprint to the maximum extent practical. When deemed appropriate, HQ AFSOC/IG may give credit for unit activity in conjunction with exercises and contingencies, real world operations, combined inspections, other inspections/evaluations, and other measures of sustained performance to minimize footprints. These measures can be used to adjust the breadth, duration, and incidence of inspection activities. When practical, IG teams may deploy to forward locations and headquarters during exercises and contingency operations to evaluate processes and performance. Inspectors may observe, but will not interfere with, real world activities unless observed actions are in direct violation of AFIs, technical data, or injury to personnel and/or damage to equipment could occur.

2.1.2.1. When scheduling inspections for ARC units gained by multiple MAJCOMs, HQ AFSOC/IGs will coordinate the inspection schedule in order to conduct concurrent MAJCOM inspections, to the maximum extent possible.

2.1.2.2. It is AFSOC policy to schedule CIs, EESOHCAMPs, ASEVs, LCAPs, Safety inspections, and other formal inspections concurrently (or near concurrently) whenever possible to reduce the inspection footprint on the inspected units.

2.1.3. Inspection Alignment with deployment battle rhythm. Make every attempt to de-conflict inspections with deployment battle rhythm, enabler unit deployments, and out of cycle expeditionary support deployments. If possible, avoid inspecting units within 60 days before or after a major deployment (more than 20 percent of a unit's assigned personnel deployed). Final determination with be with HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.1.4. Inspection Frequency Deviations. AFSOC/CC approval is required to exceed any inspection frequency directed in AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*. HQ AFSOC/IG will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the required inspection frequency and will provide the anticipated inspection date(s).

2.1.5. **HAF Checklists.**

2.1.5.1. HAF checklists standardize assessment criteria and facilitate AF and AFSOC inspection, evaluation, and unit self inspection programs. These checklists and templates will be available on the AF Checklist site (**https://www.my.af.mil/reservenetprod/talonsupport/home.aspx**).

2.1.5.2. Functional checklists are a tool available for use by AFSOC Headquarters and unit personnel when conducting assessments of programs or activities. The checklists do not constitute the order or limit the scope of any inspection or unit self inspection. The checklists do not limit the requirement to comply with any published DOD or AF policies, directives, or instructions.

2.1.5.3. Once an applicable HAF checklist is published, AFSOC will supplement HAF checklists with AFSOC references, as required for command-specific responsibilities. AFSOC will not supplement HAF checklists with any guidance authored above the AFSOC level. Checklists will be coordinated with applicable HAF functionals, AFRC, and NGB. AFSOC functional will include a comprehensive list of references used in each checklist (AFIs, DODDs, etc) and identify the units listed in paragraph 3.1.2. to which each checklist applies.

2.1.5.4. Checklist Currency. Checklists must be updated within 90 days of guidance changes being posted on the AF e-Publishing website. All checklists will be reviewed annually by the AFSOC functional staffs; HAF checklist review/update conducted NLT 31 Jan with AFSOC supplement review/update NLT 31 Mar. All updates will be approved by HQ AFSOC/IG for AFSOC checklist updates.

2.1.5.5. Until HAF checklists are published, HQ AFSOC/IG and FAMs will continue to use and maintain the AFSOCI 90-205 inspection checklists.

2.1.6. Selection for Performance-based Evaluations. Inspection teams will randomly select individuals/teams for executing performance based evaluations in lieu of the inspected unit self identifying individuals/teams for evaluation (maintain team integrity as appropriate).

2.1.7. Rating System. Inspection criteria serve as a guideline and are not a substitute for sound inspector judgment. For Total Force Integration initiative units, the association will be given an overall comprehensive rating to reflect how the integrated unit would have performed had the integrated units been presented to a combatant commander for employment.

2.1.8. Validation.   The AFSOC validation process provides the inspected unit the opportunity to clarify and/or rebut in a timely manner any potential deficiencies identified during the inspection as well as coordinate with the appropriate AFSOC FAM(s) on all critical and significant deficiencies identified during the inspection. Inspectors will validate all potential deficiencies at the lowest appropriate unit and AFSOC FAM level and resolve any policy interpretation differences with the appropriate FAM/OPR.   All validated deficiencies will be documented in the report.   This process also applies to deficiencies levied against other AFSOC units or HHQ organizations.

2.1.9. Use of Contractors. Contractors are prohibited from acting in the capacity of an IG inspector; however, contractors may be consulted for their functional expertise.   Use of contractors must be in compliance with DOD Instruction 1100.22, *Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix*.

2.1.10. Contracted Functions.   Assess and rate contracted functions against Performance Work Statements (PWS).   Assess adequacy of PWS to meet mission requirements.   Tailor functional checklists to address differences between AF checklists and PWS requirements. The contracting officer and/or quality assurance (QA) personnel should accompany the IG during inspections. Develop and implement safeguards to prevent contractor claims related to inspections activities.

2.1.10.1. Rating and Report.   Contracted functions will be rated; however, individual contractors will not.   Sampling of contracted activity will be coordinated through QA personnel.   Contractors may be provided with applicable portions of the report in accordance with (IAW) DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program;* and AFI 90201, *Inspector General Activities.*

2.1.10.2. Validation of Contracted Functions. Validate observations related to contractor functions with the contracting officer and appropriate unit personnel. Track deficiencies IAW paragraph 2.6., *Inspection Write-ups*. **Note:** Only the Contracting Officer can take formal action against the contractor for noncompliance or direct contractors to correct deficiencies identified during inspections.

2.1.10.3. Inspector Training. Inspectors and augmentees will complete Phase I QA personnel training or similar on-line training listed below prior to inspecting contracted functions. Phase I QA personnel training provides general knowledge of QA personnel responsibilities and procedures.   On-line training shall consist of at least two of the following three courses:

2.1.10.3.1. "Seven Steps to Performance-Based Acquisition" training available on-line at: **http://www.arnet.gov/comp/seven_steps/index.html**.

2.1.10.3.2. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) CLC106, "COR (Contracting Officer Representative) with a Mission Focus", available online at: **https://learn.dau.mil/html/login/login.jsp**.

2.1.10.3.3. The Air Force module on Performance-Based Services Acquisition available   on-line   at: **https://afkm.wpafb.af.mil/ASPs/eCourse/course.asp?Filter=OO-AQ-SV-AQ&CourseID=15**"

2.1.11. Installation Exercise Program Office (IEPO).

2.1.11.1. Organization. The wing/installation commander determines whether the exercise program resides under the vice commander (CV), plans and programs office (XP), IG, or other equivalent staff level office, unless otherwise directed by HQ AFSOC.

2.1.11.2. Staffing. Staffing levels vary among units based on mission complexity, but adequate manning is essential to mission readiness. Successful IEPOs typically have three or more personnel assigned. Recommended staffing includes, as a minimum, one officer (field grade or civilian equivalent) and one enlisted (senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO) or civilian equivalent). IEPO offices typically include a blend of AF specialty codes (AFSC) and experience that complement the mission requirements.

2.1.11.3. Training. Prior to evaluating wing/installation activities, exercise evaluation team (EET) members will complete the core training outlined in AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program Planning and Operations*. Additional training may be directed by the EET chief to enable EET members to meet specialized team, functional area, host nation, or local requirements or standards. EET members may attend the USAF Inspectors Course as outlined in paragraph 2.9., *IG Inspector Eligibility, Training and Certification*. IEPO personnel and wing-designated EET members should serve as HQ AFSOC/IG inspection team augmentees when requested by HQ AFSOC.

2.1.12. Exercise Safety. During exercises where immediate distinction between non-participants (i.e., inspectors, evaluators, and observers) and participants (i.e., unit personnel, exercise players, and opposition forces (OPFOR)) is important to exercise safety, security, and/or success, nonparticipants will be clearly identified through the wear of safety/reflective vests or other clearly identifiable markings. Safety procedures and markings will be included in all exercise plans/scenarios and must be disseminated prior to the start of evaluations or exercises. Use appropriate operational risk management practices during planning and execution of exercise events.

2.2. Limited Inspections. Limited inspections are smaller, targeted inspections that assess selected elements of operational readiness and/or compliance of inspected units. Limited inspections have a smaller footprint than a full-scale inspection. Limited inspections will be rated on the same scale as the associated full scale inspection.

2.3. Additional Inspections.

2.3.1. Federal Recognition Inspection (FRI). AFSOC will conduct a FRI of a state unit when the unit is being considered for federal recognition or when asked to do so by the NGB. Conduct the FRI according to AFI 90-201 *ANG Supplement, Inspector General Activities*. As soon as an acceptable FRI is complete on a unit, the gaining command assumes the responsibility assigned in AFI 10-301, *Responsibilities of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) Forces.*

2.3.2. Wounded, Ill, and Injured (WII) Facility Inspections. When applicable AFSOC/IGs will conduct WII Facility Inspections, as required by National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, House Record (H.R.) 4986, Section 1662, *Access of Recovering Service Members to Adequate Outpatient Residential Facilities*. WII Facility Inspections may be conducted in conjunction with other inspections (ORI, CI) but will be a separate, distinct inspection providing a separate inspection report. WII Facility Inspections

will utilize a 3-tier rating scale: In Compliance, In Compliance with Comments, Not In Compliance.

2.3.2.1. Frequency. IAW NDAA FY 2008, H.R.4986, Section 1662, WII Facility Inspections will be conducted on a semi-annual basis CY 2009, then annually thereafter.

2.3.2.2. Scope. Criteria and actions IAW NDAA FY 2008, H.R.4986, Sec 1662, and DOD Housing Inspection Standards for Medical Hold and Holdover Personnel. WII Facility Inspections assess the condition of facilities for those Airmen currently on Medical Hold occupying AF-owned properties. Individuals recuperating in privately-owned housing fall outside the scope of these inspections.

2.3.2.3. Responsibilities. When applicable, conduct WII Facility Inspections within AFSOC on schedule directed by SAF/IGI. Provide individual inspection reports to AFIA/SG NLT 60 days prior to OSD-established close-out date. Post individual inspection reports on AFSOC public website (or direct hyperlink to reports on AFW2 public website).

2.3.3. FAM evaluations, assessments, and other inspections. HQ AFSOC/IG may elect to use the results of command FAM evaluations, assessments, other inspections and/or audits in lieu of additional IG inspections in those areas provided the criteria used in those evaluations meet or exceed the requirements of this instruction. When utilized, the HQ AFSOC/IG will publish the results of the FAM evaluations, assessments, or other inspections in the appropriate section of the inspection report for that unit. The HQ AFSOC directorate administering the evaluation must coordinate ORI or CI credit prior to the evaluation and will provide the results of the evaluation to the HQ AFSOC/IG following the evaluation. If the evaluation, assessment, other inspection or audit does not occur as planned, a determination must be made on how the unit will be inspected in that area.

2.3.4. Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Visit (ASEV). HQ AFSOC/A3 ensures subordinate units are in compliance with AF instructions, MDS-specific grading criteria and appropriate HHQ guidance IAW AFSOC Supplement to AFI 11-202, Volume 2, *Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Program*.

2.3.5. Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP) is the HQ AFSOC/A3 evaluation of the air traffic system's safety, effectiveness and compliance with HQ USAF and FAA standards IAW AFI 13-218, *Air Traffic System Evaluation Problem*. ATSEP will use the Functional Area Checklists (FAC) available on the AFFSA Airfield Operations Directorate website to evaluate compliance with established guidance and standards.

2.3.6. Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP). HQ AFSOC/A4 validates basic logistics assessment policy and procedures are being used throughout the AFSOC logistics community, and provide senior leadership and management direction for standardizing and verifying the accomplishment of the mission in accordance with policy IAW AFI 20-111, *Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP)*. LCAP functional checklists are published by AF/A4L in coordination with Lead MAJCOMs and posted on the AF Checklist site (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/).

2.3.7. Health Services Inspection (HSI) and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Inspections. HQ AFSOC/SG will coordinate with the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) for combined HSI and JCAHO inspections to assess the

ability of AFSOC medical units to fulfill peace/wartime missions, including medical care and support of the host wing mission as well as access health care quality. AFIA is responsible for conducting a HSI IAW AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities*. Air Force Inspection Agency, Medical Operations Directorate (AFIA/SG), annually updates the inspection guide and posts it to the AFIA Community of Practice.

2.3.8. Safety Inspection. HQ AFSOC/SE will conduct flight, ground, and weapons safety assessments and SAVs IAW AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program.* AF Reserve Command will conduct safety inspections of AF Reserve units. Safety inspections for ANG units will be conducted by the NGB as part of the Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance Assessment Management Program.

2.3.9. Energy, Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance Assessment Management Program (EESOHCAMP). HQ AFSOC/CE is OPR and will coordinate with HQ AFSOC/SE and HQ AFSOC/SG the conduct of the EESOHCAMP assessments of AFSOC units. The EESOHCAMP is an assessment that monitors overall compliance with governmental and departmental directives that encompass Occupational Health, Environmental, and Ground and Weapons Safety. Flight Safety, though not part of EESOHCAMP, may take part in a combined inspection for units with a flying mission. IAW AFI 90-201, ANG Supplement, *The Inspection System*, the ANG conducts the EESOHCAMP inspections for ANG units. AFSOC/IG inspections will not duplicate ANG EESOHCAMP inspection elements. AFSOC/IG should arrange to receive a copy of the most recent ANG EESOHCAMP report and review the status of discrepancies noted in the ANG EESOHCAMP report.

2.3.10. Self Inspection. Self inspection (SI) provides commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and complements external assessments. AFSOC SI program guidance is in Chapter 5 of this instruction.

2.3.11. Intelligence Standardization and Evaluation Visit (ISEV). HQ AFSOC/A2 ensures subordinate units are in compliance with AF instructions, MDS-specific grading criteria and HHQ guidance IAW AFSOC Supplement to AFI 14-202, Volume 1, *Intelligence Training*, and Volume 2, *Intelligence Standardization/Evaluation Program.*

2.4. The AFSOC/IG inspection team. For most inspections, the number of inspectors required exceeds the manning of the AFSOC/IG directorate. Therefore, HQ AFSOC or field units will augment the inspection team. HQ AFSOC/IG will normally provide the inspection team chief and core support staff for IG conducted inspections.

2.4.1. Augmenting the IG Team. HQ AFSOC directorates and field units will, as inspection or visit requirements dictate, provide qualified personnel to augment inspection teams. Qualified personnel are subject matter experts recommended by the appropriate HQ AFSOC functional director. HQ AFSOC/IG, as required, will provide Temporary Duty (TDY) funds for augmentees. Augmentation requests will be sent directly from HQ AFSOC/IG to other HQ AFSOC directorates. The minimum grade for an augmentee is master sergeant (E-7). On a case-by-case basis, a technical sergeant (E-6) assigned to HQ AFSOC can augment the inspection team upon approval from the HQ AFSOC/IGI. Once augmentation requirements have been tasked, HQ AFSOC/IG will coordinate directly with the supporting directorates or unit(s). Requested ANG and AFRC augmentation will be coordinated with HQ NGB-IG and HQ AFRC/IG respectively.

2.4.2. IG Team Clearances. HQ AFSOC/IG team orders contain each individual's security clearance. At the start of each inspection, IG team entry access listings (EAL) are provided to the unit commander or base command post representative. It is the inspected unit's responsibility to ensure adequate copies of the IG team EAL are distributed to appropriate offices and proper access is granted to IG team members.

2.4.3. IG Support Requirements. Upon notification of an inspection, the inspected unit's commander will provide HQ AFSOC/IG with a single Point of Contact (POC). The POC will contact the HQ AFSOC/IG inspection planner to determine detailed support requirements. Some requirements may not be identified until after team arrival; however, Attachment 2 provides basic information for planning purposes. The AFSOC IG planner(s) will define specific requirements for each inspection.

2.5. Inspector General Evaluation Management System (IGEMS).

2.5.1. Description. An unclassified web based software program serving as an inspection tool comprised of planning, executing, reporting, and corrective action management. In addition, IGEMS provides HQ AFSOC/IG with the capability to gather trend data on a multitude of inspection variables. If the need arises for classified reporting, HQ AFSOC/IG will use classified reporting channels.

2.5.2. Phased Implementation. IGEMS will be phased for implementation on a schedule to be determined in coordination with SAF/IGI and MAJCOM/IGs.

2.5.3. Access management. Access to IGEMS will be administered by the HQ AFSOC/IG IGEMS Administrators.

2.5.4. Trend Reports. HQ AFSOC/IG will use IGEMS to record trend data of inspection results that will be available for extract by SAF/IG.

2.6. Inspection Reports. At the conclusion of a formal inspection conducted by HQ AFSOC/IG, a report will be provided to the AFSOC/CC and the inspected unit. Inspection reports are posted on the HQ AFSOC/IG SIPRNET site and emailed to SAF/IGI. Inspection reports for ANG units will be e-mailed via SIPR to NGB-IGD. Contact NGB-IGD at **ngbigd@ng.army.mil** to obtain current NGB-IGD SIPR account. The HQ AFSOC/IG will normally brief inspection results to the unit at the conclusion of the inspection. The HQ AFSOC/IG will also normally brief the AFSOC/CC and staff after returning from the inspection. The briefing will include repeat findings, ongoing problems, and other observations by the HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.6.1. Inspection reports will be maintained in accordance with the Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS), T 90-02, Special Management − Inspection Records: Destroy 10 years after completion of subject inspection.

2.7. Inspection Write-ups. For CIs, ORIs and additional inspections, inspection reports will only include write-ups categorized as Strengths, Deficiencies, and Recommended Improvement Areas (RIA). RIAs will not be used to document procedural deviations or non-compliance; they are only used to recommend a more efficient or effective course of action.

2.7.1. **Deficiency write-ups identified by the HQ AFSOC/IG will contain:**

2.7.1.1. <u>Deficiency Number.</u> A unique tracking number developed by combining the inspected unit designation, type inspection (i.e. ORI, CI), year (i.e. 09), the AFSOC directorate responsible for the policy area, and two-digit sequence number of the deficiency for directorate (i.e. 1SOW-CI09-A601).

2.7.1.2. <u>Short Title (optional).</u> A short (one-line) summary/description of the deficiency.

2.7.1.3. <u>Detail</u>. Describe, in sufficient detail, the deficiency and contextual facts as necessary to clearly convey the defect requiring resolution. The written description alone should be adequate for the inspected party to begin corrective action planning.

2.7.1.4. <u>Severity</u>. A deficiency severity of Critical, Significant, or Minor.

2.7.1.5. <u>Reference(s)</u> to the applicable instruction, technical order, policy letter, or other source documentation.

2.7.1.6. <u>Impact</u>. For critical deficiencies address impact of continued deviation or non-compliance.

2.7.1.7. <u>HQ AFSOC OPR</u>. The AFSOC functional OPR responsible for policy related to the deficiency (three or four letter office symbol).

2.7.1.8. <u>OCR.</u> Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR), if applicable. The AFSOC functional OCR, and/or external functional OCR responsible for collateral policy related to the deficiency (three or four letter office symbol). OCR use commonly occurs if a deficiency is cross functional in nature, impacts a host/tenant relationship, or has an ARC interrelated issue.

2.7.1.9. <u>Corrective Action OPR.</u> The unit Corrective Action OPR office symbol (typically a squadron commander or equivalent) that is responsible for oversight of the corrective action, determining the deficiency code(s), and recommending closure when corrective action is complete. In instances where corrective action responsibility is assigned to both the host and tenant unit (or supported and supporting unit), HQ AFSOC/IG will also assign both a Corrective Action OPR and a Corrective Action OCR. A Corrective Action OCR also may be identified if a deficiency is cross functional and requires action by more than one organization within a unit.

2.7.1.10. <u>Closing Authority.</u> The deficiency closing authority (typically the wing commander or equivalent for minor deficiencies or the HQ AFSOC/IG for major and critical deficiencies). The closing authority is responsible for reviewing deficiency corrective actions for appropriateness prior to closure.

2.7.2. **External/ HHQ/Support Agency deficiencies.**

2.7.2.1. Deficiencies that involve hosts/tenants outside the inspected unit's chain-of-command, higher headquarters (HHQ), other MAJCOMs, or non-AF entities will be categorized as HHQ/Support Agency Deficiencies.

2.7.2.2. Deficiencies External to Inspected Unit. When the HQ AFSOC/IG team assigns a deficiency to an organization outside AFSOC, the inspecting team will notify the owning MAJCOM/IG of the deficiency (or SAF/IGI for HAF or non-AF deficiencies) and courtesy copy both the tenant and host base units. Once notified, the owning IG is responsible for tracking status and notifying the HQ AFSOC/IG when closed IAW AFI

90-201. In instances where the inspection involves associate units, coordination between the associated and associating MAJCOM/IGs on how deficiencies are assigned, assessed, and resolved will be essential to ensuring timely resolution.

2.7.3. **Reporting Instructions.** The inspected unit will provide an initial corrective action plans/matrix (spreadsheet) NLT 60 days after the final inspection report is published to the HQ AFSOC/IG Analysis Team (**AFSOC.IG.ANALYSIS@hurlburt.af.mil.**) The inspected unit will provide status updates on open deficiencies (those not fully corrected and closed) to HQ AFSOC/IGI quarterly by 31 Jan, 30 Apr, 31 Jul, and 31 Oct until all deficiencies are closed. The minimum information covered in the corrective action matrix consists of the open deficiencies and the estimated completion date for each.

2.7.4. **Deficiency corrective action procedures.**

2.7.4.1. The HQ AFSOC/IG will track all deficiencies and provide the inspected unit with reply instructions as part of the final report.

2.7.4.2. The AFSOC/IG, after coordinating review by the appropriate AFSOC FAM(s), will close all critical and significant unit-level and AFSOC-level deficiencies. These deficiencies will be inspected during the unit's next scheduled inspection.

2.7.4.3. The HQ AFSOC/IG will determine if Minor deficiencies assessed to the inspected unit will be closed at the unit-level or by the HQ AFSOC/IG. These deficiencies will be inspected during the unit's next scheduled inspection. Minor deficiencies assessed to the AFSOC-level will be closed by the HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.7.4.4. The HQ AFSOC/IG will forward all HAF-level actionable deficiencies to SAF/IGI for processing. SAF/IGI, after review and coordination by the responsible HAF functional(s), will close HAF-level deficiencies in collaboration with the HQ AFSOC/IG IAW AFI 90201.

2.7.4.5. AFSOC FAMs and the HQ AFSOC/IG will review corrective actions for appropriateness prior to closure when the HQ AFSOC/IG is the Closing Authority. Units may request assistance from the HQ AFSOC OPR to determine/develop corrective actions. Units may be required to provide problem solving documentation for these deficiencies.

2.7.4.6. Not in Compliance or Unsatisfactory Grade. The IG will conduct a reinspection of any graded area(s) found to be Not in Compliance for CIs or Unsatisfactory for ORIs once the unit has resolved and submitted a recommendation for closure to the IG for all deficiencies in the graded area(s). The re-inspection will be conducted NO EARLIER than 6 MONTHS after the initial inspection.

2.7.4.7. The unit will correct deficiencies for which they are identified as the Corrective Action OPR. Deficiencies will be inspected during the unit's next scheduled inspection.

2.7.4.8. The unit Corrective Action OPR will assign a deficiency code(s) and determine appropriate corrective action(s) for each deficiency as part of the deficiency corrective action process. Use deficiency codes from AFI 90201, Table 2.1., *Deficiency Codes and Explanations*. Units are encouraged to coordinate their corrective actions with the appropriate wing FAM and/or HQ AFSOC FAM identified as HQ AFSOC OPR.

2.7.4.9. Basic responsibility for problem solving and the corrective action process resides at the lowest appropriate command level; normally the Corrective Action OPR. Problem solving should be applied through the AF eight-step problem solving model as outlined in the AFSO21 Playbook (or SAF/SO approved publication) to assist in identifying root causes and solutions to deficiencies.

2.7.4.10. For each deficiency, use the AFSOC Form 18, *Deficiency Corrective Action Staffing*, to document the deficiency code(s) and corrective action(s) and route the deficiency for closure with the Closing Authority identified in the deficiency write-up.

2.7.5. **AFSOC Form 18,** *Deficiency Corrective Action Staffing*, **Procedures** (corrective action process).

2.7.5.1. The AFSOC Form 18 will be used to describe deficiency corrective actions and coordinate closure.

2.7.5.2. The AFSOC Form 18 actions. The HQ AFSOC/IGI inspection support manager (ISM) will manage completion of Section I of AFSOC Form 18 with deficiency information from the inspection report. The ISM will also manage completion of the Section II, Corrective Action OPR (office symbol only), and all subsequent coordinating offices in Section III (office symbols only). The coordinating process will normally follow the chain of command until the highest commander in the inspected unit is reached. The next coordinating officer will be the AFSOC Director for the deficiency OPR. The final coordinating officer will be the HQ AFSOC/IGI for Minor deficiencies or the HQ AFSOC/IG for Significant and Critical deficiencies. For example, the lowest level deficiency action officer in section II would normally be a squadron commander. The coordinating officers in section III would then be the corresponding group commander, the wing commander, the appropriate AFSOC director (i.e. HQ AFSOC/A1), then the HQ AFSOC/IG. For minor findings closed by the inspected unit, the HQ AFSOC/IGI is for acknowledgment only (for tracking purposes).

2.7.5.3. Units will designate a Corrective Action Coordinating POC(s) to facilitate coordination of corrective action plans and AFSOC Form 18 processing within the unit and between the unit and HQ AFSOC/IG. The Corrective Action Coordinating POC is normally the wing IG or XP, for units without an IG or XP, the inspected unit executive officer (or other individual designated by the unit).

2.7.5.4. The HQ AFSOC/IGI Analysis Team will forward all AFSOC Forms 18 and handling instructions to the inspected unit for processing.

2.7.5.5. Unit Corrective Action OPRs Form 18 actions. The deficiency Corrective Action OPR documents the corrective action(s) accomplished and identifies the deficiency cause code(s) from Table 2.1. in Section II and digitally signs the Form 18.

2.7.5.6. The unit Corrective Action Coordinating POC(s) forwards all completed Forms 18 (signed by the unit CC) to the HQ AFSOC/IG Analysis Team (**AFSOC.IG.ANALYSIS@hurlburt.af.mil**). The HQ AFSOC/IG Analysis Team will coordinate all Forms 18 within Headquarters AFSOC to close each deficiency.

2.7.6. The deficiency codes listed in Table 2.1. apply to all inspections listed in this AFI.

Table 2.1. Deficiency Codes and Explanations.

Category	Deficiency Code Sub-Categories
Equipment/ Tools	Adequacy of equipment/tools considered causal factor of deficiency.
	EQ1 Equipment Reliability
	EQ1.1 Inadequate equipment maintenance
	EQ1.2 Equipment defect or design flaw
	EQ2 Inadequate/Unavailable Equipment (not resource driven)
	EQ2.1 Base-Level support inadequate
	EQ2.2 HHQ-Level support inadequate
	EQ2.3 Outside/external-agency support inadequate
	EQ3 Equipment/Tool Accountability inadequate
	EQ4 Other Equipment/Tools Issue (describe)
Guidance	Existing guidance considered causal factor of deficiency. Guidance cited can be any authorized source IAW AFI 33-360, *Publications and Forms Management*. If "GD" cause code is used, the guidance cited will be provided to OPR.
	GD1 Complexity of Guidance
	GD2 No/Inadequate Guidance
	GD3 Incorrect/Conflicting Guidance
	GD4 Outdated/Non-current Guidance
	GD4 Other Guidance Issue (describe)
Leadership/ Supervision	Leadership or supervision considered a causal factor in the deficiency.
	LS1 – Inadequate Leadership/Supervision:
	LS1.1 Supervisor/leadership involvement insufficient
	LS1.2 Ineffective communication
	LS1.3 Decision making process ineffective
	LS2 Work Environment
	LS2.1 Equal Opportunity (EO) environment not supported
	LS2.2 Workforce effectiveness limited by existing human relations climate
	LS2.3 Physical working conditions not conducive to productivity
	LS2.4 Other work environment issue (describe)
	LS3 Use of Resources
	LS3.1 Unit incorrectly prioritized available resources
	LS3.2 Unit failed to adequately program resources
	LS3.3 Other supervisory resource issue (describe)
	LS4 Other Leadership/Supervision issue (describe)

Category	Deficiency Code Sub-Categories
Resource Shortfall	Lack of resources considered causal factor of deficiency.

	RS1 Funding Shortfall
	    RS1.1 Program shortfall (Air Force level)
	    RS1.2 Program shortfall (MAJCOM level)
	    RS1.3 Program shortfall (wing/installation level)
	    RS1.4 Parent unit withheld funding (applies to any unit through which funds are allocated/ distributed superior to the unit in question)
	    RS1.5 Other funding shortfall (describe)

	RS2 Personnel Shortfall
	    RS2.1 Assigned personnel less than accepted CONUS/OCONUS manning averages
	    RS2.2 Insufficient personnel due to TDY/deployment
	    RS2.3 Insufficient personnel due to medical profile
	    RS2.4 Insufficient personnel due to validated installation augmentee requirements shortfall
	    RS2.5 Awaiting security clearance
	    RS2.6 Other personnel shortfall (describe)

	RS3 Equipment Shortfall
	    RS3.1 Awaiting resupply
	    RS3.2 Not requisitioned
	    RS3.3 Maintenance
	    RS3.4 Deployed
	    RS3.5 Other equipment shortfall (describe)

	RS4 Other Resource Shortfall Issue (describe)
Safety	Safety deviation considered causal factor of deficiency.

	SE1 Flight Safety Program Management / Implementation
	   SE1.1 Flight Safety Program Management Inadequate
	   SE1.2 Selected aspects of flight safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	   SE1.3 Flight Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	   SE1.4 Other flight safety program management issue (describe)

	SE2 Flight - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE3 Flight - Other Safety Deviation (describe)

	SE4 Ground Safety Program Management / Implementation
	   SE4.1 Ground Safety Program Management Inadequate
	   SE4.2 Selected aspects of ground safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	   SE4.3 Ground Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	   SE4.4 Other ground safety program management issue (describe)

	SE5 Ground - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE6 Ground - Other Safety Deviation (describe)

Category	Deficiency Code Sub-Categories

	SE7 Space Safety Program Management / Implementation
	  SE7.1 Space Safety Program Management Inadequate
	  SE7.2 Selected aspects of space safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	  SE7.3 Space Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	  SE7.4 Other space safety program management issue (describe)

	SE8 Space - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE9 Space - Other Safety Deviation (describe)

	SE10 Weapons Safety Program Management / Implementation
	  SE10.1 Weapons Safety Program Management Inadequate
	  SE10.2 Selected aspects of weapons safety program not effectively implemented (describe)
	  SE10.3 Weapons Safety Supervisory support inadequate
	  SE10.4 Other weapons safety program management issue (describe)

	SE11 Weapons - Personal Error / Safety Deviation (describe)
	SE12 Weapons - Other Safety Deviation (describe)
	Training considered a causal factor in the deficiency.

Training	**TR1 Training Program Management**
	  TR1.1 Training program management inadequate
	  TR1.2 Training guidance/policy/procedures inadequate
	  TR1.3 Training oversight inadequate
	  TR1.4 Training support inadequate
	  TR1.5 Controls/metrics of training process/progress inadequate
	  TR1.6 Other training program management issue (describe)

	TR2 Training Program Implementation
	  TR2.1 Initial qualification training inadequate
	  TR2.2 Hands-on training inadequate
	  TR2.3 Upgrade/certification training inadequate
	  TR2.4 Training supervisory support inadequate
	  TR2.5 Training evaluation tools inadequate
	  TR2.6 Training documentation inadequate
	  TR2.7 Other training program implementation issue (describe)

	TR3 Personnel Error
	  TR3.1 Error committed despite adequate training & guidance
	  TR3.2 Inexperience
	  TR3.3 Other personnel error (describe)

	TR4 Other Training Issue (describe)
Other	Other deviation considered causal factor of deficiency (used when no other Cause Code adequately describes the nature of the deficiency). Clear text will be used.
	OT1 Explain in Clear Text

2.8. AF Special Interest Item (SII) Program.

2.8.1. Purpose. SIIs provide a means to focus management attention and/or gather data to evaluate the status of specific programs and conditions in the field requiring AF senior leader attention. SIIs are used by HAF functional staffs to make policy adjustments and enhance decision making. Active SIIs should not exceed more than five at any given time.

2.8.2. Responsibilities.

2.8.2.1. SAF/IGI, IAW AFI 90-201, manages the AF SII program by coordinating AF SII topic proposals, obtaining SAF/IG approval, distributes approved AF SII to MAJCOM/IGs, compiles and forwards SII data to the sponsoring agency.

2.8.2.2. SII Sponsors. Only HAF functionals may sponsor SIIs IAW AFI 90-201. Proposed SII topics may be initiated at any level but must be submitted by the appropriate HAF functional to SAF/IGI at **safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil.** Submit SII topic proposals in the format provided on the SAF/IGI Community of Practice (CoP).

2.8.2.3. HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.8.2.3.1. SII Inspections.   Inspect all applicable active SIIs during formal inspections. Units need only be inspected and reported once during the SII's active period. For AFSOC gained units, the HQ AFSOC/IG will coordinate with owning IG prior to conducting SII inspections on gained units. Document the results of SII inspections as a separate section of the final inspection report.

2.8.2.3.2. SII Reports. Consolidate SII inspection results and report quarterly to SAF/IGI at **safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil.**   Provide a summary of units inspected, locations, dates of inspection, and electronic extract of the SII portion of the final inspection report. Include unit SII self inspection results NLT the third quarter report. IG remarks are important to the SII process and should be annotated IAW specific instructions attached to each SII.

2.8.2.4. Wing/Unit. Obtain SII information via HQ AFSOC/IG portal page or SAF/IGI CoP. Wings/units not inspected during the active period of an SII will conduct a one-time self inspection and report results to HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.8.3. Rating. If rating is required as part of the SII, the scale will be specified in the SII instructions.

2.8.4. Command Interest Items (CII). The HQ AFSOC/IG will ensure that AFSOC CIIs do not conflict with AF SIIs.

2.9. IG Inspector Eligibility, Training and Certification.

2.9.1. Eligibility. Officer inspectors should be senior captains (captains with more than 7 years commissioned service) or above. Enlisted inspectors must be 7-level or above and be SNCOs (TSgts will be considered on a case-by-case basis only). All inspectors must have knowledge, experience, and maturity commensurate with the duties required to conduct inspections.

2.9.2. Mandatory Training. All IG team members will complete the USAF Inspectors Course within 90 days of assignment to the HQ AFSOC/IG. While designed and required for newly assigned MAJCOM/IG team members, other HQ AFSOC inspectors and Exercise

Evaluation Team (EET) members may attend on a space-available basis. Additional information regarding the Inspectors Course may be obtained at the SAF/IGI CoP.

2.9.2.1. HQ AFSOC/IGI will submit course requests for the upcoming fiscal year to SAF/IGI NLT 01 September using the course request template on the SAF/IGI CoP.

2.9.2.2. HQ AFSOC/IG-Specific Training. HQ AFSOC/IGI will develop and provide all required specialized team, functional area, host-nation, and MAJCOM-specific training.

2.9.2.3. For required inspector training prior to assessing contractor functions see paragraph 2.1.10.3.

2.9.3. Recurring Training. All AFSOC Inspectors will re-accomplish mandatory training NLT 48 months after certification.

2.9.4. Certification. HQ AFSOC/IG, at a minimum, will certify all inspectors. Inspector certification to conduct inspections requires completion of mandatory and MAJCOM-specific training, as well as a field observation. Field observation requirement is a minimum of one over-the-shoulder inspection by a certified inspector.

2.10. Inspection Report Handling.

2.10.1. Classification. Review all reports prior to publication to ensure they are properly classified and marked IAW DOD 5200.1-R, and AFI 31-401, *Information Security Program Management*.

2.10.2. Report Marking. At a minimum, mark unclassified inspection reports "For Official Use Only (FOUO)" IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement.

2.10.3. Releasability. AF inspection reports, related materials and drafts are official government documents and the AF controls their distribution. DOD members, DOD contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted access to inspection reports IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement. Non-DOD parties requesting inspection reports should be referred to the appropriate Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) office.

2.10.3.1. Release Determination Authority. Before release outside DOD, FOIA offices will receive a final release determination from SAF/IGI for any inspection reports.

2.10.3.2. Release Within DOD. HQ AFSOC/IG is authorized to release inspection reports, in whole or in part, within DOD. Courtesy copy SAF/IGI on any release outside the AF.

2.10.3.3. Release of Inspection Summary to Media. An inspection summary may be released for inclusion in response to media queries or for internal information. The summary will be limited to the overall rating, inspection process/definition and, if desired, personal comments by the commander (e.g. general laudatory comments, perception of inspection process). The published summary will not contain detailed information (e.g. sub-area ratings, a list of individuals recognized by the IG, specific deficiencies, or specific ratings for inspection criteria).

2.10.3.4. Releasability Statement. The following statement must appear on the cover and each page of the report as well as in any transmission, presentation, or document containing protected IG material: "*For Official Use Only. This report may be protected from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. Do not release or publish, in*

whole or in part, outside official DOD channels without express approval of the Director, SAF/IGI.” Include similar statements on reports of inspections conducted jointly with inspection teams from other DOD agencies.

2.10.3.5. Inspection Outbrief. Unit outbriefs are considered a version of the inspection report and consequently fall within releasability restrictions. DOD members, DOD contractors, consultants, and grantees are permitted to attend inspection outbriefs at the discretion of the installation/wing commander. Community leaders and general public are not authorized access to inspection results, to include outbriefs, except as permitted by IAW DOD Regulation 5400.7/Air Force Supplement (see paragraph 2.9.3.)

2.10.4. Distribution. MAJCOM/IGs will send an UNCLAS email to **safigi.workflow@pentagon.af.mil** or a CLASSIFIED (up to SECRET) email to **safigi@af.pentagon.smil.mil**:

2.10.4.1. NLT 15 days of IG team departing the inspected unit, send an executive summary of the inspection to include overall rating, MGA ratings, and all Critical deficiencies.

2.10.4.2. NLT 30 days of IG team departing inspected unit, send an electronic version of the final IG inspection report. If the inspection report is produced in IGEMS, sending an electronic version is not required. Availability of reports on AFSOC internet sites does not satisfy this requirement.

2.11. Gatekeeper Functions.

2.11.1. AF Gatekeeper. IAW AFI 90-201, *AFIA Gatekeeper*, in coordination with SAF/IGI, serves as the AF focal point for notification of HAF and non-AF assessments and relays visit notifications. AFIA Gatekeeper assists MAJCOM Gatekeepers in de-conflicting schedules as required.

2.11.2. The HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper is the overall AFSOC Gatekeeper. The HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper serves as the focal point for notification of visits designed to inspect, assess, or evaluate AFSOC units. The HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper assists in de-confliction of visits to AFSOC units or AFSOC gained units with owning MAJCOM Gatekeeper, as required. The AFSOC Gatekeeper does not have authority to deny access to inspectors/auditors from agencies outside AFSOC. If required, the AFIA Gatekeeper will assist with resolving conflicts.

2.11.2.1. HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper will submit an annual inspection schedule update to AFIA Gatekeeper NLT the last day of each quarter. Quarterly, the AFIA Gatekeeper will forward a consolidated inspection schedule to MAJCOM/IGs, SAF/IGI, and AFSC/SEW. HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper will distribute inspection schedules on a need-to-know basis.

2.11.2.2. HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper will update and forward the 6-month Gatekeeper calendar for the AFSOC/CC staff meeting by the third Thursday of each month.

2.11.2.3. HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper will brief HQ AFSOC/IG during weekly staff meetings.

2.11.2.4. HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper will update the master Gatekeeper long-term calendar located on the unclassified HQ AFSOC/IG SharePoint site.

2.11.3. Directorate/unit Gatekeepers.   Directorate/unit Gatekeepers will establish a Gatekeeper program to de-conflict inspections, evaluations, and audits to minimize impact to units. Units listed in Table 2.2. will designate a primary/alternate Gatekeeper and forward updated appointment letters to HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper.

Table 2.2. Units That Will Designate a Primary/Alternate Gatekeeper.

All HQ AFSOC Directorates	720 STG	107 WF
23 AF	AFSOTC	146 WF
1 SOW	123 STS	181 WF
27 SOW	125 STS	150 SOF
193 SOW	209 CES	
919 SOW	280 CBCS	
352 SOG		
353 SOG		

2.11.3.1. AFSOC directorate/unit Gatekeepers do not have the authority to deny access to inspectors/auditors from agencies outside AFSOC. If required, AFIA and HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeepers will assist with resolving conflicts.

2.11.3.2. AFSOC directorate/unit Gatekeepers will update their leadership at least monthly of upcoming visits.

2.11.3.3. AFSOC directorate/unit Gatekeepers will review at least monthly the HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper calendar and forward updates or discrepancies to HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper.

2.11.3.4. AFSOC directorate/unit Gatekeepers will notify the HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper upon knowledge of a planned visit meeting the criteria identified in paragraph 2.11.2.2. Gatekeepers will submit a consolidated monthly report to HQ AFSOC/IG Gatekeeper of all upcoming visits with the following information:

2.11.3.4.1. Location and unit(s) to be visited.

2.11.3.4.2. Visiting Agency with POC and phone number.

2.11.3.4.3. Purpose of visit and number of visitors.

2.11.3.4.4. Start and end dates.

2.11.3.5. Unit Gatekeepers assigned to tenant units will comply with HQ AFSOC and host-base Gatekeeper reporting procedures.

2.11.3.6. Unit Gatekeepers with host-base responsibilities will coordinate with non-AFSOC tenant units of upcoming visits that could impact daily operations.

2.11.4. The following types of visits/inspections will be tracked by all AFSOC Gatekeepers, as well as, any other inspections requiring leadership visibility:

2.11.4.1. Air Traffic Services Evaluation Program (ATSEP).

2.11.4.2. Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation Visit (ASEV).

2.11.4.3. Audits.

2.11.4.4. Contracting Management Reviews.

2.11.4.5. Compliance Inspection.

2.11.4.6. Energy, Environmental, Safety and Occupational Health Compliance Management Program (EESOHCAMP).

2.11.4.7. Health Surety Inspection (HSI).

2.11.4.8. Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program (IAAP).

2.11.4.9. Command Cyber Readiness Inspection (CCRI).

2.11.4.10. Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP).

2.11.4.11. Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI).

2.11.4.12. Readiness Observation Visit (ROV).

2.11.4.13. Staff Assistance Visit (SAV).

2.11.4.14. Intelligence Standardization and Evaluation Visit (ISEV).

2.11.4.15. State Regulatory Inspections.

2.12. Best Practices. Air Force Best Practices guidance is contained within AFH 38-210, *Air Force Best Practices Clearinghouse*, and managed by the Air Force Manpower Agency. Although inspection team leads may validate Best Practices, the expectation is that units will have previously submitted Best Practice candidates IAW AFH 38-210. It is AFSOC/IG policy to only consider Best Practice candidates previously submitted IAW AFH 38-210.

2.13. Observing AFSOC Inspections. AFSOC units desiring to send personnel to observe an inspection must obtain permission from the unit receiving the ORI and inform HQ AFSOC/IG of the names of all approved observers. Other MAJCOMs desiring to send personnel to observe an inspection must obtain permission from HQ AFSOC/IG. HQ AFSOC/IG and the inspected unit reserve the right to limit the total number of observers. Units/MAJCOMs will submit their request via message to HQ AFSOC/IG and the inspected unit. The message will contain each individual's name, rank, security clearance, line badge number, SSAN, and justification. Units requesting observers will:

2.13.1. Be within one year of their inspection target month.

2.13.2. Submit requests NLT two months prior to the scheduled start date of the inspection.

2.13.3. Normally limit requests to no more than two observers.

2.13.4. Inspection observer must obtain approval from the responsible headquarters, by message or email, prior to submission to HQ AFSOC/IG.

2.13.5. Inspection observers are responsible for funding, billeting, transportation, and per diem requirements. Inspected unit is responsible for any requirements generated by the observers.

Chapter 3

COMPLIANCE INSPECTION (CI)

3.1. Execution. CIs are conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas that are critical or important to the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact. At a minimum, CIs will be conducted on all wing/wing equivalent units (over-seas Special Operations Groups) at an interval of no more than 60 months. AFSOC/CC approval is required to exceed the 60-month inspection interval. The HQ AFSOC/IG will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the inspection interval and will provide anticipated inspection date(s).

3.1.1. The HQ AFSOC/IG intends to conduct CIs approximately every three years (four years for AFSOC-gained ANG units) and not normally in conjunction with an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI). However, the AFSOC/CC can direct a CI of active units at anytime. HQ AFSOC/IG will coordinate visits of AFSOC-gained ANG units with National Guard Bureau (NGB) IG and the unit prior to the visit. AF Reserve Command (AFRC) conducts CIs of AFSOC-gained AF Reserve units. The CI schedule is published in the HQ AFSOC/IG Inspection/Gatekeeper calendar.

3.1.2. Applicable Air Force SIIs, AFSOC CIIs, and ANG CIIs will be assessed during CIs, and will be incorporated into the CI report.

3.1.3. AFSOC-specified compliance MGAs and Sub-areas. AFSOC directors may propose additional areas for inspection using the sample request at Attachment 3. The directorate will provide an inspection checklist for the proposed additional compliance MGAs and Sub-areas. All approved AFSOC-specific compliance areas will be included in this chapter.

3.1.4. Inspection Out-brief. The IG will deliver the final inspection report and conduct an out-brief with the commander of the inspected unit and essential unit personnel upon completion of the inspection.

3.2. CI Rating. Three-tier rating (e.g., IN COMPLIANCE / IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS / NOT IN COMPLIANCE) will be used to assess each compliance area. It is not the intent of this inspection to specifically rate organizations; the intent is to rate programmatic compliance.

3.3. AF Compliance MGAs and Sub-areas. Air Force Compliance MGAs represent key processes, procedures, and requirements based on public law, executive orders, DOD, AF, MAJCOM, and ARC directives and instructions. AFSOC may supplement the requirements of AF MGAs and add AFSOC-specific MGAs. Air Force and AFSOC MGAs are organized according to the AFSOC functional policy origin/oversight for each MGA. It is not the intent of this instruction to inspect units according to the numbered Air Staff construct but rather to better align inspection requirements with functional responsibilities and guidance. MGAs are delineated with a **bold font title** and sub-areas are delineated with <u>underline</u> in this chapter. AFSOC supplemental Compliance MGAs are delineated with **(AFSOC)** following the MGA title.

3.3.1. **AFSOC/A1 - Manpower, Personnel, and Services.**

3.3.1.1. **Equal Opportunity (EO) Program. AFI 36-2706,** *Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program.*

3.3.1.1.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of military and civilian EO complaint processing procedures (formal, informal, and commander worked issues).

3.3.1.1.2. Evaluate managerial and supervisory enforcement of AF EO policies and procedures.

3.3.1.1.3. Evaluate human relations education and training.

3.3.1.1.4. Evaluate organizational climate assessments.

3.3.1.2. **Force Support**.

3.3.1.2.1. Mortuary Affairs. Assess unit mortuary affairs planning and support (to include plans, memorandum of understanding, support agreements, and case files).

3.3.1.2.2. Appropriated Fund Food Service Operations. Assess appropriated fund food service operations (to include cash control, contract management, subsistence accountability, and adherence to sanitation standards).

3.3.1.2.3. Lodging Operations. Assess lodging operations (to include cash control; financial management; adherence to Air Force furnishing, amenities, and service standards; and quarters' utilization).

3.3.1.2.4. Fitness Facility Operations. Assess fitness facility operations (to include cash control, adherence to equipment and operation standards, and evaluation of programs).

3.3.1.2.5. "Dram Shop" Training. Assess "Dram Shop" theory of liability training IAW AFI 34219, *Alcoholic Beverage Program.*

3.3.1.2.6. Customer Service. Assess Customer Service (includes Individual Newcomer Treatment and Orientation (INTRO), in-processing, Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS), ID cards, and adverse actions).

3.3.1.2.7. Force Management. Assess Force Management (includes leave, duty status, Unit Personnel Management Roster (UPMR), evaluations, and decorations).

3.3.1.2.8. Career Development (includes assignments, separations, retirements, reenlistments, and promotions).

3.3.1.2.9. Personnel Program Support to Unit Commanders. Assess personnel program support to unit commanders (includes Information Technology (IT) support, communications and advisory products/services).

3.3.1.2.10. Prime Readiness in Base Service (RIBS). Assess Prime Readiness in Base Service (RIBS) training and equipment accountability.

3.3.1.2.11. Resource Management. Assess Resource Management to include personnel systems support.

3.3.1.2.12. Installation Personnel Readiness. Assess Installation Personnel Readiness functions.

3.3.1.2.13. <u>Program Manager (PM)</u>.   Assess Program Manager (PM) ability to manage personnel programs (includes evaluations, decorations, fitness, and readiness indicators) in support of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), unit commanders, and IMA Unit Reserve Coordinators (URCs).

3.3.1.2.14. <u>Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrator (BIMAA).</u> Assess Base Individual Mobilization Augmentee Administrator (BIMAA) ability to manage personnel programs (includes evaluations, decorations, fitness, and readiness indicators) in support of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), unit commanders, and IMA Unit Reserve Coordinators (URCs).

3.3.1.3. **Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR).** Ref DODI 6495.02, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures*; AFPD 36-60, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program;* AFI 36-6001, *Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program.*

3.3.1.3.1. Evaluate if essential training tasks identified in DODI 6495.02 and AFI 36-6001 are conducted for Victim Advocates (VA), Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC), healthcare personnel, law enforcement, criminal investigators, judge advocates, and chaplains.

3.3.1.3.2. Inspect initial and periodic training.

3.3.1.4. Suicide Prevention Program**.**   Evaluate Suicide Prevention Program IAW AFI 44-154, *Suicide and Violence Prevention Education and Training.*

3.3.1.5. **Trafficking In Persons (TIP)**.   Ref DODI 2200.01, and AFI 36-2921, *Combating Trafficking in Persons (CTIP).*

3.3.1.5.1. Assess unit compliance with CTIP training, which applies to all DOD military and civilian personnel.

3.3.1.5.2. Assess unit compliance with CTIP training requirement verification prior to all deployments.

3.3.1.5.3. Evaluate unit TIP awareness program, to include dissemination of local installation CTIP policy letter and local actions to increase CTIP awareness through a variety of public access methods. These methods may include, but are not limited to: hotline posters, base newspaper, commander's channel, commanders' call, handouts, and newcomer's briefings/orientation programs.

3.3.1.6. **Transition Assistance Programs (TAP).** Applies to all active duty personnel with more than 180 days of active service, all active duty personnel separated for disability regardless of length of active service, and all reserve component members (Reserve and Guard) demobilized after 180 days or more of active duty in support of a contingency. Ref DODD 1332.35, *Transition Assistance for Military Personnel* and AFI 36-3009*, Airman and Family Readiness Centers.*

3.3.1.6.1. Assess the unit's compliance with DODD 1332.35, sub paragraphs 5.4.1. through 5.4.6.

3.3.1.6.2. HQ AFSOC/IGI will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 10 January, a consolidated report of inspected units' compliance.

3.3.1.7. **Voting Assistance Program (VAP).** Applicable to AD, AFRC, and applicable to ANG units when mobilized. Ref DODD 1000.04, *Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP),* and AFI 36-3107, *Voting Assistance Program.*

3.3.1.7.1. Assess the unit's compliance with rules and procedures outlined in DOD and AF policy posted on SAF/IGI CoP.

3.3.1.7.2. HQ AFSOC/IG will forward, to SAF/IG NLT 10 January, a consolidated report of VAPs assessments answering the DOD mandated questions.

3.3.1.8. **Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).** (AFI 90-201, Para. 3.3.10.1., *A10 (Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration)*)

3.3.1.8.1. HQ AFSOC/A1 will **i**nspect applicable portions of the PRP at non-nuclear-capable units. At non-nuclear units, the PRP will be inspected to assess the overall effectiveness of the unit's implementation of the PRP IAW DOD 5210.42-R, and AFMAN 10-3902, *Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).* This inspection will focus on PRP screening (administrative qualification and certification processes), continuous evaluation, training, and management.

3.3.1.8.2. Inspectors will use applicable sections of the inspection checklist found on the AF checklist site (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/).

3.3.1.8.3. If the program is managed by a recently-activated Force Support Squadron (FSS), inspect but do not rate the program until the FSS full operational capability (FOC) exceeds 120 days.

3.3.1.9. Base Training & Education (AFSOC). AFI 36-2201V3, *Air Force Training Program on the Job Training Administration.*

3.3.1.10. Manpower & Organization **(AFSOC).** AFI 38-201, *Determining Manpower Requirements;* AFI 38-204*, Programming USAF Manpower;* AFI 38-205*, Manpower & Quality Readiness and Contingency Management.*

3.3.2. **AFSOC/A2 - Intelligence.**

3.3.2.1. **Intelligence.**

3.3.2.1.1. Force Protection. Ensure personnel have been designated to support force protection missions, to include security forces (SF), integrated defense, and AFOSI counter-threat operations. If the base/unit does not have an organic intelligence capability, ensure processes/procedures are in place to meet the commander's, Antiterrorism Officer's and security forces' intelligence requirements. IAW AFI 14-119, *Intelligence Support to Force Protection* (FP).

3.3.2.1.2. Assess unit/installation processes/procedures for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating threat information/warnings.

3.3.2.2. **Intelligence Oversight.** Ref Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*; DOD 5240.1-R, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*; AF Policy Directive (AFPD) 14-1, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning, Resources, and Operations*; AFI 14-104, *Oversight of Intelligence Activities*. (OPR: AF/A2RR)

3.3.2.2.1. Assess compliance with the rules and procedures pertaining to collecting, retaining, and disseminating intelligence on US persons and the adequacy of Intelligence Oversight programs. Use AFI 14-104 and its associated inspection checklist.

3.3.2.2.2. HQ AFSOC/IG will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 2nd day following the end of each calendar year quarter, a consolidated report of all inspections of Intelligence Oversight.

3.3.2.2.3. HQ AFSOC/IG will forward, to SAF/IGI NLT 5 January, the end-of-year report including a list of self inspections conducted for that calendar year (see AFI 14-104 for specifics).

3.3.3. **AFSOC/A3 - Operations.**

3.3.3.1. **Aircrew Protection.**

3.3.3.1.1. Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) Training. Evaluate unit's AFE training program to include use of performance-based evaluations for all aircrew members. AFI 11-301, *Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) Program.*

3.3.3.1.2. AFE equipment. Assess AFE equipment availability, serviceability, configuration, accountability, and management. AFI 11-301, *Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) Program.*

3.3.3.1.3. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE). Evaluate the unit's Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) program IAW AFI 16-1301, *Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Program*.

3.3.3.2. **Command Post (CP).**

3.3.3.2.1. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). Assess CP procedures in Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) IAW AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System.*

3.3.3.2.2. Operational Reporting. Assess CP procedures for building and transmitting reports IAW AFI 10-206, *Operational Reporting*.

3.3.3.2.3. CP Procedures. Assess CP procedures and programs IAW AFI 10-207, *Command Posts*, for functional area responsibilities, console operations requirements, mission management/monitoring, training, testing, certification, rescue coordination, facility requirements, systems and status reporting, and CP security and entry control.

3.3.3.3. **Information and Cyberspace Operations.**

3.3.3.3.1. Information Operations (IO). Evaluate IO Programs IAW AFPD 10-7, Information Operations and all 10-7 series AFIs.

3.3.3.3.2. Operations Security (OPSEC). Evaluate OPSEC Program IAW AFI 10-701, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

3.3.3.3.3. Military Deception. Evaluate military deception program IAW AFI 10-704, *Military Deception Program.*

3.3.4. **AFSOC/A4 - Logistics Directorate.**

3.3.4.1. **Logistics.**

3.3.4.1.1. When a HQ AFSOC/A4 Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) inspection is conducted in conjunction with, or within six months of, a scheduled AFSOC CI, credit will be granted for logistics-specific inspection graded areas contained in this section that are evaluated by the LCAP.

3.3.4.1.2. Deployment Training. Evaluate deployment training for deployment work center personnel and unit deployment managers in aircraft load planning, cargo processing/ handling/loading, passenger processing, and use of integrated deployment systems for updating execution and movement data supporting intransit visibility. AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution.*

3.3.4.1.3. Vehicle Management. Assess the maintenance and management of vehicle assets. AFI 23-302*, Vehicle Management.*

3.3.4.1.4. Hazardous Material Management. Evaluate Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) management procedures, processes, and safeguards (Vehicle Maintenance, Aerial Port, Shipment/Receipt). AFI 32-7086, *Hazardous Material Management*.

3.3.4.1.5. Personal Property and Passenger Movements. Assess personal property and passenger movements for compliance with entitlements and regulations. DOD 4500.9-R, Part IV, *Personal Property;* JFTR V1*, Joint Federal Travel Regulations;* AFI 24-101*, Passenger Movement.*

3.3.4.1.6. Stock Control Management. Evaluate Stock Control management processes (to include the Global Logistic Support Center, if applicable) used to support weapon system spares and the base missions. AFMAN 23-110V2P2, *Organization and Responsibilities;* AFJMAN 23-21*, Reporting Of Supply Discrepancies.*

3.3.4.1.7. Repair Cycle Management. Assess Repair Cycle Management to ensure tracking, status accuracy, and turn-in methods for all unserviceable assets in maintenance, including the execution of AF weapon system warranty processing.

3.3.4.1.8. Management of Mission Capable (MICAP) Requisitions and Reporting. Evaluate management of mission capable (MICAP) requisitions and reporting system processes (to include the Logistic Support Center if applicable).

3.3.4.1.9. Readiness Spares Packages and Mission Support Kits. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of the Readiness Spares Packages and Mission Support Kits.

3.3.4.1.10. Equipment Accountability (AFSOC). Ensure accountability of in use equipment is properly maintained and equipment custodians are trained and conducting their duties.

3.3.4.1.11. Mobility Assets. Assess the physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of mobility assets to include assets decentralized throughout the wing (e.g., mobility bags and weapons).

3.3.4.1.12. Facility and Equipment Inspection and Preventative Maintenance. Assess facility and equipment inspection and preventative maintenance programs.

3.3.4.1.13. Fuels.   Assess confined space, hazardous communication training/awareness, environmental compliance practices pertaining to fuel servicing operations, receipts, transfers, and inventory management.

3.3.4.1.14. Fuels (cont).   Evaluate Fuels Management ability to train, maintain, receive, store, issue, and account for quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants in a safe and timely manner.

3.3.4.1.15. War Reserve Materiel (WRM). Assess War Reserve Materiel (WRM) management.

3.3.4.1.16. In   Garrison/Expeditionary   Site   Plan.   Assess   the   In Garrison/Expeditionary Site Plan process.

3.3.4.1.17. Deployment Planning. Assess the base's deployment planning process to ensure a reviews of all deployment-related documentation, e.g., OPLAN /CONPLAN Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) taskings, AEF Reporting Tool (ART) data, Unit Type Code (UTC) Availability (formerly AFWUS), the all-forces TPFDD for equipment and related UTC taskings, and Global Command and Control System (GCCS) Classified Newsgroups.

3.3.4.1.18. Support Agreements. Evaluate unit's Support Agreement processes.

3.3.4.1.19. Wood Packaging Material (WPM).   Evaluate compliance with Wood Packaging Material (WPM) inspection and reporting requirements.

3.3.4.1.20. Shipping and Receipt of Arms, Ammunition and Explosive (AA&E) and Classified Cargo. Assess Arms, Ammunition and Explosive (AA&E) and classified cargo shipping and receipt procedures to ensure proper document preparation, assignment of Transportation Protective Services (TPS), shipment reporting and material handling.

3.3.4.1.21. Shipment Records. Evaluate maintenance and disposition of shipment records (e.g., Bills of Lading, Reports of Shipments, Discrepancy Reports).

3.3.4.2. **Munitions (Conventional).**

3.3.4.2.1. Munitions Maintenance.   Evaluate Munitions Maintenance to ensure assigned missiles, conventional munitions, and support equipment are inspected, maintained and serviced IAW established policy and technical guidance.

3.3.4.2.2. Conventional Munitions Serviceability and Product Assurance. Evaluate Conventional Munitions Serviceability and Product Assurance to assess condition of the munitions stockpile to reliably support safe and effective air and ground operations for both training and combat missions. Key focus elements are munitions reliability, periodic surveillance inspections, specific event inspections (i.e., receipt, shipping, special, pre- or postuse inspections) to ensure fielded munitions systems serviceability. Additionally assess that flight and element training programs provide personnel capable of performing mission functions.

3.3.4.2.3. <u>Munitions Accountability</u>. Evaluate Munitions Accountability to assess effectiveness of management controls for munitions assets, accuracy of accountable and auditable munitions transactions records, and management of munitions allocations, stock levels, inventories, requisition, and disposition. Specifically assess the Munitions Accountable Systems Officer's (MASO) compliance with accounting processes.

3.3.4.2.4. <u>Munitions Systems</u>. Evaluate the Munitions Systems functions as it pertains to planning, scheduling, controlling and directing munitions activities to include processing of accountable transactions in Combat Ammunition System (CAS) and ensuring established security measures are implemented.

3.3.5. **AFSOC/A5/8/9 Plans, Programs, Requirements, and Assessments.** TBD.

3.3.6. **AFSOC/A6 - Communications and Information.**

3.3.6.1. **Communications and Information.**

3.3.6.1.1. <u>Training to Support Mission Critical Communication Systems.</u> Evaluate training to support mission critical communication systems.

3.3.6.1.2. <u>Base Communication Infrastructure</u>. Assess the planning, configuration control, physical infrastructure/medium, management, maintenance, and security of the base's communication infrastructure.

3.3.6.1.3. <u>Spectrum Management Program</u>. Evaluate an installation's Spectrum Management Program.

3.3.6.1.4. <u>Command and Control (C2) Systems Maintenance.</u> Evaluate command and control (C2) systems maintenance.

3.3.6.1.5. <u>Knowledge Operations</u>. Evaluate Knowledge Operations Management Programs to include Records Management, FOIA, Privacy Act, and Publication Management Programs for compliance of all legal and regulatory requirements.

3.3.6.1.6. <u>Scientific and Technical Information (STINFO)</u>. Evaluate an installation's Scientific and Technical Information (STINFO) Program for compliance of all legal and regulatory requirements.

3.3.6.1.7. <u>Security of IT Systems</u>. Evaluate management and security of IT Systems for compliance with all legal and regulatory requirements to include Information Assurance of legacy systems.

3.3.7. **AFSOC/A7 - Installations & Mission Support.**

3.3.7.1. **Civil Engineering.**

3.3.7.1.1. <u>Facility and Infrastructure Requirements</u>. Assess whether Civil Engineers are meeting present and future facility and infrastructure requirements in accordance with the Civil Engineer Strategic Plan in the following areas:

3.3.7.1.1.1. <u>Real Property Maintenance, Services, and Demolition/Consolidation</u>. Real Property Maintenance Activities: Real Property Maintenance (Restoration and Modernization, Facilities Sustainment Model), Real Property Services, and Demolition/Consolidation.

3.3.7.1.1.2. Work Information Management System (WIMS)/Automated Civil Engineering System (ACES).

3.3.7.1.1.3. Real Property Accountability.

3.3.7.1.1.4. Housing.

3.3.7.1.2. Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF). Assess Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) training and Air Force Specialty Certifications.

3.3.7.1.3. Deployment Requirements and Readiness. Assess compliance with deployment requirements and other readiness programs.

3.3.7.1.4. Fire Emergency Services (FES). Assess Fire Emergency Services (FES) flight using the FES Assessment Program (FESAP), National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 1201 checklist.

3.3.7.1.5. Environmental Laws, Regulations, and Policies. Assess installation compliance with applicable environmental laws, regulations, and policies. In addition, assess remediation response plans.

3.3.7.2. **Emergency Management (Installation Commander, Group and Squadron Commanders, Detachment Commanders, and staff agency chiefs).**

3.3.7.2.1. Ensure the installation commander has met requirements listed in AFI 10-2501 *Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program, Planning and Operation.*

3.3.7.2.2. Ensure unit commanders have met requirements listed in AFI 10-2501.

3.3.7.2.3. Evaluate whether the base exercise program complies with AFI 10-2501, AFI 10-2603, *Emergency Health Powers on Air Force Installations*, and AFI 10-2604, *Disease Containment Planning Guidance*. The installation, unit or activity shall demonstrate the tasks and/or technical operations required to comply with exercise and evaluation program by conducting a base-wide exercise.

3.3.7.2.4. Evaluate base/unit training has been completed IAW AFI 10-2501, Chapter 6.

3.3.7.2.5. Assess installation's EM planning, coordination, implementation and execution of Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) 10-2 as required by AFI 10-2501, Chapter 4, including checklists supporting CEMP 10-2 created by all assigned installation units.

3.3.7.2.6. Assess installation warning and notification system for peacetime response capability IAW AFI 10-2501, Chapter 9.

3.3.7.2.7. Assess Nuclear Chemical Biological Defense Report (CBDRT) reporting for the installation, per AFI 10-201.

3.3.7.3. **Disease Containment Response (Installation Commander, Group and Squadron Commanders, Detachment Commanders, and staff agency chiefs).**

3.3.7.3.1. Assess adherence to public health emergency training requirements listed in AFI 10-2603.

3.3.7.3.2. Assess installation's ability to meet specialized teams' personnel, equipment and training requirements, as applicable, listed in AFI 10-2501 and the CEMP 10-2.

3.3.7.3.3. Assess installation's public health emergency and disease containment planning, implementation/execution of the disease containment plan (DCP), as required by AFI 10-2603, and AFI 10-2604, including checklists supporting DCP created by all assigned installation units.

3.3.7.4. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). Assess adherence to AFI 32-3001 *Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program*, 60series Technical Orders, AFI 10-210 *Prime BEEF Program*, and other technical data and directives as applicable. (AFSOC/SE will inspect compliance with AFMAN 91-201 *Explosive Safety Program.)*

3.3.7.5. **Force Protection and Antiterrorism.**

3.3.7.5.1. Evaluate unit's Antiterrorism/Force Protection program to include subordinate units' adherence to AFI 10-245, *Antiterrorism (AT)*.

3.3.7.6. **Installation Security/Integrated Defense.**

3.3.7.6.1. Installation Security/Integrated Defense. Assess installation security/Integrated Defense at home stations. Installation security is comprised of physical security (Protection Level (PL) 1-3 resources), resource protection (PL 4 resources), police services, entry control, and base defense.

3.3.7.6.2. SF Support Program. Assess key SF support program areas to include training and standardization evaluation, SF investigations, intelligence/counterintelligence/law enforcement in coordination with AFOSI, military working dog program, intrusion detection systems and the armory.

3.3.7.6.3. Information, Personnel, and Industrial Security. Assess information, personnel, and industrial security programs. This graded area is now inspected by IP; see paragraph 3.3.16.1.

3.3.7.6.4. Confinement Program. Assess confinement program.

3.3.7.6.5. Wing Augmentation Forces Program. Assess wing augmentation forces program support for SF, and the effectiveness of SF training/use.

3.3.7.6.6. Combat Arms. Assess combat arms to include training and management program.

3.3.7.7. **Contracting.**

3.3.7.7.1. Contract Award and Management. Evaluate if contract award, and contract management procedures are conducted according to applicable laws, executive orders, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS), directives, instructions, and applicable MAJCOM Regulations.

3.3.7.7.2. Government Purchase Card (GPC). Evaluate the Government Purchase Card (GPC) program, management, and administration across all functional areas IAW AFI 64-117, *Air Force Government-Wide Purchase Card (GPC) Program.*

3.3.7.7.3. Contracting Oversight. Evaluate the contracting oversight office of the QA program IAW Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) MP5346.103, *Contracting Office Responsibilities*.

3.3.7.7.4. Continuation of Contractor Services During Crises. Assess plans for continuation of contractor services during crises as required by DODI 3020.37, *Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis*, and AFI 63-124, *PerformanceBased Services Acquisition (PBSA)*.

3.3.8. Not used. See paragraph 3.3.5. AFSOC/A5/8/9 Plans, Programs, Requirements, and Assessments.

3.3.9. Not used. See paragraph 3.3.5. AFSOC/A5/8/9 Plans, Programs, Requirements, and Assessments.

3.3.10. **A10 (Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration).**

3.3.10.1. Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). This MGA is covered in paragraph 3.3.1.8.

3.3.11. **AFSOC/FM - Directorate of Financial Management & Comptroller.**

3.3.11.1. **Financial Management and Comptroller.**

3.3.11.1.1. Evaluate FM QA, Non-Appropriated Funds oversight, systems access controls, Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA), Anti-Deficiency Act, and audit liaison responsibilities.

3.3.11.1.2. Pay, Travel, Accounting, and Disbursing. Assess pay, travel, accounting, and disbursing functions.

3.3.11.1.3. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Analysis. Evaluate planning, programming, budgeting, and analysis functions.

3.3.11.1.4. Independent Review Official and Economic Analysis. Evaluate organization capability and training to conduct Independent Review Official and Economic Analysis duties in accordance with published guidance (AFPD 65-5, *Cost and Economics*; AFMAN 65-506, *Economic Analysis*; AFI 65-501, *Economic Analysis*; AFI 65-502, *Inflation*; and AFI 65-503, *US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors*).

3.3.11.1.5. Training Program. Evaluate training program.

3.3.11.1.6. Official Representation Fund (ORF). Evaluate Official Representation Fund (ORF) program in accordance with AFI 65-603, *Official Representation FundsGuidance and Procedures* (self inspection check list is available to assist MAJCOM/IGs and units as applicable).

3.3.12. **AFSOC/JA - Staff Judge Advocate.**

3.3.12.1. **Judge Advocate Programs** (AFSOC)**.**   Inspect wing Judge Advocate programs.

3.3.13. **AFSOC/HC - Chaplain.**

3.3.13.1. **Chaplain Corps Programs** (AFSOC). Inspect the wing Chaplain Corps.

3.3.14. **AFSOC/HO - History.**

3.3.14.1. **History Office Programs** (AFSOC)**.**   Inspect the wing and group history office.

3.3.15. **AFSOC/IG - Inspector General.**

3.3.15.1. **Complaints Resolution Program** (AFSOC)**.**   Inspect the wing Complaints Resolution Program IAW AFI 90301.

3.3.15.2. **Self Inspection Program** (AFSOC)**.** Inspect the unit Self Inspection Program IAW AFSOCI 90-201 *Inspector General Activities, Chapter 5*.

3.3.16. **AFSOC/IP - Information Protection.**

3.3.16.1. **Information, Personnel, and Industrial Security.** Assess information, personnel, and industrial security programs (formerly an A7 MGA).

3.3.17. AFSOC/PA - Public Affairs.

3.3.17.1. **Public Affairs Programs** (AFSOC). Inspect wing and overseas groups Public Affairs programs.

3.3.18. **AFSOC/SE - Safety.**

3.3.18.1. **Safety Programs.**

3.3.18.1.1. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Confined Spaces, and Explosives Safety Standards.   Assess how the organization adheres to AF safety guidelines and procedures to include applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration, confined spaces, and explosives safety standards.

3.3.18.1.2. Mishap Prevention Program. Assess mishap prevention programs IAW AFIs 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program*, 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*, 91-207, *The US Air Force Traffic Safety Program,* and 91-301, *Air Force Occupational and Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, and Health (AFOSH) Program*.

3.3.18.1.3. Explosive Safety Program.   Assess unit explosive safety program, to include determination of compliance with AFI 91-202 and AFMAN 91-201, *Explosives Safety Standards*.

3.3.18.1.4. Wing Safety Reporting Program (DULL SWORD). Assess wing safety reporting program used to identify nuclear deficiencies (DULL SWORD).

3.3.19. **AFSOC/SG - Command Surgeon.**

3.3.19.1. **Surgeon General Programs.**

3.3.19.2. <u>Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System</u>. Evaluate Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System IAW AFI 90-501, *Community Action Information Board and Integrated Delivery System.*

3.3.19.3. <u>Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP).</u> Consistent with the medical unit's home station mission and capabilities, evaluate IAW AFI 41-106, *Unit Level Management of Medical Readiness Programs,* the effectiveness in executing appropriate functions of the Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP) to support wing EM activities, including: medical counter-CBRN response; in-place patient decontamination; immediate medical response; in-patient medical support; pharmaceutical support; threat agent surveillance; homeland defense-lab response; National Disaster Medical System support (Federal Coordinating Centers facilities only); public health emergencies; and aero medical evacuation (AE) interface/support.

Chapter 4

OPERATIONAL READINESS INSPECTION (ORI)

4.1. Execution. ORIs evaluate and measure the ability of units to perform their wartime, contingency, or force sustainment missions. For maximum effectiveness in assessing operational readiness, all readiness MGAs should be assessed during the same visit. However, if required to divide the inspection into separate visits, the inspection will consist of two phases. Phase I evaluates the unit's transition from peacetime readiness and the unit's ability to maintain and sustain essential home station missions during and after the deployment of forces and includes the MGA of Positioning the Force. Phase II evaluates the unit's ability to meet wartime/contingency taskings through the MGAs of Employing the Force, Sustaining the Force, and Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO). Within the parameters set by the IG, wing commanders may request appropriate unit activity be observed by the IG to receive credit for Phase I or Phase II requirements. At a minimum, ORIs will be conducted on all wing/wing equivalent units with a wartime, contingency, or force sustainment mission at an interval of no more than 60 months. AFSOC/CC approval is required to exceed the 60-month inspection interval. HQ AFSOC/IG will notify SAF/IG when a unit will exceed the inspection interval and will provide anticipated inspection date (s). Every AFSOC unit with assigned Unit Type Codes (UTC) is eligible for ORI tasking. Normally, AFSOC active duty units receive an ORI every three years and AFSOC gained AFRC/ANG units every four years. When directed by AFSOC/CC, units may receive an ORI regardless of their reported combat capability (coordinate with NGB/IGD for ANG units reporting less than C-3 status). Units may receive full or partial ORI credit when deployed to a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or theaterdirected contingency operation. Refer to chapter five of this instruction for more information.

4.1.1. Scenarios**.** IG teams will attempt to create a realistic environment for evaluation while ensuring safety is not compromised. ORI scenarios evaluate garrison operations, contingency response (from both garrison and continuity of operations [COOP] location), and sustained performance. When possible, combine ORI scenarios with existing exercises, contingency events, or other AFSOC scenarios.

4.1.2. Performance**.** The IG team will focus on mission performance. Academic testing will not be used as a primary measure of readiness unless it serves a specific inspection objective or hands-on performance cannot be observed.

4.1.3. HQ AFSOC/IG evaluates unit readiness using Mission Essential Tasks, Design Operational Capability (DOC) statements, UTC mission capability statements, and governing instructions. Attachment 7 of this instruction contains common areas and tasks normally inspected during AFSOC ORIs. This information is provided for reference only does not limit the scope of the inspection. Functional area inspectors are encouraged to create inspection guides to aid in the conduct of the inspection. Inspected units should not use these functional area guides for inspection preparation, but should train to wartime tasking. Throughout the inspection, the decision-making process is observed. Commander, staff and individual decision making opportunities presented by the ORI should not be inhibited by an event-driven checklist.

4.1.4. Inspected units will be evaluated on OPSEC, COMSEC, and COMPUSEC practices and use of available secure systems throughout the inspection. HQ AFSOC/IG may request outside agency support to assist this evaluation.

4.1.5. Safety and operational risk management (ORM) awareness are evaluated throughout the ORI. Unit commanders may deviate from any part of the ORI if conditions compromise safety. Advise the functional area inspector of the reasons for the deviation and notify the inspection team chief in writing using AFSOC Form 19, *Inspection Communication*.

4.1.6. ORI Vehicle**.** The ORI vehicle is the exercise chosen to host the ORI. The preferred ORI vehicle is a JCS sponsored exercise. In cases where a JCS exercise is not available, the IG may generate an IG exercise (IGX) to serve as the ORI vehicle. If the selected ORI vehicle does not engage required inspection activities, HQ AFSOC/IG may supplement the ORI by observing other unit exercises and/or deployments. The IG normally initiates ORI vehicle selection two years from the inspected unit's projected ORI.

4.1.7. **ORI Planning.** If the ORI vehicle is a JCS or equivalent exercise, IG planners will coordinate with the host agency to attend conferences and ensure ORI objectives are integrated into the exercise concept. If the ORI vehicle is an IGX, the IG will oversee the planning process through a series of exercise conferences. IG planners will attend these conferences to provide assistance; however, unit trusted agents are responsible for the conduct of detailed exercise planning. If elements of the inspected unit are not tasked within the exercise, the IG will determine the best method for their inspection. The IG will coordinate with the inspected unit to determine the conference schedule and required attendees. A typical planning timeline for an IGX is as follows:

4.1.7.1. The Initial Planning Conference (IPC) normally takes place 12-10 months prior to the scheduled inspection. Primary objectives of the IPC are to establish planning relationships, define level-of-effort (i.e., inspectable UTCs/force package), identify support requirements, and establish planning milestones.

4.1.7.2. The Main Planning Conference (MPC) normally takes place six months prior to the scheduled inspection. Primary MPC objectives include building detailed mission profiles for tasked operations (master mission matrix), developing the ORI timeline and schedule of events, defining Exercise Control Group (ECG) connectivity, tasks, and manning requirements, identifying inspected unit C2 processes and responsibilities, and reviewing the ORI ground rules and simulation package.

4.1.7.3. The Final Planning Conference (FPC) normally takes place two prior to the scheduled ORI. Primary objectives of the FPC are to verify completion of planning milestones, ensure exercise support agreements are ready to execute, and to synchronize (wargame) the master mission matrix against the exercise scenario/timeline.

4.1.7.4. The Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS) normally takes place following the MPC. Primary objective of the PDSS is to map exercise play areas, define and coordinate for exercise support requirements, and identify infrastructure and support shortfalls that may impact.

4.1.7.5. The Scripting Conference(s) normally takes place following the MPC. Primary objective of the Scripting Conference is to develop the exercise scenario and supporting intelligence message traffic, maps, and associated documentation.

4.1.8. Trusted Agents. The IG depends on inspected unit planners to conduct detailed ORI planning. Inspected unit planners are considered trusted agents due to the sensitive nature of the information they are exposed to during ORI planning. Trusted agents are normally made available to support the entire planning process. If required, they also assist during execution as members of the ECG. IG planners will coordinate trusted agent requirements with the inspected unit prior to the IPC. The IG provides training to ensure trusted agents understand their responsibilities to the IG and ORI planning process.

4.1.9. ORI Initiation. In most cases, the ORI begins immediately following the formal in brief. ORI initiation may or may not coincide with exercise messages.

4.1.10. Prior to ORI initiation, commanders should posture their forces based on the intelligence buildup and exercise development. Depending on the exercise scenario, units will normally receive scenario development messages approximately 30 days from execution. Positioning the Force is normally executed real-time using a short-notice contingency response scenario.

4.1.11. All personnel assigned and available for duty are eligible for ORI tasking. Aircraft, equipment, and personnel away from home station on HHQ directed missions are considered deployed, but may be used for ORI tasking depending on the scenario and approval from the controlling agency. Units should simulate recall of personnel on leave or on TDY for an ORI.

4.1.12. **Communications:**

    4.1.12.1. HQ AFSOC/IG expects units to demonstrate realistic use of C2 channels. In cases when the IG role-plays the HHQ element, units should take all preliminary steps necessary (e.g., draft messages, etc.) when relaying requests to the IG.

    4.1.12.2. During ORI execution the primary mode of communication between the IG and the inspected unit is via AFSOC Form 19, *Inspection Communication,*(see attachment 8). Normally, the IG team chief will act on coordinated requests from the unit. Submit the AFSOC Form 19 IAW procedures outlined in the applicable ORI ground rules.

4.1.13. Do not compromise safety during IG-directed exercises. Do not take actions that may result in injury to personnel or damage to equipment, aircraft, or property. Actual emergencies take immediate precedence over any exercise event. Security forces will not be delayed, evacuated, or otherwise prevented from performing their real-world security mission or responding to actual situations. The IG will not confront unit members with situations that could be interpreted as actual hostile actions. Under no circumstances should any IG team member attempt to compromise real world security for the purpose of conducting exercises.

4.1.14. Simulations or substitutions are approved only when it is impossible or impractical to perform actual procedures or use specified equipment. Coordinate all simulations not expressly authorized by exercise implementing instructions, ORI ground rules, or the simulation package with the IG prior to accomplishment. During ORI execution, submit new simulation requests via AFSOC Form 19, *Inspection Communication*. All requests for simulations should answer the following questions:

    4.1.14.1. WHAT? -- Describe the simulated task or equipment.

    4.1.14.2. HOW? -- Describe how you will simulate the task.

4.1.14.3. WHY? -- Provide a brief explanation of the need for simulation and the impact if the simulation request is disapproved.

4.1.15. **Message Preparation and Handling.**

4.1.15.1. Deliver and transmit all exercise messages required by the supported exercise. Do not transmit messages that are solely for IG information.

4.1.15.2. Provide a copy of all outgoing messages to the IG Team Chief.

4.1.15.3. Send the CAT activation, deactivation, Situation Report (SITREP) and real-world Operations Report (OPREP-3) messages to all appropriate agencies.

4.1.15.4. Simulate and log all required off base communication. Preface all communications with the words, "EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE" and refer to events as "simulated."

4.1.16. ORI Outbrief. Depending upon the unit and scope of the inspection, the ORI outbrief can range from a table-top briefing with the inspected unit commander and key staff, to a more formal presentation open to the entire inspected unit population. If the more formal platform is selected, the HQ AFSOC/IG will debrief the inspected unit commander prior to the presentation.

4.1.17. **Responsibilities.**

4.1.17.1. **HQ AFSOC will:**

4.1.17.1.1. Designate subject matter experts to assist ORI planning efforts.

4.1.17.1.2. When requested by the IG, source qualified inspection augmentation from AFSOC staff and field agencies.

4.1.17.1.3. Define, develop, and maintain METs with associated conditions and standards, UTC mission capability statements, and governing instructions to be used as inspection criteria.

4.1.17.1.4. Ensure sufficient flying hours are available for ORI requirements.

4.1.17.1.5. Schedule and coordinate continental United States (CONUS) combat control support for units without collocated combat control/special tactics units.

4.1.17.1.6. Activate the AFSOC CAT or response cell when required by the exercise to provide realistic command and control and real-time exercise injects.

4.1.17.1.7. Ensure satellite access for deployed networks (if inspection involves a Theater Deployable Communications (TDC)-equipped unit).

4.1.17.1.8. Schedule and coordinate CONUS weather support for units without collocated weather units.

4.1.17.2. **HQ AFSOC/IG will:**

4.1.17.2.1. Schedule, plan, and conduct ORIs.

4.1.17.2.2. Facilitate development of realistic ORI scenarios in conjunction with headquarters exercise planners and inspected unit trusted agents.

4.1.17.2.3. Strive to lessen operations tempo impact by using established exercises on the unit's exercise schedule.

4.1.17.2.4. Provide ORI schedules/changes to HQ AFIA/EM.

4.1.17.2.5. Provide Temporary Duty (TDY) funds for IG augmentees.

4.1.17.2.6. Coordinate and provide support for the deployed ORI team.

4.1.17.2.7. Coordinate with other military services and allies for ORI support.

4.1.17.2.8. Forecast munitions (pyrotechnic) requirements to support inspections through HQ AFSOC/SF and HQ AFSOC/A4.

4.1.17.2.9. Request ORI augmentation with as much lead-time as possible prior to the inspection.

4.1.17.3. **The IG team chief will:**

4.1.17.3.1. Ensure the ORI evaluates the inspected unit to the maximum extent possible.

4.1.17.3.2. Notify the inspected unit commander in writing when the ORI is officially completed.

4.1.17.3.3. If applicable, provide a formal ORI outbrief to the inspected unit.

4.1.17.4. **Inspected unit commanders will:**

4.1.17.4.1. Assign personnel as IG trusted agents to plan/script exercise inputs in order to meet ORI/exercise objectives.

4.1.17.4.2. Provide operational aircraft and manpower with the necessary equipment to perform the assigned ORI missions.

4.1.17.4.3. Within 24 hours of ORI termination transmit flying hours used during the ORI to HQ AFSOC/A3. AFRC units include HQ AFRC/A3 as an addressee. ANG units include NGB/A3 as an addressee.

4.1.17.4.4. Support the ORI team IAW this instruction and the IG requirements letter.

4.1.17.4.5. When conducted, ensure the maximum number of unit personnel attend the formal ORI outbrief.

4.1.17.5. **Inspected units will:**

4.1.17.5.1. Grant unescorted entry into unit controlled/restricted areas to inspectors who fulfill requirements of AFI 31-101, *Air Force Installation Security Program*, and supplements. The Automated Entry Control Card and entry authority list (EAL) for supporting verification satisfy unescorted entry requirements for inspectors. Do not impose additional identification or search requirements.

4.1.17.5.2. Simulate the recall of personnel on leave or TDY during the execution of emergency action checklists.

4.1.17.5.3. Document and provide to the IG all LIMFACs that may preclude accomplishment of assigned tasks.

4.1.17.5.4. During ORI execution, deliver to the IG Workcenter one copy of the following:

4.1.17.5.4.1. Emerging LIMFACs and operational constraints affecting readiness of the unit/performance during the ORI. Include critical shortages of personnel, supply, equipment, etc., which might affect mission accomplishment.

4.1.17.5.4.2. All ORI/exercise generated mission schedules, itineraries, flow plans, etc., as soon as each is published, but not later than 4 hours prior to scheduled departure.

4.1.17.5.4.3. Copies of all up channel reports.

4.1.17.5.4.4. Electronic and hard copies of standard and tailored DCAPES, Logistics Module (LOGMOD), and MANPER-B products reflecting ORI tasking.

4.1.17.5.5. Provide the IG with copies of the following documents NLT 3 hours after completion:

4.1.17.5.5.1. DSOE.

4.1.17.5.5.2. Passenger manifests.

4.1.17.5.5.3. LOGMOD Load and Packing Lists.

4.1.17.5.5.4. Aircraft load plans.

4.1.17.5.5.5. Hazardous cargo waivers.

4.1.17.5.5.6. Shippers Declaration for Dangerous Goods.

4.1.17.5.5.7. DD Forms 2133, *Joint Airlift Inspection Record*.

4.1.17.5.5.8. Message traffic between the unit and off base agencies.

4.1.17.5.5.9. All deployment workcenter logbooks.

4.1.17.5.5.10. Personnel Accountability Kit (PAK).

4.1.17.5.6. NLT 90 days prior to the ORI, provide the IG with electronic copies of the Installation Deployment Plan (IDP), Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2 (or equivalent Expeditionary Site Plan), installation or exercise play area map, local directives, supplements, and Operating Instructions relating to home station and deployed C2.

4.1.17.5.7. Ensure cannibalization of nonpossessed aircraft or aircraft not available for the ORI is approved by HHQ.

4.1.17.5.8. Provide the senior maintenance inspector:

4.1.17.5.8.1. The ramp parking plan to include aircraft parking locations, traffic flow, and equipment storage areas (may be part of the base support plan) before closure and within 6 hours of a change.

4.1.17.5.8.2. A copy of all current Maintenance Operating Instructions (MOI).

4.2. ORI Rating. Overall inspection performance, readiness MGAs, and sub-areas will be rated using the five-tier scale Outstanding, Excellent, satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory.

4.2.1. The ORI grading process emphasizes safe mission accomplishment in accordance with established tactics, techniques, and procedures. Major safety violations will negatively impact the readiness MGAs/sub-area grade. In addition, safety violations may result in the IG declaring a sortie unreliable when a safety violation occurs during aircraft operations. Aircraft, personnel, and equipment may be declared out-of-play if involved in a major safety violation.

4.2.2. When an inspected unit is rated unsatisfactory, provisions of Joint Pub 1-03.3, *Joint Reporting System (JRS), Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS),* apply.

4.3. AF Readiness MGAs and Sub-areas. Units with a wartime or contingency mission will be rated in four MGAs: Positioning the Force, Employing the Force, Sustaining the Force, and ATSO in a hostile environment and/or contaminated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) environment. Conduct Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) ORIs using applicable guidance in Attachment 6.

4.4. Positioning the Force. Positioning the force is defined as the deployment, reception, and beddown of tailored and prioritized forces. Includes all actions required to transition from peacetime to contingency operations or wartime posture, and applies to all units unless otherwise specified. Evaluate the unit's ability to command, control, and execute assigned tasks while continuing its home station mission (when applicable). Evaluate readiness posture changes, aircraft generation, and deployment operations, to include the handling, storage, authorization, and transportation of material, weapons, munitions, and classified information.

4.4.1. **Command and Control (C2).** Evaluate the effectiveness of the initial response actions performed by the Installation Control Center (ICC) and other wing C2 agencies/elements (command post, Installation Deployment Readiness Center (IDRC) and Unit Control Centers (UCC), etc).

4.4.1.1. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff procedures for receiving processing and disseminating emergency action messages (EAM) IAW HHQ requirements as applicable.

4.4.1.2. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff reporting in SORTS IAW AFI 10-201.

4.4.1.3. For all C2 functions consider; decision making, direction, coordination, and reporting. Consider the interaction between unit command functions, subordinate units, and HHQ organizations. Consider coordination between unit, base, and tenant organizations (when applicable). Consider the unit's protection of classified information, operational plans and capabilities. Evaluate overall C2 of deployment actions. See Attachment X for C2 subareas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.4.2. **Preparing for Operations.**

4.4.2.1. Evaluate weapon system generation and deployment. Tasked units must demonstrate the ability to generate/launch UTC authorized or possessed aircraft; whichever is less, within the times specified in their DOC statement or most stringent tasking as specified by the IG. The IG evaluates units without an aviation mobility or generation requirement during employment operations only. Aircraft generation timing begins at X-hour unless otherwise specified by the IG. Aircraft will be inspected to

ensure configuration and Mission Essential System Listing (MESL) requirements are met. See Attachment 7 for Preparing for Operations sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.4.2.2. Evaluate personnel readiness to deploy.

4.4.2.3. Evaluate equipment and logistic readiness.

4.4.2.4. Evaluate status reporting.

4.4.2.5. Evaluate Information Operations (electronic warfare, network warfare, and influence operations).

4.4.3. **Deployment Planning/Processing.** Assess unit's ability to position the force for mission employment through successful deployment execution.

4.4.3.1. Evaluate deployment planning.

4.4.3.2. Evaluate deployment process.

4.4.3.3. Evaluate use of automated deployment systems.

4.4.3.4. Evaluate medical deployment personnel processing support (individual or mass), as appropriate for wing mission and capabilities, including medical/dental/immunization clearance certification, pre-deployment health assessment, deployable medical records management, immunizations, prophylaxis distribution, and medical intelligence briefing.

4.4.3.5. Evaluate the unit's ability to implement the local deployment plan in response to the deployment tasking. This process covers planning and all necessary actions for air or surface movement of personnel, equipment, and consumables deploying in support of an OPLAN or contingency tasking. Deployment timing begins upon the establishment of an X-hour by the IG which normally coincides with the receipt of the Deployment Order. Inspected units will use Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Deliberate Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES) to the maximum extent practical. Units should be prepared to deploy any UTC identified in the AFSOC portion of the Air Force-Wide UTC Summary (AFWUS). See Attachment 7 for Deployment Planning/Processing sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.4.4. **Reception and Beddown.** Assess unit's ability to receive and beddown forces for personnel accountability, equipment accountability, and adequacy of services provided.

4.5. Employing the Force. Employing the force is defined as the conduct and support of air and space operations from garrison or forward location to include: generating forces to combat or operational levels; providing timely information and intelligence dissemination; launching, recovering, or regenerating operational elements; planning for force replacement to continue operations; preserving installation security; wartime materiel support (WMS). Evaluates the unit's capability to employ tasked capabilities IAW procedures and standards described in AFTTP 3-1, Volume 2, *Threat Reference Guide and Counter Tactics (SECRET)*, AFTTP 3-1 series, Volumes 3134, *Tactical Employment – (weapon system specific)*, AFI 11-2 series, Vol. 3, *(weapon system specific) Operations Procedures*, and AFSOCI 11-203 series, *(weapon system specific) Configuration/Mission Planning*, as applicable. Missions may be evaluated during a dedicated ORI scenario, major exercise, joint operation, or other simulated combat operation.

4.5.1. **Command and Control (C2).**

4.5.1.1. Evaluate if C2 functions support and facilitate mission accomplishment through proper arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures.

4.5.1.2. Evaluate CP's and Commander's Senior Staff procedures for building and transmitting Commander's Situational Reports (SITREP) IAW AFI 10-206.

4.5.1.3. Evaluate CP's quick reaction checklist procedures, as applicable, IAW AFI 10-207.

4.5.1.4. See Attachment 7 for Command and Control sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.5.2. **Information Operations.**

4.5.2.1. Evaluate integration of all applicable Information Operations activities IAW AFPD 10-7, *Information Operations*; Joint Pub 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*; Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, *Information Operations*; and all 10-7 series AFIs.

4.5.2.2. Evaluate tactics conducted under military deception plans IAW AFI 10-704. Evaluate tactics, techniques and procedures conducted under military deception and operations security operations IAW AFI 110-704, *Military Deception* and AFI 10-701, *Operations Security*.

4.5.2.3. Evaluate Public Affairs tactics conducted in support of Information Operations (IO) objectives IAW AFI 35-101, *Public Affairs Policies and Procedures.*

4.5.2.4. See Attachment 7 for IO sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.5.3. Intelligence**.** Evaluate operational and target intelligence support to commanders. Evaluation should be relevant to unit's mission, and may include: Information Operations threats, threat assessment analysis, support to Threat/Force Protection Working Groups, Tactical Deception, tasking orders, production/collection/transmission requirements, effects-based assessment (tactical, operational), geospatial information and services (GI&S), force protection operations, etc. Evaluate provision of realtime intelligence briefings, data, and products (including national capabilities) to support comprehensive pre-mission evasion planning and mission execution. Ensure information connectivity with appropriate supported and supporting agencies. See Attachment 7 for Intelligence sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.5.4. **Maintenance.** Evaluate aircraft maintenance on the ability to rectify all mission essential and safety of flight discrepancies, meet aircraft servicing and configuration requirements, provide aircrews with mission ready aircraft on schedule, and the ability to respond effectively to rapidly changing events in a dynamic environment.

4.5.4.1. Control of maintenance.

4.5.4.2. Sortie production.

4.5.4.3. Aircraft maintenance during employment.

4.5.4.4. Munitions activity.

4.5.4.5. Airborne release reliability.

4.5.4.6. See Attachment 7 for Maintenance subareas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.5.5. **Operations.**

4.5.5.1. Evaluate unit's ability to integrate deployed location procedures and requirements into unit's plans. Evaluate if the unit has a COOP plan which it exercises for contingency operations for incidents at the garrison location IAW AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*. Evaluate if all unit individuals know what actions to take during potential incidents. Inspected units normally receive mission tasking in-accordance with procedures outlined in JP 3-05.1, *JSOTF Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. Typically, more than one graded event is tasked per aircraft sortie/special tactics mission (e.g., air refueling, airdrop, airland). Graded events are averaged to produce an overall rating for the mission sortie. Operations include assigned weapon systems, aircrew flight equipment, airfield operations, and personnel recovery/SERE. See Attachment 7 for Operations sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.5.5.2. Review application of unified commander's rules of engagement (ROE) for clarity and understanding within exercise constraints.

4.5.5.3. Evaluate established searchandrescue procedures within exercise constraints (flying units).

4.5.5.4. Evaluate whether operations, equipment, and training can adequately meet wartime or contingency requirements.

4.5.5.5. AFE. Evaluate ability to provide aircrews with serviceable protective, survival, rescue, and CBRN defensive equipment.

4.5.5.6. Airfield Operations (Air Traffic Control and Airfield Management).

4.5.5.6.1. Evaluate ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft.

4.5.5.6.2. Evaluate ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities.

4.5.5.6.3. Evaluate any Base Operations Inter-Service Support Agreements.

4.5.5.7. Evaluate whether operating procedures can meet the requirement to mitigate the results of an airbase attack.

4.5.5.8. Evaluate ability of flying unit to meet tasking in designed operational capability (DOC) statements, Ready Aircrew Program (RAP) messages, OPLANS, and Air Tasking Orders (ATO) as applicable.

4.5.5.9. Evaluate ability of space unit to meet tasking in DOC statements, Fragmentation Orders, execution orders (EXORD), Space Tasking Orders (STO) as applicable.

4.5.6. **Weather.**

4.5.6.1. Evaluate the timeliness, accuracy, and relevance of weather support to users. IAW AFMAN 15-125, *Weather Station Operations*, and AFSOCI 15-102, *Weather Operations*.

4.5.6.2. Evaluate the integration of global, regional, and local weather information into the unit's mission exploitation products. Product verification and quality control will be evaluated to ensure observers and forecasters are continually improving future weather support and product quality.

4.5.6.3. Evaluate ability to accurately transmit local weather information in a timely manner.

4.5.6.4. Inspected units must deploy with sufficient Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TSOP), Tactical Analysis and Forecast Program (TAFP), and Area of Operations (AO) familiarization packages to accomplish assigned missions.

4.5.6.5. See Attachment 7 for Weather sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6. Sustaining the Force. Defined as the ability to maintain and prolong combat support to all users for the duration of the operation. Evaluates home station and deployed sustaining the force responsibilities in accordance with the unit's mission. Inspect sustaining the force capabilities against assigned UTCs and support agreements as appropriate. Host base support adversely affecting an inspected tenant's mission may be documented as an extract deficiency reportable to the corresponding MAJCOM.

4.6.1. **Communications and Information Systems Operations.**

4.6.1.1. Evaluate ability to provide non-secure and secure voice and data connectivity to support command, control, communications, and computer (C4) functions and to enable air and space forces to retrieve, create, fuse, and disseminate information.

4.6.1.2. Evaluate measures to protect critical information and C4 systems.

4.6.1.3. Evaluate C4 back-up and restoral capabilities.

4.6.1.4. Evaluate ability to provide, disseminate, and protect STINFO.

4.6.1.5. Evaluate the ability to provide Information Management (IM).

4.6.1.6. See Attachment 7 for C4 sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.2. **Manpower, Personnel, and Services.** (military and civilian personnel management.)

4.6.2.1. Evaluate timeliness and accuracy of personnel management, casualty reporting, force accountability, reporting, and analysis IAW AFI 36-3208.

4.6.2.2. Evaluate ability of deployed manpower elements to assess, account for, and manage the organization and adequacy of forces.

4.6.2.3. Evaluate the ability of manpower elements to access and refine manpower databases from forward deployed operating locations.

4.6.2.4. Evaluate the ability of the manpower and Personnel Support for Contingency Operations (PERSCO) teams to ensure alignment and accuracy of the PERSCO and manpower reporting numbers between the Unit Manning Document (UMD) and UTC databases.

4.6.2.5. Evaluate ability to perform wartime duties including mortuary, lodging, food service, community programs, and fitness programs.

4.6.2.6. See Attachment 7 for Manpower sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.3. **Civil Engineer.**

4.6.3.1. Assess capability to meet in-place wartime requirements and, if required, maintain a capability to deploy to another area.

4.6.3.2. Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Mobile Forces: Evaluate forces' ability to perform tasks as outlined in AFI 10-210, *Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) Program.* Emphasis should be given to the following: CBRN Defense and EM, expedient methods (beddown), expedient methods (construction), expedient methods (repair), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), FES using the FESAP, NFPA 1201 checklist, expedient methods (destruction), force protection, and deployment support. Other tasks will include minimum airfield operating strip (MAOS) and airfield damage repair (ADR).

4.6.3.3. See Attachment 7 for Civil Engineering sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.4. **Security Forces.**

4.6.4.1. Evaluate ability of base defense forces to plan and conduct defense operations to protect assets IAW the unit's Integrated Defense Plan.

4.6.4.2. Check for compatibility and interoperability of communication systems with other units, commands, services, and national or theater assets.

4.6.4.3. Assess police services and resource protection activities and responses.

4.6.4.4. Assess security of PL 1-4 resources and responses.

4.6.4.5. Evaluate ability of base defense forces to defeat Level I threats and disrupt or delay Level II threats.

4.6.4.6. See Attachment 7 for Security Forces sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.5. **Logistics Readiness.**

4.6.5.1. Evaluate adequacy of material management to meet user asset requirements.

4.6.5.2. Assess physical control, accountability, serviceability, and efficient management of supplies and equipment.

4.6.5.3. Evaluate ability to safely and efficiently issue quality bulk petroleum products, cryogenic fluids, and missile propellants.

4.6.5.4. Evaluate ability to provide efficient and economical transportation services.

4.6.5.5. Evaluate ability to use economical, reliable, and up-to-date procedures to maintain vehicles in a safe and serviceable condition.

4.6.5.6. Evaluate ability to determine the location of unit passengers and cargo and to reprioritize or redirect movement in response to changing circumstances.

4.6.5.7. See Attachment 7 for Logistics Readiness sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.6. **Medical/Health Services.**

4.6.6.1. Consistent with the medical unit's deployment and generation missions as described on the unit DOC statement and/or listed on the Medical Resource Letter, evaluate the ability to provide medical support to deployed personnel, to include emergency, outpatient-inpatient medical care, AE interface, food and water safety and disease surveillance.

4.6.6.2. Assess performance IAW AFI 41-106, *Medical Readiness Planning and Training*, AFMAN 23-110, Volume 5, *Air Force Medical Material Management System*, and AFSOCI 48-101, *Special Operations Aerospace Medical Operations.*

4.6.6.3. See Attachment 7 and AFSOCI 90-205, CL 111, Part I, *Medical Inspection Checklists*, for Medical/Health Services sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.7. **Rules of Law.**

4.6.7.1. Evaluate knowledge and understanding of the principles and rules of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) throughout the installation, commensurate with individual duties and responsibilities.

4.6.7.2. Evaluate knowledge and understanding of the applicable ROE and rules for the use of force.

4.6.7.3. Evaluate that legal (or command) representative briefed ROE as published by the combatant commander. Evaluate dissemination and training of ROE and RUF to operators, medical personnel, security forces, and the base populace at large. Evaluate cooperation between Judge Advocate, operations, and the Commander to evaluate and develop ROE/RUF as required.

4.6.7.4. Evaluate adequacy of legal support for wartime and contingency operations.

4.6.7.5. Evaluate availability of legal assistance for deployed personnel.

4.6.7.6. Evaluate adequacy of legal office operational and mission readiness.

4.6.7.7. See Attachment 7 for additional Judge Advocate subareas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.8. **Financial Management (FM) and Comptroller Support.**

4.6.8.1. Evaluate ability to provide FM decision support.

4.6.8.2. Evaluate ability to provide financial service support.

4.6.8.3. See Attachment 7 for Financial Management and Comptroller Support sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.9. **Contracting.**

4.6.9.1. Evaluate adequacy of contracting support.

4.6.9.2. Evaluate ability to execute contingency operational contracting procedures.

4.6.9.3. Evaluate the ability to provide proper oversight of deployed operations contracts.

4.6.9.4. See Attachment 7 for Rules of Law sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.10. **Safety.**

4.6.10.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of mishap prevention program, including actions taken to mitigate risks associated with all phases of deployments and contingencies.

4.6.10.2. Evaluate the effectiveness of Operational Risk Management (ORM) program.

4.6.10.3. Evaluate the effectiveness of safety reporting.

4.6.10.4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's flying safety program.

4.6.10.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's ground safety program.

4.6.10.6. Evaluate the effectiveness of the unit's weapons safety program.

4.6.10.7. See Attachment 7 for Safety subareas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.11. **Chaplain.**

4.6.11.1. Evaluate ability to support religious observances.

4.6.11.2. Evaluate ability to provide and support pastoral care.

4.6.11.3. Evaluate ability to advise leaders on spiritual, ethical, moral, morale, and religious accommodation issues.

4.6.11.4. See Attachment 7 for Chaplin sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.6.12. **Public Affairs (PA).**

4.6.12.1. Evaluate effectiveness of support to commander.

4.6.12.2. Evaluate effectiveness of all aspects of the PA program in directly helping to achieve organizational mission objectives.

4.6.12.3. Evaluate readiness to support deployed PA taskings.

4.6.12.4. Evaluate integration of research, planning, execution and assessment model into communication activities.

4.6.12.5. Evaluate readiness to performance effectiveness of deployed multimedia operations.

4.6.12.6. See Attachment 7 for Public Affairs sub-areas and commonly inspected tasks.

4.7. Ability To Survive and Operate (ATSO). Evaluate the unit's ability to conduct the full range of contingency operations, either in a stand alone, joint, or coalition forces operating environment, while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-state use of CBRN weapons, major accidents, natural disasters, or HAZMAT incidents using the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS).

4.7.1. **Command and Control.**

4.7.1.1. Evaluate units' ability to control, collect, display, report, and disseminate information.

4.7.1.2. Evaluate ability of unit C2 agencies/elements to implement appropriate plans, procedures, and directives using AFIMS response structure as defined in AFI 10-2501 and AFMAN 10-2602, *Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense Operations and Standards*.

4.7.2. **Prepare.**

4.7.2.1. Determine if the installation CEMP 10-2; DCP, base support, joint support or expeditionary site plan identifies integrated tasks and assigns responsibilities to implement preparation, response, recovery, and sustainment actions.

4.7.2.1.1. Determine if the installation plan includes support provided to or received from joint service, host nation, or coalition forces.

4.7.2.1.2. Determine if the unit has identified and documented to HHQ critical infrastructure assets requiring special considerations for operational planning.

4.7.2.1.3. For units in medium or high threat areas or where a geographically specific Terrorism Threat Warning Report is in effect, determine if contingency plans are developed and training/exercises are conducted for both the home station and deployment location(s) IAW AFMAN 10-2602 and AFMAN 10-2605, *Education, Training and Exercise Competencies for Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations*.

4.7.2.2. Evaluate ability of the installation to implement CBRN defense plan actions to save lives, protect resources, recover from attacks, and restore mission capability.

4.7.3. **Protection.** Determine ability of organizations to prepare for and implement actions to protect personnel and resources from conventional and CBRN weapons effects.

4.7.3.1. Individual Protection. Determine if required individual protective equipment (IPE)/aircrew chemical defense ensemble (ACDE) is on-hand and serviceable and individuals are capable of using IPE/ACDE appropriately.

4.7.3.1.1. Determine if individuals have completed Protective Mask Fit training with their personal mask, understand the threat of CBRN agents as well as effective protective measures and whether the mask has been properly tested for serviceability using the Joint Service Mask Leak Tester.

4.7.3.1.2. Evaluate individuals' knowledge of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) levels IAW AF Visual Aid (AFVA) 10-2512, *Mission Oriented Protective Postures* (MOPP); ability to inspect and don their IPE within specified time criteria (AFMAN 10-2602, Table 5.1.); ability to remove their IPE by processing through a contamination control area (CCA); demonstrate the use of issued chemical decontamination kits, detection equipment, and chemical agent antidotes.

4.7.3.2. Collective Protection. Determine the ability to provide adequate collective protection for assigned and deployed forces and CCA capability for 20% of those forces during a 24-hour period.

4.7.3.3. Force Health Protection (FHP). Evaluate ability to execute force health protection activities.

4.7.3.4. Protective Hardening. Determine ability to provide permanent and expedient hardening protection for assigned and deployed forces.

4.7.3.5. Dispersal. Evaluate ability to disperse and protect critical assets.

4.7.3.6. Blackout. Evaluate ability to conduct operations under blackout conditions, as appropriate for the threat.

4.7.3.7. Critical Infrastructure. Determine if unit accomplished asset identification supporting the AF critical infrastructure program per AFPD 10-24, *Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP)*.

4.7.4. **Contamination Avoidance and Control.**

4.7.4.1. Evaluate ability to receive and disseminate information through the installation and theater CBRN defense warning and reporting system.

4.7.4.2. Determine adequacy, serviceability, and sustainment capability of available CBRN detection and monitoring equipment. Evaluate ability to deploy, operate, and maintain the CBRN detection and reporting system.

4.7.4.3. Determine adequacy of contamination avoidance plans and material stocks, based on the CBRN threat. Evaluate ability to implement contamination avoidance measures in preparation of and response to attacks.

4.7.4.4. Determine adequacy of contaminated waste collection, control, and disposal capability. Evaluate ability to implement contaminated waste collection actions at the unit and installation level.

4.7.4.5. Evaluate ability to identify and mark CBRN hazard and hazard areas, conduct post-attack risk assessment, and implement management actions to reduce mission degradation.

4.7.5. **Respond.**

4.7.5.1. Base Population. Evaluate ability of base population to react to MOPP and alarm condition changes and respond to attacks. Evaluate ability of base population to identify, mark, report, and avoid hazards after an attack. Evaluate ability of individuals to perform self-aid/buddy care and to identify/recognize symptoms associated with chemical attacks (to include toxic industrial chemical (TIC)/toxic industrial material (TIM)), biological events, disease outbreaks, and radiological/nuclear events.

4.7.5.2. Unit. Evaluate ability of unit to implement preparation, response and recovery actions after an attack. Evaluate ability of unit post-attack reconnaissance teams and other assigned specialized teams to conduct operations to include detection/identification/quantification of threats to FHP. Evaluate ability of unit to manage the movement of casualties and exposed personnel to the appropriate medical treatment facility. Evaluate the ability of the unit to relocate, establish command and control functions and conduct operations from a COOP (alternate) site.

4.7.5.3. Joint Service, Host Nation or Coalition. Evaluate ability to integrate with assigned or attached joint service, host nation or coalition CBRN defense forces and support installation or theater missions.

4.7.5.4. Enemy Prisoners of War (POW), DOD Civilian and Contract Personnel. Evaluate ability to protect enemy POW, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees in AF custody. Evaluate ability to protect DOD civilian and contract personnel not designated as emergency essential.

4.7.6. **Mission Continuation/Restoration and Sustainment.**

4.7.6.1. Evaluate ability to conduct integrated response operations, restore mission capability, and sustain operations.

4.7.6.2. Determine adequacy of personnel accountability and replacement actions.

4.7.6.3. Determine adequacy of CBRN defense individual and team equipment stock levels to support sustained operations.

4.7.6.4. Evaluate actions to initiate re-supply of critical CBRN defense equipment, including medical and pharmaceutical supplies.

Chapter 5

AFSOC SELF INSPECTION PROGRAM

5.1. General Guidelines. Self inspections are conducted by units to assess their compliance with AF policy. SI provides commanders with a tool for internal assessment of unit health and complements external assessments. SI prepares units for and complements other inspections. The SI program outlined in this chapter is a basic framework for units to use in constructing their program.

5.1.1. Unit functional and crossfunctional elements should work with their self inspection manager to develop guidelines, procedures, criteria, checklists, and resolution requirements as required.

5.1.2. The AFSOC and AFSOC-gained units in Table 5.1. will have a self inspection program and are responsible for their sub units. Smaller units may integrate with their parent wing/host unit SI program.

Table 5.1. Units That Will Have a Self Inspection Program.

1 SOW	150 SOS	107 WF
27 SOW	123 STS	146 WF
193 SOW	125 STS	181 WF
919 SOW	209 CES	
352 SOG	280 CBCS	
353 SOG		
720 STG		
AFSOTC		

5.2. Execution.

5.2.1. The HQ AFSOC/IG superintendent is the AFSOC self inspection monitor and will interface with unit self inspection managers.

5.2.2. Units identified in Table 5.1. will appoint/designate a SI manager and/or SI team to manage the unit SI program. Wings/units with IGs are encouraged to appoint/designate their SI manager/team from within their IG and augmentation (similar to the EET construct). Units may consider using their EET and the EET process to conduct their SI.

5.2.3. The unit self inspection manager conducts the self inspection at least annually. Report estimated date of completion by 1 July each year to the HQ AFSOC/IGI Analysis Team. Do not send self inspection results to the HQ AFSOC/IG. After self inspection has been accomplished, send an email reporting completion from the 2-digit level (IG, XP, DO, etc.) to **AFSOC.IG.ANALYSIS@hurlburt.af.mil.**

5.2.4. Although encouraged, the SI does not have to be accomplished at one time (some functionals may accomplish their portions independently).

5.2.5. Units are encouraged to have a cross tell relationship with the HQ AFSOC/IG, AFSOC FAMs and with similar units to develop and execute their SI program. Units may consider having functional experts from other units assist with their self inspection.

5.2.6. When able, unit self inspection mangers should organize execution of their SI program along functional lines. Functional managers should inspect all elements in the wing/unit that are obligated to comply with Air Force instruction(s) that govern their subject matter (linear and/or crossfunctional). For example, the wing Communications and Information Systems Officer (CSO) should inspect all wing organizations for compliance with AFI 33-112, *Information Technology Hardware Asset Management.*

5.2.7. Anytime the intent of an AFI is unclear the unit should seek clarification from the installation program owner (ex: the Communications Squadron for information technology asset management questions) or from the appropriate AFSOC OPR.

5.2.8. AF CI MGAs/sub-areas and other major inspections. Identify which Air Force CI MGAs and sub-areas apply to the unit as well as other major inspections that apply to the unit (i.e. ASEV, ATSEP, LCAP, HSI, JCAHO, EESOHCAMP, etc).

5.2.9. Units should use/tailor all available published inspection checklists for formal inspections (CI, HSI, LCAP, IAAP, etc.) to include MAJCOM and/or NGB supplements as a basis for organizing and conducting self inspections. Unit supplemental checklists may be developed, as appropriate. Checklists do not limit the requirement to comply with any published DOD or AF policies, directives, or instructions.

5.2.9.1. Units will use AFSOC CI checklists and HAF CI inspection checklists (once established) to conduct self inspections. AFSOC CI checklists are posted as checklists to AFSOCI 90-205, *AFSOC Inspection Checklist Program* (on the AFSOC Command Publications webpage) until superseded by HAF CI checklists that will be posted on the AF Checklist site when available (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/). HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/IGI.

5.2.9.2. Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Visit (ASEV) checklists are posted on the AFSOC Command Publications webpage as checklists to AFSOCI 90-205*, AFSOC Inspection Checklist Program.* HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A3V.

5.2.9.3. Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP) Functional Area Checklists (FAC) available on the AFFSA Airfield Operations Directorate website IAW AFI 13-218, *Air Traffic System Evaluation Problem.* HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A3OA.

5.2.9.4. Logistics Compliance Assessment Program (LCAP) checklists are published by AF/A4L in coordination with Lead MAJCOMs and posted on the AF Checklist site (**https://wwwmil.afrc.af.mil/afia**/). HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A4M."

5.2.9.5. Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program (IAAP) inspection criteria can be found on AF Form 4160, *Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program (IAAP) Criteria* (IAW AFI 33-230 will become AFSSI 8560, *Information Assurance Assessment and Assistance Program).* Additional IAAP criteria can be located at **https://private.afca.af.mil/ip**. HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A6OS.

5.2.9.6. Health Services Inspection (HSI) and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Inspections inspection guides are posted to the AFIA Community of Practice. HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/SG.

5.2.9.7. Safety Inspection checklists are posted as checklists to AFSOCI 90-205, *AFSOC Inspection Checklist Program,* on the AFSOC Command Publications webpage. HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/SE.

5.2.9.8. Energy, Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance Assessment Management Program (EESOHCAMP) information is posted at **https://www.denix.osd.mil/portal/page/portal/denix** (under the environment tab go to compliance tools; find US Team Guide, State Guides and Air Force guide). HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A7AV.

5.2.9.9. Intelligence Stan/Eval Visit (ISEV) checklists are posted on the AFSOC/A2 Training and Stan/Eval CoP. HQ AFSOC OPR is HQ AFSOC/A2F.

5.3. Self Inspection Report. A formal self inspection report is not required however; deficiencies must be tracked until resolved/closed. A spreadsheet may be used to meet this requirement. A record of the self inspection deficiencies should be kept for 3 years. Self Inspection Deficiency Write-ups may contain:

5.3.1. Deficiency Number. A unique tracking number.

5.3.2. Short Title. A one line summary/description of the deficiency.

5.3.3. Detail. Describe, in sufficient detail, the deficiency and contextual facts as necessary to clearly convey the defect requiring resolution. The written description alone should be adequate for the inspected party to begin corrective action planning.

5.3.4. Severity. A deficiency severity of Critical, Significant, or Minor.

5.3.5. Reference(s) to the applicable instruction, technical order, policy letter, or other source documentation.

5.3.6. Impact.   For critical deficiencies address impact of continued deviation or non-compliance.

5.3.7. Wing/unit OPR. The wing/unit functional OPR for policy related to the deficiency (three or four letter office symbol).

5.3.8. OCR. Office of Collateral Responsibility (OCR), if applicable (three or four letter office symbol).

5.3.9. Corrective Action OPR. Basic responsibility for problem solving and the corrective action process resides at the lowest appropriate command level. The unit Corrective Action OPR office symbol (typically a squadron commander or equivalent) that is responsible for determination and oversight of the corrective action, determining the deficiency code(s) (Table 2.1.), and recommending closure when corrective action is complete. In instances where corrective action responsibility belongs to both the host and tenant unit (or supported and supporting unit), a Corrective Action OPR and a Corrective Action OCR may both be assigned to correct the identified deficiency. A Corrective Action OCR also may be identified if a deficiency is cross functional and requires action by more than one organization within a unit.

5.3.9.1. Unit corrective action OPRs are encouraged to coordinate their corrective actions with the appropriate wing OPR and/or HQ AFSOC OPR. Problem solving should be applied through the AF eight-step problem solving model as outlined in the AFSO21

Playbook (or SAF/SO approved publication) to assist in identifying root causes and solutions to deficiencies.

5.3.10. Closing Authority. The deficiency closing authority may be the wing/unit self inspection monitor for minor deficiencies or the wing/unit commander (or designee) for major and critical deficiencies. The closing authority and the corrective action OPR should not be the same individual for deficiency. The closing authority is responsible for reviewing deficiency corrective actions for appropriateness prior to closure.

5.4. Deficiency corrective action procedures.

5.4.1. The unit self inspection monitor will track all deficiencies.

5.4.2. Corrective action plans may be developed to resolve/close deficiencies.

5.4.3. The AFSOC Form 18 may be used to document the corrective action(s) and deficiency code(s) and route the deficiency for closure.

5.4.4. Deficiencies External to the unit. In instances where a deficiency involves an external unit, coordination with the external unit will be essential to ensuring timely resolution.

Chapter 6

READINESS OBSERVATION VISITS (ROV)

6.1. Purpose. The Readiness Observation Visit (ROV) provides the AFSOC/CC and staff with readiness feedback for any AFSOC or AFSOC-gained unit. ROVs also provide direct feedback to commanders for items solely within their purview, regarding IG perceptions of readiness, quality implementation, compliance, etc. ROVs can be requested by a unit commander or can be directed at any time by the AFSOC/CC.

6.1.1. The IG team may observe unit performance using criteria defined in Chapter 4, however, no overall grade will be assessed. ROVs may also be used for new units as an introduction to AFSOC and to identify any problems developed as a result of the transition.

6.1.1.1. An ROV will be tailored in size and purpose as needed. Normally it will be limited to a tailored version of one of the four major graded areas of an ORI. The ROV will be documented in a manner consistent with the breadth and depth of the visit.

6.1.1.2. The following areas may be observed during a ROV:

6.1.1.2.1. Positioning the Force.

6.1.1.2.2. Employing the Force.

6.1.1.2.3. Sustaining the Force.

6.1.1.2.4. Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) activities.

6.1.1.3. IG members may fly on missions when the situation allows.

6.1.1.4. If an ROV is conducted in conjunction with an actual contingency, the IG will observe on a non-interference basis.

6.2. Policy. This chapter applies to all active duty AFSOC units and AFSOC-gained ANG and AFRC units. HQ AFSOC/IG will coordinate with HQ AFRC/IG and NGB-IG for ROVs of AFSOC gained AFRC and ANG units.

6.2.1. Primary areas of focus during ROVs are unit leadership, functional or directorate area management, mission accomplishment, and risk management. Scheduled ROVs are published in the HQ AFSOC/IG inspection calendar.

6.2.2. Special Interest Items (SII). Applicable SIIs will be inspected during ROVs.

6.2.3. Visit Outbrief. The IG will conduct an outbrief with the commander and essential unit personnel upon completion of the visit.

6.2.4. Frequency. ROVs may be conducted any time deemed appropriate by the AFSOC/CC or requested by unit CC. ROVs may be requested by a unit commander at any time, but the generally expected window would be between 18 months and 6 months prior to an ORI.

6.3. Responsibilities:

6.3.1. **HQ AFSOC Directorate Responsibilities:**

6.3.1.1. Provide qualified augmentees for the IG team.

6.3.1.2. Assist units in correcting issues/findings identified during ROVs. Inform the unit when corrective actions are taken.

6.3.2. **HQ AFSOC/IG Responsibilities:**

6.3.2.1. Schedule and conduct ROVs in accordance with this instruction.

6.3.2.2. Maintain a record of issues forwarded to the HQ AFSOC staff and the final resolution of the issues.

6.3.2.3. Inform units of directed visits in the inspection schedule. However, the nature of an ROV in conjunction with a contingency dictates that the observed unit may have extremely limited notification.

6.3.2.4. Inform directorates of scheduled ROVs and request/task augmentation as required.

6.3.2.5. Coordinate with the observed unit for mission support.

6.3.2.6. Coordinate with the NGB and/or AFRC Inspector General as required.

6.3.2.7. Maintain a record of the results from all ROVs.

6.3.2.8. Provide funding for all inspection team members.

6.3.2.9. Assign an IG planner to establish and maintain liaison with the unit.

6.3.3. **Observed Unit Responsibilities:**

6.3.3.1. Units may request an ROV using the letter format at Attachment 4 signed by the unit commander.

6.3.3.2. Units will prepare for observation visits in accordance with this instruction.

6.3.3.3. Units will implement corrective actions for findings/issues identified by inspections. Inform and coordinate corrective actions with the proper headquarters directorate.

6.3.3.4. Units provide inspection team support as required by AFSOCI 90-201.

Chapter 7

OPERATIONAL READINESS ASSESSMENT (ORA)

7.1. Policy.

7.1.1. This chapter describes the ORA. The ORA may grant full or partial ORI credit to AFSOC or AFSOC-gained Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) units deployed to a Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) or theater-directed contingency operation.

7.1.2. A unit receiving ORI credit through the ORA process will be scheduled for a full ORI within approximately three years (four years for AFSOC-gained ANG units) from the date of the ORA initial assessment report.

7.1.3. The ORA or portions of it may be conducted during the contingency operation or after the unit redeploys to home station.

7.2. Administration:

7.2.1. The OPR for the ORA is the HQ AFSOC/IG. Assessments will be based on ORI criteria in this instruction and modified by HQ AFSOC/IG and HQ AFSOC directorates to reflect the unit and contingency.

7.2.2. The AFSOC/CC and HQ AFSOC/IG will determine if a unit is eligible for an ORA using the following guidelines:

7.2.2.1. The unit deploys in support of a JCS or theater-directed contingency operation within 6 months of, or within their inspection window.

7.2.2.2. The unit deploys a significant portion of its assigned forces.

7.2.2.3. The unit received a standard ORI within the last three years. A unit should not receive back-to-back ORA credit.

7.2.3. Definitions:

7.2.3.1. Full Credit. A unit receiving full credit has met the establish criteria of that major graded area or subarea and will not be inspected in that area or subarea during any follow-up training or inspection.

7.2.3.2. Partial Credit. A unit receiving partial credit has met some of the requirements of that major graded area or subarea but not enough to receive full credit. The unit must conduct specified follow-up training or be inspected during a tailored ORI to receive full credit.

7.2.3.3. No Credit. A unit receiving no credit has not met any of the requirements of that major graded area or subarea. They will conduct follow-up training or be inspected in that area to receive credit.

7.2.4. Follow-Up Training. Training used to validate a unit's skills or capabilities. This will include items required by the AFSOC directorates and will be approved and monitored by HQ AFSOC/IG.

7.2.5. Tailored ORI. An ORI designed by HQ AFSOC/IG to inspect specific areas not given ORA credit.

7.3. Implementation:

7.3.1. Initiating the ORA. HQ AFSOC/IG will inform HQ AFSOC and the unit being assessed via message that an ORA will be conducted. The message will identify the operation being assessed, the dates of the assessment, an HQ AFSOC/IG Point of Contact (POC), and direct the unit to save any data or material related to the operation.

7.3.2. Scheduling ORA activities. The HQ AFSOC/IG POC will coordinate with the unit to gather requested data and schedule interviews with requested unit personnel.

7.3.2.1. The assessed unit will make requested data available at the IG work center the morning of the first day of the assessment. A safe for storing classified material will be required in the work center.

7.3.2.2. The HQ AFSOC/IG POC will work with the unit to build a schedule allowing approximately one to two hours per interview period.

7.3.3. Customer Support. HQ AFSOC/IG will conduct interviews with organizations working with the assessed unit (i.e. higher headquarters, SOF components, etc.). The results of these interviews will be included in the Employment section under a subarea titled Customer Support.

7.3.4. Assessment Outbrief. The IG will conduct an outbrief with the commander and essential unit personnel upon completion of the assessment.

7.4. Grading:

7.4.1. The IG will write a memorandum after an ORA specifying the type of ORI credit the assessed unit received. Any findings noted will be documented in the memorandum and will be handled IAW AFSOCI 90-201, *AF Special Operations Command Inspection Program.* For ANG units, forward final memorandum to NGB-IGD at **ngbidg@ng.army.mil** for NGB tracking purposes.

7.4.1.1. The ORA memorandum will contain an overall assessment, ORI credit received, required follow up training or tailored inspections, and the timeframe for the next inspection.

7.4.1.2. If a major graded area receives partial credit, each subarea in that area will receive a grade of full, partial, or no credit to further define the specific area that did not meet requirements.

7.4.1.3. If required, an addendum to the original memorandum will be published after the assessed unit completes required follow-up training.

7.4.2. A unit given Full Credit for all ORI major graded areas will be credited with having completed an ORI and will normally be given a new projected ORI date of approximately 3 years (4 years for AFRC/ANG) from the date of the ORA memorandum. In the case of a unit earning Full Credit for all ORI major graded areas, the period between actual ORIs will not exceed 6 years (8 years for AFRC/ANG).

7.4.3. A unit given Partial Credit in any major graded area or subarea will either conduct follow-up training or be inspected in those areas not given full credit. HQ AFSOC/IG will determine if the unit will conduct follow-up training or receive a tailored ORI.

7.4.3.1. Follow-up training. HQ AFSOC/IG will be the HQ AFSOC POC for follow-up training. The appropriate HQ AFSOC directorate will serve as OPR. The assessed unit will schedule and conduct training in designated areas. HQ AFSOC/IG will monitor and validate the unit's performance during the training. The training will include items and events required by HQ AFSOC/IG to ensure unit readiness. The follow-up training/inspection will be completed within 6 months of the initial assessment.

7.4.3.1.1. If the unit's performance is unsatisfactory during the follow-up training, the unit will receive a tailored ORI on those areas deemed unsatisfactory, using criteria in AFSOCI 90-201, no later than 12 months after the ORA.

7.4.3.2. Tailored ORI. HQ AFSOC/IG will design and coordinate an area-specific ORI. The inspection will be conducted IAW AFSOCI 90-201.

7.4.3.3. Upon successful completion of follow-up training or a tailored ORI, units will be given a projected ORI date approximately 3 years (4 years for AFRC/ANG) from the date of the ORA memorandum. The next ORI date may be set up to 3 years from completion of the tailored ORI if the HQ AFSOC/IG determines that the tailored ORI was of significant enough scope to validate readiness of the majority of the unit's combat capabilities.

7.4.4. A unit given No Credit overall will receive an ORI; normally 3 years from the last accomplished ORI.

7.5. Responsibilities:

7.5.1. **HQ AFSOC Directorate Responsibilities:**

7.5.1.1. Provide qualified augmentees for the IG team.

7.5.1.2. Deconflict their SAVs with the IG assessment. HQ AFSOC SAVs should not be scheduled 60 days prior to or 60 days after a HQ AFSOC/IG assessment, unless specifically requested by the unit commander.

7.5.1.3. Assist units in correcting issues/findings identified during ORAs. Comply with AFSOCI 90-201 in addressing findings.

7.5.1.4. Provide input for required follow-up training.

7.5.2. **HQ AFSOC/IG Responsibilities:**

7.5.2.1. Schedule, conduct, and report on ORAs in accordance with this instruction.

7.5.2.2. Inform directorates of scheduled ORAs and solicit inputs and request augmentation as required.

7.5.2.3. Coordinate with the appropriate command authorities to conduct assessment activities during the contingency operation.

7.5.2.4. Coordinate with the unit's supported organizations for operations related material and to conduct interviews with requested personnel.

7.5.2.5. Assign an IG planner to establish and maintain liaison with the unit.

7.5.2.6. Coordinate with the assessed unit for inspection support.

7.5.2.7. Coordinate with the assessed unit and headquarter directorates to schedule follow up training.

7.5.2.8. Coordinate with the NGB and AFRC as required.

7.5.2.9. Provide funding for all inspection team members.

7.5.3. **Assessed Unit responsibilities:**

7.5.3.1. Save data or materials requested by HQ AFSOC/IG. The material will be made available to the inspection team at the start of the assessment.

7.5.3.2. Have requested personnel available for the inspection team to interview.

7.5.3.3. Schedule and conduct required follow-up training. Coordinate with HQ AFSOC/IG to ensure the training meets requirements.

7.5.3.4. Provide inspection team support as required by AFSOCI 90-201.

Chapter 8

QUIET RESPONSE INSPECTION

8.1. Policy.

8.1.1. The HQ AFSOC/IG conducts QUIET RESPONSE inspections with the primary focus on the Installation Emergency Management (EM) Program. Incident command and response capabilites will be emphasized rather than strict accomplishment of quick reaction checklists. QUIET RESPONSE inspections may be no notice (no notice is N/A for ARC and N/A for ANG).

8.1.2. Functional area inspectors are encouraged to to create their own inspection guides to aid in the conduct of the inspection. Inspected units should not use these functional area-generated guidesfor inspection preparation, but should train to EM standards outlined in AFI 10-2501 and AFMAN 10-2502.

8.2. Exercise Concept.

8.2.1. HQ AFSOC/IG will conduct QUIET RESPONSE inspections of AFSOC units IAW

AFI 90-201. The inspection will be focused on the wing's ability to to provide an integrated response to a full spectrum of physical threats. These threats include but are not limited to major accidents, natural disasters, enemy attacks, and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Commanders must be prepared to confront the threats and provide for the protection of personnel and installation resources while ensuring mission continuation. The following areas may be inspected during QUIET RESPONSE: emergency and crisis action plans (to include Incident Action Plans); command, control, and communications; Disaster Response Force (DRF) elements (Installation Control Center, Crisis Action Team, Emergency Operations Center, Unit Control Centers, First Responders, and Emergency Responders); response actions; and support and recovery teams.

8.3. Exercise Conduct.

8.3.1. QUIET RESPONSE inspections may be no-notice (no notice is N/A for ARC). HQ AFSOC/IG will direct execution of a QUIET RESPONSE inspection. The IG will normally only evaluate those areas required to mitigate the emergency.

8.3.2. QUIET RESPONSE communications: HQ AFSOC/IG-driven inspections are initiated by verbal or written exercise inputs. The initiation input will start with "this is a HQ AFSOC/IG QUIET RESPONSE Inspection." After initial notification, all communications will be preceded by the phrase " Exercise Message" and/or "Exercise, Exercise, Exercise."

8.3.2.1. QUIET RESPONSE scenarios: QUIET RESPONSE inspections will be structured to test the unit's integrated responses to a full spectrum of threats. Scenarios will be developed around an EM event and have a duration of approximately 4 to 8 hours.

8.3.2.2. HQ AFSOC/IG inspectors will not confront unit members with scenarios that could be interpreted as an actual hostile action. Under no circumstances will any HQ AFSOC/IG team member attempt to compromise security for the purpose of conducting an inspection.

8.3.2.3. Inspections will not compromise the safety of unit members. Actual emergencies will take immediate precedence over the inspection activities.

8.3.3. The HQ AFSOC/IG team will serve as Higher Headquarters (HHQ) for all inspection-associated events. Any reports, messages, or inquiries normally directed to HHQ will be presented by the inspected unit to the AFSOC IG Team Chief or designated representative. Units should aniticipate a response to such messages in a time frame commensurate with the scenario.

8.3.4. **Safety.**

8.3.4.1. Responsibilities. Unit commanders and supervisors at all echelons are responsible for ensuring flight, ground and weapons safety directives are followed. Aircrews will adhere to all directives, rules of engagemnt, and air traffic control clearances. If deviation from the QUIET RESPONSE scenario becomes necessary in the interest of safety, inform the IG Team Chief or an appropriate inspector of the condition or hazard and the deviation. Unsafe and/or potentially unsafe operations or conditions will be immediately stopped. The IG Team Chief or Wing Commander may temporarily halt the inspection for uncontrollable factors that may adversely affect safe operations. The unit commander is the final authority for launching missions and is responsible for the safety of unit aircraft, aircrews, support personnel and equipment.

8.3.4.2. Safety Violation. HQ AFSOC/IG inspectors will assess safety throughout the inspection. Violation of safety standards could impact ratings in those areas in which the violation is observed. Impact on ratings depends on the severity of the violation, and the impact and potential impact on unit readiness.

8.3.4.3. Major Safety Violation. A major safety violation is an unsafe act or condition, which results in or in the judgment of an inspector, could result in, serious damage to equipment or disabling injury to personnel.

8.3.4.4. Minor Safety Violation. A minor safety violation is an unsafe act or condition which results in, or in the judgment of an inspector could result in, damage to an aircraft that does not render it unsafe for flight, damage to equipment that does not render it unsafe for use, or less than disabling injury to personnel.

8.3.5. Security. The HQ AFSOC/IG will publish an Entry Access Listing (EAL) of inspectors. The EAL will be delivered to the Wing's Command Post upon commencement of the QUIET RESPONSE inspection.

8.3.6. Exercise Termination**.** The IG Team Chief will declare "ENDEX" when all major rated areas have been observed to make a full evaluation of the unit's ability to conduct operations.

8.3.7. Photography. IG personnel are authorized to carry cameras and photograph those areas under control of the unit being inspected.

8.3.8. **Communications with the IG Team.**

8.3.8.1. Prepare all messages and communications required by the inspection scenario. All required voice communication will be made to the IG vice the actual off-base controlling agency or authority. Maintain a copy of messages for IG review. Provide exercise records and logs as specified by the IG.

8.3.8.2. Telephone Conversations. Preface and close any telephone conversation that may be misinterpreted as an actual situation with "This is a Headquarters HQ AFSOC/IG inspection message." Also, when talking about casualties, accidents, or crashes, in relation to QUIET RESPONSE, use the term "Simulated."

8.3.9. **Message Preparation and Handling.**

8.3.9.1. Deliver all inspectiongenerated messages and reports directly to the IG Team Chief or his designee. Exercise traffic, not for transmission, will contain the following statement "FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY, DO NOT TRANSMIT." If using floppy disks/CDs, then the disk or releasing document will be labeled "FOR EXERCISE USE ONLY, DO NOT TRANSMIT."

8.3.9.2. A copy of exercise Crisis Action Team activation, deactivation, attainment reports, operational reports (OPREP-3), and situation reports (SITREP) will be completed and submitted to the Command Post/Crisis Action Team inspector.

8.3.9.3. A copy of all outgoing messages will be given to the Command Post/Crisis Action Team inspector.

8.3.10. **Simulations and Deviations.**

8.3.10.1. Approved simulations and deviations (standing or unit requested) do not relieve the unit from all responsibilities with regard to a specific item. Units must notify the inspector upon implementing an approved simulation or deviation. Unless told otherwise by the IG, resources (manpower and equipment) must be dedicated for the duration of the simulated task. If individuals or equipment are assigned to a task that is to be simulated, the individuals or equipment will not be available for another task until the simulated task time has expired. Submit all deviations/simulations to the Command Post/Crisis Action Team inspector via an AFSOC Form 19.

8.3.10.2. Message Preparation and Handling: Inspected units deliver all exercise record messages to the area IG inspector. "EXERCISE" must clearly appear above the message ID (MSGID) line and again on the bottom of the page.

8.3.10.2.1. Up-channel actual events and incidents occurring during the inspection period in according with applicable directives. Identify all inspection events and incidents to the inspection team.

8.3.10.2.2. Inspected units will not transmit inspection-related message traffic off base unless prior coordination is made with the IG Team Chief. The simulated time of transmission will be the time the message traffic is provided to the appropriate inspector.

8.3.10.3. Security and Custody: Critical C2, local, and remote monitoring facilities will not be evacuated.

8.3.10.4. Communications: Evacuation and destruction of COMSEC, classified, and two-person control materials will not be accomplished. Demonstration of capability must be shown.

8.3.10.5. Command and Control: Base-wide telephone service will not be disrupted. Mission-essential personnel will not evacuate the Command Post, Maintenance Control, Communications Center, Central Security Control, and medical aid facilities.

8.3.10.6. General Simulations and Deviations: The IG Team Chief, prior to implementation, will grant deviations/simulations on a case-by-case basis.

8.3.11. **Deliverables:** Inspected units will provide the following to the IG team upon arrival and execution of the QUIET RESPONSE inspection:

8.3.11.1. Six handheld radios, keyed and ready for immediate use, with discreet frequency if requested.

8.3.11.2. Key personnel list with phone numbers.

8.3.11.3. Work area with one desktop PC (loaded with latest AFSOC-standard MS Office software), one printer, one ream of paper, phone, and access to a shredder. These items do not need to be available until immediately following exercise to facilitate report generation.

8.4. Grading.

8.4.1. **General.** Inspectors will use a two-tier rating system for evaluating major areas. Inspectors will assign overall ratings to the highest level of organization being inspected based on performance and will use objective rating criteria whenever possible. However, the criteria are designed as a guide and not as a substitute for sound inspector judgment.

8.4.1.1. MEETS/EXCEEDS MISSION REQUIREMENTS: Performance or operation meets or exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist, but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

8.4.1.2. DOES NOT MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS: Performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist which preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

8.4.2. Overall Unit Grade. The IG Team Chief will use a two-tier rating system as outlined above for assigning the overall grade to the respective unit. The following major areas will be graded: Emergency and Crisis Action Plans, Command, Control, and Communications, Disaster Response Force Elements, Response Actions; and Support and Recovery teams. UNSATISFACTORY in any major area will result in an overall grade of UNSATISFACTORY.

8.5. Execution.

8.5.1. The IG will inspect the unit's ability to provide an integrated response to a full spectrum of physical threats. Commanders must be prepared to confront these threats and provide for the protection of installation resources. This inspection may inspect the complete incident response cycle, from planning to response, ability to maintain mission capability, and recovery. The scenario will drive what areas are evaluated.

8.5.2. Emergency and Contingency Response Plans. The IG will inspect the unit's ability to execute the installation's CEMP 10-2 and other applicable plans/checklists as described in governing regulations with regard to installation protection and EM.

8.5.3. **Areas Inspected.**

8.5.3.1. The IG may inspect the wing's implementation of the following plans:

8.5.3.1.1. Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 10-2.

8.5.3.1.2. Base Antiterrorism and Force Protection Plan and/or Installation Security Plan.

8.5.3.1.3. Medical Contingency Response Plan.

8.5.3.1.4. Civil Engineer Contingency Response Plan.

8.5.3.1.5. Appropriate Memorandums of Agreement and/or Memorandums of Understanding.

8.5.3.2. The IG may inspect the unit's command and control. This includes the accurate flow of information from key personnel to the Incident Commander (IC) and wing organizations as well as the accurate flow of information from the IC to leadership as required.

8.5.3.2.1. Unit Leadership: The IG may inspect the ability to support emergency activities, while ensuring maximum mission readiness. Areas of assessment may include:

8.5.3.2.1.1. Ability to manage isolation/recovery activities while executing the unit's mission as required based on scenario inputs.

8.5.3.2.1.2. Effectiveness of decision-making and risk management processes.

8.5.3.3. The IG may inspect elements of the installation's DRF to include the following:

8.5.3.3.1. Installation Control Center (ICC)/Crisis Action Team (CAT). The IG may inspect the management of readiness posture changes as required by AFSOC or theater directives as well as coordination with subordinate staff agencies. The IG will also evaluate ability to identify problems, reach effective solutions, and provide positive direction to execute those decisions.

8.5.3.3.2. Command Post. The IG may inspect the unit's ability to recall appropriate personnel and communicate pertinent information to affected on-and off-base personnel, communities, or organizations in a timely manner, and to execute required reporting (i.e. Voice, OPREP, or PINNACLE). **Note:** No QUIET RESPONSE communications will leave the base; communications to off-base agencies will be simulated accomplished once the controller provides the IG inspector with the message to be sent.

8.5.3.3.3. Unit Control Centers (UCC). The IG may inspect essential UCCs required for the successful mitigation of the emergency, their checklists, disaster response maps, communications equipment, alternate control centers, recall rosters, and the required logs to ensure completeness and accuracy. The UCCs that may be inspected

include, but are not limited to: Fire Alarm Communication Center, Central Security Control, and individual unit UCCs.

8.5.3.3.4. Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The IG may inspect the ability of the EOC (and the Emergency Support Functions [ESF]) to direct, monitor, and support the installation's action before, during, and after an incident. Additionally, the IG may inspect the ability of the EOC to support the IC's on-scene control at the incident. Only those ESFs required to mitigate the scenario will be inspected.

8.5.3.3.5. Incident Commander (IC). The IG may inspect the IC's ability to organize, control and support necessary emergency forces; IC-directed actions to mitigate damage, save lives and restore primary mission assets; and ability to control access to the scene IAW the AFIMS.

8.5.3.4. The IG may inspect the response actions of the following units/personnel:

8.5.3.4.1. Readiness and Emergency Management Flight (CEX). The IG may inspect CEX activities to include: support to the EOC Director and/or IC concerning major accident/incident, natural disaster response, recovery policies and procedures; hazard prediction using available software, decontamination operations and response capabilities (to include active CBRN response as well as HAZMAT team augmentation).

8.5.3.4.2. Senior Fire Officer (SFO)/Fire and Emergency Services. The IG may inspect the SFO as the IC, transfer of command to the IC upon arrival, information provided to calculate toxic corridor plotting, and withdrawal actions. Additionally, the IG may inspect fire protection activities required to conduct rescue, save lives, protect property, manage the incident, safety, emergency medicine, fire suppression, hazardous materials mitigation, decontamination, technical rescue, accountability, and other emergency activities as required.

8.5.3.4.3. Security Forces. The IG may inspect security measures used to protect classified materials, establish and maintain physical security of the disaster cordon, entry control point, and on-scene command points. Emphasis will be placed on the installation's ability to implement and execute security operations, protect personnel/resources, and respond to a terrorist attack involving a WMD, natural disaster, or major accident.

8.5.3.4.4. Bioenvironmental Engineering. The IG may inspect protective measures and equipment recommended to protect personnel from occupational, radiological and environmental health hazards, determinations for monitoring personnel, decontamination operations, contamination control requirements, response operations (to include active CBRN response and HAZMAT team augmentation) and proper control and reporting of environmental conditions.

8.5.3.4.5. Maintenance. The IG may inspect plans and procedures for the evacuation of aircraft and support equipment.

8.5.3.4.6. Munitions. The IG may inspect policy and guidance on weapon components and their recovery, and coordination with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) to meet or exceed EOD requirements per paragraph 8.5.3.4.12.

8.5.3.4.7. Logistics Readiness (Transportation). The IG may inspect the unit's ability to provide required transportation support to the IC and responding forces.

8.5.3.4.8. Force Support. The IG may inspect the unit's ability to meet food and lodging billeting operations, plan the procedures for recovery, identification, and disposition of human remains and other mortuary services.

8.5.3.4.9. Safety. The IG may inspect the ability of the safety staff to support and provide safety consultation services to the DCG response support teams.

8.5.3.4.10. Medical Response. The IG may inspect the unit's ability to respond, treat, report, and transport casualties as well as the ability to monitor and provide recommendations for environmental control based on the unit's Medical Contingency Response Plan (MCRP). The IG may inspect the senior medical member's ability to manage casualty flow and all activities required to triage, treat, and transport injured personnel, and actions taken to quarantine affected personnel and provide proper identification of those that might be at risk from biological or chemical contamination outside the immediate hazard zone.

8.5.3.4.11. Non-medical personnel will be inspected on Self-Aid/Buddy Care techniques.

8.5.3.4.12. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The IG may inspect the unit's ability to properly respond, render safe, dispose of, neutralize, and mitigate an EOD incident. The inspection may include, but not be limited to, an improvised explosive device (IED), WMD, or other explosive incident. The IG may inspect the senior EOD member's ability to control the EOD incident, the unit's capability to prepare, use and effectively employ equipment.

8.5.3.5. Support and Recovery Teams. The IG may inspect teams formed from base personnel supporting emergency response actions. The IG may also inspect equipment and or resources planned for use by any specialized team during an Emergency Management exercise.

8.5.3.5.1. Readiness Support Team. The IG may inspect the team's ability to provide the support required to mitigate the emergency.

8.5.3.5.2. HAZMAT Response Team. The IG may inspect the team's ability to support HAZMAT mitigation and decontamination efforts.

8.5.3.5.3. Contamination Control Team. The IG may inspect the team's ability to provide support to emergency operations.

8.5.3.5.4. Mortuary Search and Recovery Team. The IG may inspect the team's ability to perform search and recovery activities.

8.6. Quiet Response Report.

8.6.1. Report Content. The QUIET RESPONSE Report will contain a description of the exercise and overall grades, for each area inspected. Each graded area will have comments detailing strengths and areas for improvement.

8.6.2. Report Delivery. The QUIET RESPONSE Report will be delivered to the unit commander the day following the actual inspection.

8.6.3. The IG will conduct a small, informal outbrief with the unit commander and essential unit personnel.

8.6.4. The report will be posted on the HQ AFSOC/IG SIPR web address at **www.afsoc.af.smil.mil/ig**.

JOHN A. GLAZE, Colonel, USAF
Inspector General

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

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AFSOC Form 19, *Inspection Communication*

Adopted Forms

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

A1—Manpower, Personnel & Services

A1S—Services Division

A2—Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance

A3/5—Operations, Plans & Requirements

A4—Logistics

A4L—Directorate of Logistics

A7—Installations & Mission Support

A7C—The Civil Engineer

A7S—Security Forces & Force Protection

A8—Strategic Plans & Programs

A9—Studies & Analysis, Assessments & Lessons Learned

A10—Strategic Deterrence & Nuclear Integration

A10O—Operations & Integration Division

AAAHC—Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Healthcare

AA&E—Arms, Ammunition, & Explosive

AALPS—Automated Air Load Planning System

ABW—Air Base Wing

ACC—Air Combat Command

ACDE—Aircrew Chemical Defense Ensemble

ACES—Automated Civil Engineering System

ACF—Analysis, Correlation and Fusion

ACO—Airspace Control Order [AOC]

ACP—Airspace Control Plan [AOC]

AD—Active Duty

ADP—Airspace Defense Plan [AOC]

ADR—Airfield Damage Repair

AE—Aeromedical Evacuation

AECS—Automated Entry Control System

AECT—Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team [AOC]

AEF—Air and Space Expeditionary Force

AF—Air Force

AFAA—Air Force Audit Agency

AFE—Aircrew Flight Equipment

AFFARS—Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement [AOC]

AFFOR—Air Force Forces [AOC]

AFH—Air Force Handbook

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFIA—Air Force Inspection Agency

AFIMS—Air Force Incident Management System

AFJI—Air Force Joint Instruction

AFMAN—Air Force Manual

AFMC—Air Force Materiel Command

AFMS—Air Force Medical Service

AFOSH—Air Force Occupational & Environmental Safety, Fire Protection, & Health

AFOSI—Air Force Office of Special Investigations

AFPD—Air Force Policy Directive

AFRC—Air Force Reserve Command

AFRP—Air Force Recurring Publication

AFRIMS—Air Force Records and Information Management System

AFRP—Air Force Recurring Publication

AFSC—Air Force Specialty Code

AFSFC—Air Force Security Forces Center

AFSFC/SFO—Air Force Security Forces Center, Operations Division

AFSO21—Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century

AF/ST—Air Force Chief Scientist

AFVA—Air Force Visual Aid

AG—Auditor General

ALCT—Airlift Control Team [AOC]

AMC—Air Mobility Command

AMCT—Air Mobility Control Team [AOC]

ANG—Air National Guard

AOC—Air and Space Operations Center

AOD—Airspace Operations Directive [AOC]

AOR—Area of Responsibility

APO—Army Post Office

AQ—Acquisitions

AQR—Science, Technology, & Engineering

ARC—Air Reserve Component

ARCT—Air Refueling Control Team [AOC]

ARSW—Armament Systems Wing

ART—AEF Reporting Tool

AT—Antiterrorism

ATO—Air Tasking Order

ATSO—Ability To Survive and Operate

AW—Airlift Wing

BEEF—Base Engineer Emergency Force

BSAT—Biological Select Agents and Toxins

BW—Bomb Wing

C2—Command and Control

C3—Command, Control, and Communications

C4—Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

CA—Combat Assessment [AOC]

CARS—Corrective Action Report Status

CAS—Combat Ammunition System

CAT—Crisis Action Team

CBDRT—Chemical Biological Defense Report

CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear

CC—Commander

CCA—Contamination Control Area

CCCA—Common Core Compliance Area

CCI—Critical Compliance Item

CCRC—Common Core Readiness Criteria

CDD—Capability Development Document

CEMP—Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CFETP—Career Field Education Training Plan

CI—Compliance Inspection

CII—Command Interest Item

CJCS—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

CMOS—Cargo Movement Operating System

C-NAF—Component-Numbered Air Force

COA—Course of Action

COCOM—Combatant Command [AOC]

COCSP—Contingency Operational Contracting Support Program [AOC]

COD—Combat Operations Division [AOC]

COMPUSEC—Computer Security

COMSEC—Communications Security

COOP—Continuity of Operations

COP—Community of Practice

CP—Command Post

CPD—Combat Plans Division [AOC]

CPI—Continuous Process Improvement

CSAF—Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CSNI—Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

CSW—Combat Support Wing

CTIP—Combating Trafficking In Person; also known as TIP – Trafficking In Persons

CV—Vice Commander

DCAPES—Deliberate Crisis Action Planning & Execution Segments

DCP—Disease Containment Plan

DEERS—Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System

DFARS—Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement

DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency

DMF—Deployed Medical Facility [AOC]

DMPI—Desired Mean Point of Impact [AOC]

DNSI—Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection

DOC—Designed Operational Capability

DOD—Department of Defense

DODD—Department of Defense Directive

DODI—Department of Defense Instruction

DOD IG—Inspector General, Department of Defense

DRF—Disaster Response Force

DRU—Direct Reporting Unit

DTRA—Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EAM—Emergency Action Message

EAP—Emergency Action Plan/Procedures

ECF—Entry Control Facility

EESOHCAMP—Energy, Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Compliance Assessment Management Program

EET—Exercise Evaluation Team

EM—Emergency Management

EO—Equal Opportunity

EOC—Emergency Operations Center

EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal

ESS—Electronic Security System

FAM—Functional Area Manager

FAR—Federal Acquisition Regulation

FES—Fire Emergency Services

FESAP—FES Assessment Program

FHP—Force Health Protection

FLAG—Forward Location Aircraft Generation

FM—Financial Management

FMFIA—Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act

FOA—Field Operating Agency

FOC—Full Operational Capability

FoF—Force-on-Force (exercise)

FOIA—Freedom of Information Act

FOUO—For Official Use Only

FRI—Federal Recognition Inspection

FSS—Force Support Squadron

FTX—Field Training Exercise

FVAP—Federal Voting Assistance Program

FW—Fighter Wing

FY—Fiscal Year

GC—General Counsel

GCCS—Global Command & Control System

GD—Guidance

GI & S—Geospatial Information and Services

GPC—Government Purchase Card

GSORTS—Global Status of Resources and Training System

HAF—Headquarters Air Force

HAZMAT—Hazardous Materials

HC—Chaplain Corps

HHQ—Higher Headquarters

HO—Historian

HQ—Headquarters

H.R.—House Record

HSI—Health Services Inspection

HVI—High Value Initiative

IAW—In Accordance With

IBDSS—Integrated Base Defense Security System

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICC—Installation Control Center (formerly known as Battle Staff or Wing Operations Center (WOC))

IDS—Intrusion Detection Systems

IE—Installation, Environment, & Logistics

IEPO—Installation Exercise Program Office

IG—Inspector General

IGDI—Inspector General Directed Inspection

IGEMS—Inspector General Evaluation Management System

IGI—Inspections Directorate

IGQ—Complaints Resolution Directorate

INFOSEC—Information Security

INSI—Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection

INTRO—Individual Newcomer Treatment & Orientation

IO—Inspections and Oversight Directorate

IPE—Individual Protective Equipment

ISR—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance [AOC]

ISRD—ISR Division [AOC]

IT—Information Technology

IW—Information Warfare [AOC]

JA—Judge Advocate

JAOP—Joint Air Operations Plan [AOC]

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC—Joint Force Air Component Commander [AOC]

JFC—Joint Force Commander [AOC]

JIPOE—Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Environment [AOC]

JIPTL—Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List [AOC]

JOA—Joint Operations Area [AOC]

KNB—Key Nuclear Billet

LIMFAC—Limiting Factor

LL—Legislative Liaison

LNSI—Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection

LOAC—Law of Armed Conflict

LOGMOD—Logistics Module

LPS—Lightning Protection System

MAAP—Master Air Attack Plan [AOC]

MAJCOM—Major Command

MAOS—Minimum Airfield Operating Strip

MASO—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer

MCL—Maintenance Capability Letter

MCRP—Medical Contingency Response Plan

MGA—Major Graded Area

MICAP—Mission Capable

MILES—Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System

MMNSI—Multi-MAJCOM Nuclear Surety Inspection

MOE—Measures of Effectiveness

MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture

MOU—Memorandum of Understanding

MR—Manpower & Reserve Affairs

MRSP—Management of the Readiness Spares Packages

MSK—Mission Support Kits

MTF—Military Treatment Facility

MUMG—Munitions Maintenance Group

MUNS—Munitions Squadron

MUNSS—Munitions Support Squadrons

MW—Missile Wing

MWD—Military Working Dog

NAF—Numbered Air Force

NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBCC—Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, & Conventional

NCCS—Nuclear Command & Control System

NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act

NEREP—Nuclear Execution & Reporting Plan

NFPA—National Fire Protection Agency

NGB—National Guard Bureau

NGB—**IGD**—National Guard Bureau, Deputy Inspector General

NLT—No Later Than

NOB—Nuclear Oversight Board

NORI—Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspection

NOSC—**D**—Network Operations and Security Center - Deployed [AOC]

NSG—Nuclear Systems Group

NSI—Nuclear Surety Inspection

NSIC—Nuclear Surety Inspector Course

NSS—Nuclear Systems Squadron

NSTCA—Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment

NWRM—Nuclear Weapons Related Materiel

NWSS—Nuclear Weapons Security Standard

NWTI—Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection

OAT—Operational Assessment Team

OCR—Office of Collateral Responsibility

OPFOR—Opposing Force

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OPSEC—Operations Security

OPTASK LINK—Operational Tasking Data Link

ORF—Official Representation Fund

ORI—Operational Readiness Inspection

ORM—Operational Risk Management

OSD—Office of the Secretary of Defense

PA—Public Affairs

P&S—Plans & Scheduling

PBSA—Performance-based Services Acquisition

PDF—Personnel Deployment Function

PED—Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

PERSCO—Personnel Support for Contingency Operations

PI—Process Integration

PNAF—Prime Nuclear Airlift Force

POC—Points of Contact

POW—Prisoners of War

PPR—Periodic Performance Review

PRE—Personnel Readiness Element

PRP—Personnel Reliability Program

PS—Personnel

PWS—Performance Work Statement

QA—Quality Assurance

RAP—Ready Aircrew Program

RCA—Root Cause Analysis

RDS—Records Disposition Schedule

RDT&E—Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

RED HORSE—Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineer

RF—Response Force

RIA—Recommended Improvement Area

RIBS—Readiness in Base Services

ROE—Rules of Engagement

RSP—Render Safe Procedures

SABC—Self-Aid Buddy Care

SAC—Semiannual Compendium

SAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SAPR—Sexual Assault Prevention & Response

SARC—Sexual Assault Response Coordinator

SB—Scientific Advisory Board

SD—Strategy Division [AOC]

SE—Safety

SECAF—Secretary of the Air Force

SEI—Special Emphasis Items

SERE—Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape

SEW—Weapons Safety Division

SF—Security Force

SG—Surgeon General

SGT—Strategy Guidance Team

SI—Surveillance Inspection

SII—Special Interest Item

SITREP—Situational Report

SME—Subject Matter Expert

SNCO—Senior Non-Commissioned Officer

SO—AFSO21

SOF—Special Operations Forces

SOLE—Special Operations Liaison Element

SORTS—Status of Resources & Training System

SPINS—Special Instructions

SPT—Strategy Plan Team

STINFO—Scientific & Technical Information

STO—Special Technical Operations [AOC]

STRIKEVAL—Strike Evaluation

TACC—Tanker Airlift Control Center

TACEVAL—Tactical Evaluation

TACOPDATA—Tactical Operations Data

TACS—Theater Air Control System [AOC]

TAP—Transition Assistance Program

TCNO—Time Compliance Network Order

TE—Test & Evaluation

TET—Target Effects Team

TIC—Toxic Industrial Chemical

TIG—The Inspector General

TIM—Toxic Industrial Material

TIP—Trafficking in Persons

T.O.—Technical Order

TPFDD—Time Phased Force Deployment Data

TPS—Transportation Protective Service

TSART—Tanker Strategic Aircraft Generation Team

TST—Time Sensitive Targeting [AOC]

TTP—Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UCC—Unit Control Center

UCML—Unit Committed Munitions Lists

UCNI—Unclassified Nuclear Information

UIF—Unfavorable Information File

UMD—Unit Manning Document

UPMR—Unit Personnel Management Roster

US—United States

USAF—United States Air Force

USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe

USC—United States Code

USSTRATCOM—United States Strategic Command

UTC—Unit Type Code

VA—Victim Advocates

VAP—Voting Assistance Program

VI—Vitual Information

WII—Wounded, Ill, and Injured

WIMS—Work Information Management System

WPM—Wood Packaging Material

WR—War Reserve

XC—Warfighting Integration & Chief Information Officer

Terms

Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO)—The ability to conduct the full range of contingency operations while simultaneously responding to or recovering from enemy attack, state/non-state use of CBRN, major accidents, natural disasters, or Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT).

Air Force Emergency Management (EM) Program—The single, integrated Air Force program to coordinate and organize efforts to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the direct and indirect consequences of an emergency or attack. The primary missions of the Air Force EM program are to (1) save lives, (2) minimize the loss or degradation of resources, and (3) continue, sustain, and restore combat and combat support operational

capability in an all-hazards physical threat environment at Air Force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the Air Force EM program are to support homeland defense and civil support operations and to provide support to civil and host nation authorities IAW DOD directives and through the appropriate Combatant Command. The Air Force EM program is managed by the Office of The Civil Engineer, AF/A7C. Previously known as Base Disaster Plan (BDP) and Full Spectrum Threat Response (FSTR). Within AFSOC the EM program is managed by the AFSOC/A7 Director Installations and Mission Support.

Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21)—An objective assessment of key Air Force processes focused on improvement. AFSO21 tools and techniques are applied to promote process improvement, eliminate waste, and create a feasible action plan.

Best Practice—A superior method or innovative practice that contributes significantly to improved performance of a process.

Compliance Inspection (CI)—Inspections conducted to assess areas mandated by law as well as mission areas that are critical or important to the health and performance of organizations. Unit failure to comply with the established directives in these areas could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or mission impact.

Compliance Major Graded Area (MGA)—Key processes, procedures, or requirements based on bylaw requirements, executive orders, DOD directives (DODD), Air Force, MAJCOM, or applicable Air National Guard instructions.

Critical Deficiency—Any deficiency that results or could result in widespread mission impact or failure.

Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI)—A Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Deficiency—A validated inspection finding or observation (severity level of Critical, Significant or Minor).

EXCELLENT—The grade given to indicate performance or operation exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and relatively free of deficiencies.

Federal Recognition Inspection (FRI)—An inspection conducted to confirm that a unit (the organized militia of a State) meets the qualifications prescribed for the organization and composition of the ANG.

IN COMPLIANCE—Program or operation complies with governing directives and supports mission accomplishment. Deficiencies may exist but do not impede mission accomplishment**.**

IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMENTS—Program or operation does not comply with all governing directives and does not meet some mission requirements. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI)—An inspection to evaluate a unit's readiness to assume or resume a nuclear mission or to evaluate and certify new or significantly modified maintenance and storage facilities or significant changes to weapons systems or portions thereof.

Inspector General Directed Investigation (IGDI)—A high priority investigation directed by The Inspector General.

Limited Inspection—An inspection with a reduced scope and scale. Limited inspections do not reset the clock for maximum inspection intervals.

Limited Nuclear Surety Inspection (LNSI)—A limited scope inspection, which does not evaluate all NSI areas applicable to the unit. LNSIs do not alter the 18-month NSI requirement.

Limiting Factor (LIMFAC)—A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are transportation network deficiencies, lack of inplace facilities, malpositioned forces or materiel, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit or over flight rights, political conditions, etc.

MARGINAL—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet some mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an efficient manner. Resources and programs are not efficiently managed. Deficiencies exist that impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Minimal-Notice Inspection—An inspection conducted with less than 45 days notice to the inspected organization.

Minor Deficiency—A validated deficiency that does not meet the definition for a Critical or Significant Deficiency but requiring corrective action.

No-Notice Inspection—An inspection conducted with less than 72 hours notice to the inspected organization.

NOT IN COMPLIANCE—Program or operation does not comply with key elements of governing directives. Significant deficiencies exist that could result in legal liabilities, penalties, or significant mission impact.

Nuclear-Capable—A support designation that indicates a unit has the capability to support the reception, storage, or handling of nuclear WR. This designation does not confirm or deny the actual presence of assets.

Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI)—A compliance-based inspection conducted to evaluate a unit's ability to manage nuclear resources while complying with all nuclear surety standards.

Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI)—An evaluation of operational readiness or ability to conduct combat operations in wartime for any unit with a wartime mission.

OUTSTANDING—The grade given to indicate performance or operation far exceeds mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in a far superior manner. Resources and programs are very efficiently managed and are of exceptional merit. Minimal deficiencies exist.

Readiness Major Graded Area (MGA)—Criteria that establish an Air Force-wide common readiness standard for evaluation of like units or organizations.

Recommended Improvement Area (RIA)—An identified process, product, or capability which could be improved by a suggested course of action. RIAs will not be used in lieu of minor deficiencies.

SATISFACTORY—The grade given to indicate performance or operation meets mission requirements. Procedures and activities are carried out in an effective and competent manner. Resources and programs are efficiently managed. Minor deficiencies may exist but do not impede or limit mission accomplishment.

Significant Deficiency—A validated deficiency that has or could have significant mission impact.

Special Interest Item (SII)—An area of focus for management; used to gather data and assess the status of specific programs and conditions in the field.

Strength—An area that far exceeds compliance directives or mission requirements and/or expectations.

UNSATISFACTORY—The grade given to indicate performance or operation does not meet mission requirements. Procedures and activities are not carried out in an adequate manner. Resources and programs are not adequately managed. Significant deficiencies exist that preclude or seriously limit mission accomplishment.

Wartime Material Support (WMS)—The ability for a unit to accelerate its core-mission operations in response to a wartime contingency. Depending upon the type of inspected unit, the IG presents wartime scenarios requiring acceleration in the following areas: acquisition, test, science and technology, or depot operations.

Attachment 2

HQ AFSOC/IG INSPECTION SUPPORT LISTING

A2.1. Facilities: All facilities must have sufficient 110-W, 60-Hz electrical outlets to power all IG equipment. If this is not available, sufficient transformers and/or adapters will be provided.

A2.1.1. Area(s) with desks, tables, and chairs for all inspectors.

A2.1.2. One private room for the IG.

A2.1.3. One private office for the team chief.

A2.1.4. One private office, away from the IG work center, for Inspector General Complaints.

A2.1.5. One room for team meetings (up to 15 people) and later to be used as briefing preparation room.

A2.1.6. Billeting for team.

A2.1.7. Out-brief area with space for maximum participation, adequate public address capability, and dual screen video projection capability (ORI only).

A2.1.8. Lighted work area inside CAT room to accommodate two inspectors (ORI only).

A2.2. Transportation:

A2.2.1. Bus to move team from and to airport.

A2.2.2. Covered vehicle and detail to transport team baggage from and to airport.

A2.2.3. Vehicles to conduct inspection (if no rental vehicles are available).

A2.2.4. Driver's safety briefing upon arrival for local area, flight line, etc.

A2.2.5. Arrangements made for any special licensing requirements (primarily for overseas inspections).

A2.2.6. Reserved parking slots at work center and billeting.

A2.2.7. Instructions on vehicle refueling procedures (GOV vehicles).

A2.3. Telephone:

A2.3.1. Dedicated type 3 (on-base, local off-base, and routine DSN capability) line with a STE for IG.

A2.3.2. Two dedicated type 3 lines, one with a STE, and one type 1 (on-base capability) for the inspectors work area.

A2.3.3. Three direct dial, dedicated DSN line for electronic mail capability. A 1-800 access line will meet this requirement.

A2.4. Equipment:

A2.4.1. Three projectors for outbrief (2 primary, 1 backup), two of these need to be available during practice (ORI only).

A2.4.2. Two lecterns with small reading lights and microphones for outbrief (ORI only).

A2.4.3. Two power strips (with ability for seven power slots) and extension cords.

A2.4.4. Pyrotechnics (GBS and smoke generators) if required for inspection scenario, number to be determined by planners.

A2.4.5. Two computers equipped with current AFSOC standard software.

A2.4.6. Two laser printers.

A2.4.7. One copier.

A2.4.8. Fax machine.

A2.4.9. Four land mobile radios loaded with command, security, maintenance, and discreet IG nets for ISB and FOB's (ORI/ROV only).

A2.4.10. Life support equipment to include Night Vision Goggles (NVG) for all IG flyers.

A2.4.11. Shredder (approved to destroy classified/FOUO material).

A2.5. Supplies:

A2.5.1. Reams of paper – 12, Dictionaries – 2, Thesaurus – 2.

A2.5.2. In/Out baskets – 6.

A2.5.3. Base and local telephone books – 4 each.

A2.5.4. Unit key personnel rosters – 4, Staff directories – 4.

A2.5.5. White board with dry erase markers or tripod with poster paper – 2.

A2.5.6. Current UMD – 1.

A2.5.7. ASCAS roster – 1.

A2.5.8. One or two drawer safe cleared for classified storage– 1.

A2.5.9. Base maps – 4.

A2.5.10. Coffee pots – 2.

A2.5.11. Trash cans and trash bags.

A2.5.12. Vacuum, if facility is carpeted (provide on the last day of inspection).

A2.6. Products provided prior to or upon arrival:

A2.6.1. SII and compliance POC listing with office symbols and phone numbers.

A2.6.2. Risk assessment and OPSEC vulnerability assessment package on work center.

Attachment 3

SAMPLE LETTER TO REQUEST AFSOC SPECIFIC COMPLIANCE MGA

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFSOC/IG

FROM: HQ AFSOC/2-digit (Requesting Director)

SUBJECT: Request AFSOC-Specific Compliance MGA and Sub-areas.

1. Request HQ AFSOC/CV approval to add an AFSOC-Specific Compliance MGA and Sub-areas to current compliance inspection criteria IAW AFSOCI 90-201. (Add justification here.) The inspection checklist to be utilized for inspecting this additional CCCA is included as Attachment 1.

2. My POCs are Capt John Doe, at DSN 579-5555, air.commando@hurlburt.af.mil.

                                        I. M. READY, Colonel, USAF
                                        Director

Attachments
1. Proposed AFSOC-Specific Compliance MGA Checklist

Attachment 4

SAMPLE LETTER TO REQUEST A READINESS OBSERVATION VISIT (ROV)

MEMORANDUM FOR HQ AFSOC/IG

FROM: 885th Special Operations Unit/CC (Requesting Unit)

SUBJECT: Request for a Readiness Observation Visit

1. 885th Special Operations Unit requests a Readiness Observation Visit by the AFSOC Inspector General. Request you observe the following areas: (Describe the areas to be observed using the major graded areas and common core readiness criteria outlined in AFI 90-201, paragraph 2.2. and Attachment 5. The IG can observe and provide feedback on all or some of the four ORI major graded areas - i.e. Initial Response, Mission Support, Employment, and ATSO. Please be specific, as this information will help determine IG team size and overall scope of the ROV.)

2. The proposed dates for this visit are 10 Jul XX through 28 Jul XX. If these are unavailable, alternate dates are 12 Apr XX through 20 Apr XX.

3. Our unit POCs are Capt John, at DSN 579-5555, air.commando@hurlburt.af.mil and SMSgt Ready, at DSN 579-2222, air.commando1@hurlburt.af.mil.

                                             I.M. READY, Colonel, USAF
                                             Unit Commander

Attachment 5

CI AND SI PLANNING TABLE

RESERVED

Attachment 6

SPECIAL OPERATIONS LIAISON ELEMENT (SOLE) ORI

A6.1. General. SOLE Inspection criteria is derived from assigned Mission Essential Tasks (METs), AFSOCI 13-101, *Operational Procedures SOLE,* AFSOCI 90-202, *Operational Readiness Inspections,* and AFI 90-201, *Inspector General Activities.* Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) inspection criteria is derived from ACCI 90-201, Addendum H, *Air and Space Operations Center Operational Readiness Inspections.*

A6.1.1. This document does not constitute the order or limit the scope of the inspection or assessment. ORI objective is to validate readiness and identify deficiencies that preclude attainment of required capabilities. Inspection authority resides in AFI 90-201 and SOCOM Directive 525-7, *SOLE Program Management.*

A6.1.2. The IG will assign an overall grade to the highest level of organization based on performance in four readiness major graded areas: Positioning the Force, Employing the Force, Ability to Survive and when applicable, Sustaining the Force. The IG will identify and report problem areas with root causes outside SOLE control as extract findings or observations.

A6.1.3. ORI Grading. The inspected unit will be evaluated on its ability to successfully integrate SOF into AOC operations IAW established tactics, techniques and procedures. Extenuating circumstances should be considered before awarding a grade. The IG Team Chief may assign a grade that more appropriately reflects observed performance regardless of statistical results. In such cases, the IG will provide an explanation in the written report.

A6.1.3.1. When applicable, the IG will apply the following five-tier grading scale to rate overall unit performance:

A6.1.3.1.1. OUTSTANDING. Employment "Outstanding", Mission Support and Initial Response at least "Excellent" and ATSO at least "Satisfactory."

A6.1.3.1.2. EXCELLENT. Employment plus one graded area "Excellent" with remaining at least "Satisfactory."

A6.1.3.1.3. SATISFACTORY. Employment plus two graded areas at least "Satisfactory" with remaining at least "Marginal."

A6.1.3.1.4. MARGINAL. Employment plus two graded areas at least "Marginal."

A6.1.3.1.5. UNSATISFACTORY. Does not meet criteria. **Note:** Overall grade should be no higher than the Employment grade.

A6.1.3.2. Readiness major graded areas sub-areas will receive a rating in accordance with the performance scale described below:

A6.1.3.2.1. Mission Ready (MR)**:** Organization is properly trained, organized, and equipped to conduct assigned missions. No deficiencies noted.

A6.1.3.2.2. Mission Ready with Deficiencies (MRD): Organization is properly trained, organized, and equipped to conduct assigned missions. Minor deficiencies or process improvements noted.

A6.1.3.2.3. Not Mission Ready (NMR): Unit has significant shortfalls that will negatively impact ability to conduct assigned missions.

A6.2. Inspection Overview. SOLE inspections normally take place in conjunction with AOC ORIs. The AOC is organized to centrally plan, direct, control and coordinate JFACC assigned assets in support of Joint Force Commander (JFC) objectives. While the SOLE is integral to AOC operations, it is owned by the JFSOCC and is not subject to AOC inspection criteria.

A6.2.1. The IG will schedule, coordinate and conduct inspection planning conferences with assistance from other participating units. Inspection planning conferences and associated exercise planning activities should clearly outline inspection requirements, concept of operations, and responsibilities of participants. Careful consideration must be given to ensure full integration of inspection objectives into the exercise construct.

A6.2.2. Small Sample Size. Situations may exist where components of the SOLE are not fully employed by the exercise scenario and/or available to participate in the exercise. Under these conditions the IG Team Chief may declare an area "Not Rated" due to limited sample size/level-of-effort. This determination is normally made prior to the inspection.

A6.2.3. Limiting Factors (LIMFACs). When approved LIMFACs affect an area rating, the IG Team Chief will take extenuating circumstances under advisement. The IG Team Chief will fully explain the impact of unclassified LIMFACs on combat capability in the written report.

A6.3. Inspection Concept. SOLE ORIs evaluate interoperability between the SOLE and the AOC, JSOTF, and JSOAC in accordance with governing instructions and concepts established by theater Operation Plans. The SOLE is responsible for managing/utilizing augmentation in the most efficient manner.   The IG will report training deficiencies or degraded augmentee performance as extract deficiencies to the appropriate organization.

A6.3.1. When possible, conduct the ORI as part of a joint computer-assisted exercise in order to model realistic Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I) environments. When possible, base the exercise scenario on planning factors and concepts of operations outlined in theater Operation Plans.

A6.3.2. HQ AFSOC/IG will work closely with the host MAJCOM IG to ensure the ORI vehicle supports efforts to validate SOLE readiness. HQ AFSOC/IG will normally integrate into host IG inspection processes.   The IG Team Chief will align/deconflict AFSOC inspection processes with the host IG battle rhythm.

A6.3.3. Inspection Team Composition. Inspection team composition is based upon exercise requirements and projected SOLE manning and level-of-effort. A fully manned SOLE conducting 24/7 operations will drive the following inspection team requirement:

A6.3.3.1. Team Chief. Responsible for managing inspection process; AFSOC and host MAJCOM/IG interface; AFSOC Inspection Report; inspecting Command and Control (C2) processes.

A6.3.3.2. Inspection Support Manager. Responsible for team support and inspection report development and publication.

A6.3.3.3. C2 Subject Matter Expert (SME). Responsible for evaluating overarching C2 processes and serves as primary interface between the exercise control group and the IG Team.

A6.3.3.4. SOLE SME (Day). Responsible for evaluating Strategy/Plans and Combat Operations. Works with C2 SME to ensure continuity of inspection.

A6.3.3.5. SOLE SME (Night). Responsible for evaluating Strategy/Plans and Combat Operations. Works with C2 SME to ensure continuity of inspection.

A6.3.3.6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) SME. Responsible for evaluating ISR Plans and Operations. Works with C2 SME to ensure continuity of inspection.

A6.3.3.7. Logistics SME. Responsible for evaluating SOLE logistics support to theater SOF.

A6.3.3.8. Communications SME. Responsible for evaluating SOLE Communications support to ongoing mission requirements.

A6.3.3.9. Information Management SME. Responsible for evaluating SOLE IM support to ongoing mission requirements.

A6.3.4. **Exercise Control Group (ECG):** The ECG is the formal organization tasked with oversight and management of the exercise during execution. Exercise control is a process that guides and directs the exercise toward achievement of desired training objectives. HQ AFSOC/IG participates in this process to secure inspection objectives. Exercise control ensures the training/inspection audience receives a coherent, seamless presentation of scenario activities through the management of simulation models and Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) execution.

A6.3.4.1. The overall purpose of exercise control is to:

A6.3.4.1.1. Ensure that simulation and scripted scenario events remain technically and operationally synchronized.

A6.3.4.1.2. Track the accomplishment of critical scenario events and training objectives.

A6.3.4.1.3. Steer the scenario by means of control intervention in the models or scripted events.

A6.3.4.2. Effective exercise control may require exercise controller intervention to facilitate required outcomes or to refocus training/inspection audience objectives. The IG normally has representation on/or will establish liaison with the ECG to ensure ORI objectives are integrated and considered during execution. The IG must engage the planning process during concept development for this relationship to be effective.

A6.3.5. **MSEL.**

A6.3.5.1. The MSEL is used by the ECG to drive execution of pre-planned exercise objectives and to sequence exercise events. The IG participates in exercise planning to ensure the MSEL complements/supports the inspection construct. In cases where the exercise does not engage required inspection activities the IG may develop internal, self-

contained scenarios to ensure adequate coverage of all inspected areas. Close coordination between the IG and the ECG is critical to ensure deconfliction of events/minimize the risk of disrupting the exercise or inspection.

A6.3.5.2. Exercises governed by the Joint Exercise Program use the CJCS MSEL Tool for building and executing the MSEL. IG planners must be familiar with this tool to effectively integrate ORI requirements into the host exercise. The IG can influence or add MSEL events during execution provided they do not adversely impact the exercise. For example, the IG can introduce a PR or an emergency exfiltration scenario to drive desired inspection activities.

A6.3.6. Part Task Evaluation (PTE). PTEs are self-contained events that do not interfere with the exercise. Use PTEs to generate SOLE activity not driven by the exercise scenario/MSEL. For example, the IG can request SOLE personnel describe the process for coordinating time sensitive targets to demonstrate procedures.

A6.3.7. Report Writing. HQ AFSOC/IG will normally provide inputs to the host MAJCOM IG for inclusion into the AOC ORI report. Inputs focus on interoperability and AOC support to the SOLE. HQ AFSOC/IG will also publish a separate report for the SOF chain of command.

A6.3.8. Delays. If conditions force a delay/interruption of ORI events, the IG Team Chief in coordination with the host MAJCOM IG may suspend the inspection until conditions warrant continuation.

A6.3.9. Safety. The SOLE Director is responsible for ensuring safety directives are followed. If safety issues drive deviations in the exercise scenario the IG Team Chief will ensure AFSOC inspectors are aware of changes/impacts.

A6.3.10. Security. IG will provide an Entry Authority List (EAL) as prescribed in AFI 31-101, *The Air Force Installation Security Program*, to the host MAJCOM IG for publication and distribution. Authenticate the EAL in accordance with AFI 31101.

A6.3.11. IG personnel will not present situations that could be interpreted as hostile action.

A6.3.12. ORI Termination. The IG Team Chief will terminate the ORI by written correspondence, or a pre-determined time/event. Following ORI termination, inspected units can anticipate an additional two days of validation/report writing prior to the ORI out-brief.

A6.3.13. Photography. Coordinate all requirements for photography through the host MAJCOM IG. Under no circumstances should photographs be taken without proper authority.

Attachment 7

ORI COMMONLY INSPECTED TASKS

A7.1. Positioning the Force.

A7.1.1. **Command and Control (C2).**

A7.1.1.1. CAT/Battlestaff.

A7.1.1.1.1. Readiness Action Management. Evaluate CAT management of readiness posture changes IAW AFSOC or theater directives. Determine the impact of incomplete actions. Evaluate subordinate UCCs on their ability to complete local actions and comply with directives.

A7.1.1.1.2. Direction and Coordination. Evaluate the mission impact of CAT direction and coordination. Evaluate CAT ability to identify problems, reach effective solutions, and provide positive direction to execute those decisions.

A7.1.1.1.3. Command Post (CP). In some cases, AFSOC units do not manage the CP and rely on host unit support for this function. In AFSOC, the commander's representative (COMREP) is the focal point for C2 issues in the CP. For units that do not manage the CP, the unit COMREP will provide a copy of the host/tenant C2 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to the C2 inspector. When AFSOC units do not manage the CP, evaluate actions using the support agreement and other directives and regulations governing CP operation. In all cases, evaluate the CP with respect to its support of and its impact on the unit's mission.

A7.1.1.1.4. Direction and Coordination. Evaluate CP effectiveness and ability to coordinate and manage applicable processes.

A7.1.1.1.5. Emergency Action Procedures. The IG will not evaluate non-AFSOC managed CP emergency actions except for the timeliness and support given to the unit CAT. The IG will evaluate AFSOC emergency action messages by considering the currency of emergency action checklists, emergency action checklist discipline and execution, and the timeliness of unit notification of emergency action messages.

A7.1.1.1.6. Readiness Action Procedures (RAP). Evaluate readiness posture changes with respect to required actions and procedures outlined in Major Command (MAJCOM) or theater directives. Evaluate procedures utilized to monitor RAP status, completion, and attainment reporting. Determine the mission impact of incomplete actions and timeliness.

A7.1.1.1.7. Operational Reports. Evaluate the timeliness and accuracy of operational reporting.

A7.1.1.2. Subordinate Level Coordination (Applies to functional control centers below the CAT level, excluding the CP, as well as key personnel at squadron level and below). Evaluate implementation or execution of instructions issued by higher authority. Evaluate timeliness and quality of feedback.

A7.1.1.3. Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). Each AFSOC unit with an AFSOC/CC approved Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statement is responsible

for implementation of combat readiness reporting IAW Joint Pub 1-03.3, AFI 10-201, *Status of Resources and Training System*, AFSOC Supplement 1 to AFI 10-201, host-tenant agreements, and local procedures. Evaluate SORTS reported capabilities for accuracy and timely submission to the host CP. Ensure identified Limiting Factor (LIMFAC) are reported in SORTS remarks and reflected in the overall unit rating.

A7.1.2. **Preparing for Operations.**

A7.1.2.1. Takeoff Time. The first takeoff of each generated aircraft validates or invalidates generation of that aircraft and all unit preparatory actions required during the initial response phase. This applies to both generation and mobility forces. Units may continue to perform maintenance on aircraft selected for generation to include all launch procedures leading to takeoff. The timeline between X-hour and takeoff for each aircraft will be used to validate aircraft generation effectiveness.

A7.1.2.2. Closure and Inplace Reliability. Each aircraft is reliable if it:

A7.1.2.2.1. Is properly configured and loaded for the tasked mission prior to takeoff.

A7.1.2.2.2. Completes all mission tasks. Aircraft aborting or diverting are reliable for maintenance considerations if they meet the other conditions of this paragraph.

A7.1.2.2.3. Accomplishes a reliable air refueling, if scheduled.

A7.1.2.2.4. Unless otherwise directed, arrives at its designated destination no later than closure or inplace time. In the absence of a closure or in-place time, aircraft arriving in excess of 2 hours after scheduled time are unreliable.

A7.1.2.3. Operations. Evaluate operational unit deployment activities and preparations for employment. Consider unit-level mobility preparation and processing; flight and mission planning; preparation for employment flying, mission and operational activities.

A7.1.2.4. **Information Operations.**

A7.1.2.4.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of all areas of IO integration and planning. Evaluate Wing or Group-level Intel's ability to provide pre-deployment situation awareness and threat status, to include potential adversary IO threats, and target status to IO planners.

A7.1.2.4.2. Influence Operations (IFO). Evaluate, where appropriate, the effectiveness and integration of Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC) Psychological Operations (PSYOP), CounterIntelligence, and Public Affairs (PA).

A7.1.2.4.2.1. MILDEC. Determine if primary and alternate MILDEC Officer and NCO have been appointed for all program levels within the inspected unit (i.e. Wing, group, and/or squadron level as appropriate). Determine whether unit deployment requirements are consistent with the unit's ability to execute MILDEC taskings. Determine if the unit has developed and maintained generic MILDEC execution checklists for the five techniques as identified in AFI 10-704. Determine if all checklist have been pre-coordinated and integrated with other IO functions. Determine if MILDEC participants are adequately educated and trained in MILDEC TTPs.

A7.1.2.4.2.2. OPSEC. Determine if primary and alternate Program Managers (PMs)/coordinators have been appointed for all program levels within the inspected unit (i.e. Wing, group, and/or squadron level as appropriate). Ensure personnel understand and follow OPSEC policies, guidelines and countermeasures as appropriate. Determine if the unit has an OPSEC Plan pre-coordinated and integrated with other IO functions and ready to implement. Determine whether unit deployment requirements are consistent with the unit's ability to plan and execute OPSEC taskings. Determine if OPSEC PMs/coordinators are adequately represented in all applicable working groups (i.e. Threat, Force Protection, Anti-Terrorism, etc.). Evaluate the application and effectiveness of the units efforts to protect critical information with respect to OPSEC, Information Assurance (IA), communications security COMSEC, computer security (COMPUSEC) and Information Protection (IP) procedures through the use of applicable security programs, units and methods to include the AF's Electronic Systems Security Assessment (ESSA) program, 57th Information Aggressor Squadron and red teaming tactics, techniques and procedures.

A7.1.2.4.2.3. **PA operations.**

A7.1.2.4.2.3.1. Ensure PA staff responds rapidly to appropriate recalls and locations (CAT, battlestaff, DCG) and mans the PA office as required. The senior PA should be near the commander to provide trusted council. Ensure Public Affairs Officer (PAO) develops appropriate work/rest cycle for PA staff.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.2. The PAO and staff should be ready and trained to deploy with adequate equipment, reference material and supplies to provide effective PA support to the unit commander, theater, Joint Task Force (JTF) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) taskings. Typical PA deployment equipment includes digital camera, laptop, deployment bags, and issued weapon.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.3. The PA staff should disseminate host nation sensitivities, cultural information, basic deployment tips and media training to deploying members through briefings or other command/internal information tools.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.4. Ensure PA contacts the MAJCOM or theater command PA for most current guidance in a timely manner.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.5. Ensure PA staff assists in protecting critical information and applies the principles of OPSEC prior to, during, and after any deployment or employment of forces into the area of operations.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.6. Determine if PA Officers are adequately represented in all applicable working groups.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.7. Ensure PA develops and maintains an appropriate internal information program and provides trusted council to leaders to enhance morale and readiness.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.8. Ensure commander uses PA to get necessary information to deploying troops.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.9. Ensure PA attends the commander's or battlestaff meeting to impart and gather pertinent information.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.10. Ensure PA escorts media at all times while on a military installation.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.11. Ensure PA works with all functionals to ensure that information released publicly is timely, accurate, unclassified, and properly cleared.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.12. Ensure there are written plans and skeletal news releases to handle emergency situations such as a major incident or aircraft crash.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.13. Ensure PAO or a designated representative attends appropriate information operations working group meetings to become aware of all appropriate IO activities. PA influence operations should support IO activities but should never mislead or misguide the public or media.

A7.1.2.4.2.3.14. PA's influence operations and defense support to public diplomacy should support IO and strategic communications activities, but should never mislead or misguide the public or media.

A7.1.2.4.3. Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops): Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Systems Operations (C4I). Network defense and support IO elements will be evaluated during all phases of the inspection.

A7.1.2.4.3.1. Network Attack (NetA). Evaluate the unit's ability to request, coordinate and deconflict cyberspace domain support for ongoing operations.

A7.1.2.4.3.2. Network Defense (NetD) – Evaluate defense of networks from physical, environmental, or malicious attacks IAW AFPD 33-2; AFI 33-115, Volume 1; AFI 33-129; AFI 33-138; AFI 33-201, Volumes 1 and 2; AFI 33-203, AFI 33-204, and other instructions as appropriate.

A7.1.2.4.3.2.1. Network Warfare Support (NS) – Normally conducted at theater level or by NS center. Evaluate the inspected unit's support to collection and production of network related data for immediate decisions involving NW Ops. Evaluate the unit's ability to request and utilize NS such as: profiling, event analysis, open source review, pattern analysis, countermeasure development, nodal and system analysis, and full spectrum planning and deconfliction.

A7.1.2.4.3.2.2. Evaluate the ability of Wing or Group-level Intel and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) CI to provide current and valued intelligence that supports NW Ops.

A7.1.2.4.4. **Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops):**

A7.1.2.4.4.1. Electronic Attack: Not a primary AFSOC mission area. AFSOC units tasked to C2 AF or joint forces will be prepared to request and employ appropriate electronic attack assets, to include coordinating for their use, planning their employment, and preparing for Command, Control, and Communications (C3) actions associated with electronic attack employment.

A7.1.2.4.4.2. Electronic Protection (EP) – Rate EP capability under the mission employment section of the grading criteria.

A7.1.2.4.4.3. Electronic Warfare Support (ES): AFSOC units employed in C2 of AF or joint forces will be prepared to request and employ appropriate ES, to include coordinating for their use, planning their employment, and preparing for C3 actions associated with ES employment.

A7.1.2.4.4.4. Evaluate the ability of Wing or Group-level Intel and OSI CI to provide current and valued intelligence that supports EW Ops.

A7.1.2.5. **Logistics Readiness Activities.** Evaluates unit's ability to identify UTCs and deploy equipment and personnel in support of the unit tasking.

A7.1.2.5.1. Evaluation of personnel suitability is based on AFI 10-215 and consistent with deviation policies set forth in AFI 10-403.

A7.1.2.5.2. Evaluation of cargo suitability is based on the following preparatory elements:

A7.1.2.5.2.1. Correct identification and availability of equipment to fill the logistics detail requirements of the UTC.

A7.1.2.5.2.2. Proper identification, packing, marking, and documentation of all general, hazardous, sensitive, and classified cargo IAW MILSTAMP and international requirements.

A7.1.2.5.2.3. Accurate increment identification markings as specified in HHQ and local guidance.

A7.1.2.5.3. Processing and deployment of the unit mobility bags (MOBAGS) as prescribed in mobility plans and AFSOCI 23-202, *Mobility Bag Management*. The following will be evaluated:

A7.1.2.5.3.1. Configure and marshal bags to respond to the deployment tasking.

A7.1.2.5.3.2. Ensure mobility bag assets, regardless of method of storage, are serviceable and quantities are sufficient to support deployed personnel. If assets are not available, demonstrate appropriate procedures to fill short falls.

A7.1.2.5.3.3. Maintaining accountability at home station for mobility bags at all times using the Mobility Automated Inventory and Tracking System (MAITS) or the Mobility Inventory and Control Accountability System (MICAS).

A7.1.2.5.3.4. Ensure mobility bags are shipped for all personnel tasked to deploy, regardless of method of assembly, issue, storage, or shipment.

A7.1.2.5.3.5. Ensure all deploying personnel have required "C-1 mini bags" (hand-carried) CWDE. **Note:** Mobility bags are an inclusive term, which means built up bags or bags stored/shipped in bulk. The unit should clarify with IG the use of real versus training CWDE assets prior to the inspection.

A7.1.2.5.4. Processing and deployment of unit mobility weapons as prescribed in the mobility plans. The following will be evaluated:

A7.1.2.5.4.1. Configure and marshal weapons to respond to the deployment tasking (base material management /owning organizations).

A7.1.2.5.4.2. Ensure weapons identified by owning organizations are placed in deployed status (base material management).

A7.1.2.5.4.3. Pack weapons properly for deployment (base material management /owning organization).

A7.1.2.5.4.4. Ensure weapons couriers are appointed by the unit commander and are fully knowledgeable of their responsibilities (owning organization).

A7.1.2.5.4.5. Ensure weapons are clean and serviceable when deployed, and weapons support kits are deployed to maintain deployed weapons (base material management /owning organizations).

A7.1.2.5.4.6. Maintain weapons security and accountability at all times (base material management /owning organizations), and ensure required listings are signed by the deploying custodians and returned to base material management prior to aircraft departure.

A7.1.2.5.4.7. Ensure a list of weapons serial numbers is prepared for each container subject to deployment.

A7.1.2.5.5. Processing and deployment of equipment identified for deployment by unit equipment custodians. The following will be evaluated:

A7.1.2.5.5.1. Ensure equipment reviews and subsequent deployment/transfer actions are completed prior to aircraft departure times published in the schedule of events.

A7.1.2.5.5.2. Ensure trained custodians are appointed and briefed prior to deployment.

A7.1.2.5.5.3. Identify assets to be deployed (owning organizations).

A7.1.2.5.5.4. Ensure assets identified by owning organizations are placed in a deployed status and accounted for on a deployed Custodian Authorization/Custody Receipt Listing (CA/CRL) signed by the deploying custodians.

A7.1.2.5.5.5. Ensure UTCs and increment numbers are loaded on equipment details.

A7.1.2.5.5.6. Ensure all previously identified assets (and only those assets) are deployed (owning organizations).

A7.1.2.5.5.7. Ensure borrowed equipment is properly deployed.

A7.1.2.5.6. Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP)/Mission Support Kit (MSK) (Material management and/or owning organizations). Evaluate proper processing and deployment of all material management UTCs, personnel, and equipment, as identified for deployment. The following will be evaluated:

A7.1.2.5.6.1. Ensure an administrative support package is deployed with each

MRSP. This package will include, as a minimum, a laptop or PC with fax/modem and CD ROM capabilities. It will include applicable items such as R43 (Airborne MRSP Listing), R50 (Mission Support Kit Listing), R52 (Non-Airborne MRSP Listing), Dyna-Metric Microcomputer Analysis System (DMAS), current copy of FEDLOG, Federal Logistics Information System, current CD copy of the Air Force Electronic Publishing Library (AFEPL) to provide required publications, and a current copy of AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 26, AFSOC Sup 1, *War Readiness Material*. Units may include additional items if desired.

A7.1.2.5.6.2. Ensure MRSP are configured to respond to the deployment tasking and placed in a deployed status no earlier than 9 days prior for CONUS deployments and 14 days prior for overseas deployments.

A7.1.2.5.6.3. Ensure all necessary actions are taken to identify critical MRSP shortages using the DMAS.

A7.1.2.5.6.4. Ensure deploying MRSP details are transferred to the theater Regional Supply Squadron (RSS), if tasked.

A7.1.2.5.6.5. Ensure list of personnel authorized to receive classified property is up to date and available.

A7.1.2.5.7. Unit ability to support deploying unit's bench stock requirements. The following will be evaluated:

A7.1.2.5.7.1. Ensure deploying unit's bench stock is reviewed prior to deployment.

A7.1.2.5.7.2. Ensure priority action is initiated to fill bench stocks according to established procedures.

A7.1.2.5.7.3. Ensure priority action is initiated on bench stock due-out line items that the deploying organization identifies as necessary for deployment.

A7.1.3. **Deployment Planning/Processing.**

A7.1.3.1. Deployment Planning and Execution. Evaluate the following processes/activities:

A7.1.3.1.1. Deployment planning comprehensiveness, timeliness, and responsiveness to tasking.

A7.1.3.1.2. Ability to identify, prioritize, and process required resources in a timely manner.

A7.1.3.1.3. Evaluate the Installation Personnel Readiness (IPR) and Personnel Deployment Function (PDF) ability to ensure deploying personnel are eligible to deploy, prepare for deployment, and properly accounted for during deployment processing IAW AFI 36-3208.

A7.1.3.1.4. Integration and coordination with the Installation Deployment Officer (IDO) and AFSOC units.

A7.1.3.1.5. Squadrons' ability to properly execute the Installation Deployment Plan (IDP), identifying required resources and adjusting mobility equipment and personnel as necessary.

A7.1.3.1.6. Tailoring of equipment and personnel is only allowed for duplicative assets documented in applicable Base or Exercise Support Plans, War Reserve Materiel documents or similar support plans. Assess IDO and Deployment Control Center (DCC) ability to properly coordinate bed-down requirements with HHQs, theater Special Operations Commands and theater Air Force Component Commands.

A7.1.3.1.7. Assess the assembly, preparation, equipping, and processing both personnel and equipment. All cargo must be prepared and certified for air transportation.

A7.1.3.1.8. Wing/Group ability to provide risk assessments for deploying units or elements IAW AFSOCI 14-102, *Threat Working Group*.

A7.1.3.2. Installation Deployment Readiness Center (IDRC). Assess unit ability to:

A7.1.3.2.1. Provide direction, guidance, and information to subordinate work centers and collateral agencies as well as up-channeling information.

A7.1.3.2.2. Plan, adjust to changes and ensure wing, group, or squadron meets closure.

A7.1.3.2.3. Access JOPES or DCAPES deployment products (Time Phased Force Deployment DataTPFDDs and Deployment Requirement Manning Document-DRMD) via GCCS, interpret JOPES or DCAPES deployment products, identify tasking shortfalls and/or LIMFACs, as well as procedures for ensuring accurate DCAPES Level-4 detail information is provided to HHQ in a timely manner.

A7.1.3.2.4. Promptly and accurately determine strategic airlift requirements and communicate these requirements to HHQ.

A7.1.3.2.5. Properly use the components of the Integrated Deployment System (IDS) to accurately disseminate deployment tasking and process scheduling information.

A7.1.3.2.6. Ensure accurate In-transit Visibility (ITV) information is entered into the GTN in a timely manner.

A7.1.3.3. Evaluate CDF ability to establish a continuous operation, capable of meeting deployment requirements, including the ability to receive, process, manifest, and load cargo. Consider the unit's effectiveness in properly handling deployment information, their coordination with the IDRC, and compliance with the Deployment Schedule of Events (DSOE) and applicable instructions.

A7.1.3.3.1. Evaluate the accuracy, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of load plans (manual and/or computerized). Consider whether load plans meet deployment requirements, fully utilize Allowable Cabin Load (ACL) for aircraft, show passenger and cargo load displacement and hazardous cargo, identify special requirements, and meet required certifications.

A7.1.3.3.2. Evaluate the effectiveness of final audits on all transportation documentation, focusing on accuracy and timeliness. Evaluate conformity of

transportation documentation to applicable guidance. Evaluate timely completion of required briefings.

A7.1.3.3.3. Evaluate ramp management procedures, to include timeliness of briefings, distribution of load documentation packages IAW applicable guidance, maintenance of an event log, and coordination with the control center.

A7.1.3.3.4. Evaluate cargo inspection and marshaling procedures in accordance with the IDP and applicable cargo shipping instructions, including inspection and handling procedures for hazardous materials. Check whether necessary corrections to cargo shipping documents and equipment are completed and changes relayed to load planners.

A7.1.3.3.5. Evaluate procedures, accuracy, and proficiency of cargo load teams, to include correct tie down procedures, cargo increments, load plan conformity, and required safety briefings or instructions to load team members before performing unique aircraft loading procedures. Ensure team is sufficiently manned, trained, and equipped to handle anticipated air and surface flow and perform required tasks.

A7.1.3.3.6. Evaluate procedures used to ensure ITV information for personnel and equipment is entered into the GTN in a timely manner.

A7.1.3.3.7. Evaluate SMP ability to transport deployment cargo and passengers to and from units, flight line, and the DCC. Evaluate arrival of dispatched vehicles at pick-up points within schedule times. Evaluate whether SMP is sufficiently equipped to perform required tasks, and whether it maintains continuous communications with the CDF and other work centers.

A7.1.3.4. Evaluate PDF ability to receive, process, manifest, and load passengers IAW deployment guidance and schedules. Consider whether PDF is adequately manned, trained, and equipped to perform required tasks. Assess information flow and coordination with the DCC and other required work centers. Consider whether the PDF establishes required deployment processing stations IAW AFI 10-403 and AFI 36-3208. Evaluate the PDF/manpower ability to perform eligibility checks to include compliance with the deployment requirements on all deploying personnel. Approval for tasking deviation must be constant with current approving policy. The PRF and PDF (as applicable) prepare, verify, and authenticate Contingency, Exercise, Deployment (CED) orders prior to personnel departing the PDF.

A7.1.3.4.1. Assess baggage-handling procedures to ensure baggage is properly controlled, tagged, weighed, and marked for destination. Determine if passengers are provided a prohibited item briefing and allowed time to declare hazardous material.

A7.1.3.4.2. Personnel Processing and Loading. Evaluate PDF ability to maintain accountability of deploying personnel from the time they arrive at the PDF until they leave home station. Evaluate passenger manifests, briefings, and troop commander packages for accuracy and completeness. Assess loading and delay procedures.

A7.1.3.4.3. In-transit Visibility: Evaluate procedures used to ensure ITV information for personnel is forwarded to the PDF in a timely manner.

A7.1.3.4.4. Fleet Service. Ensure tasked fleet service functions are accomplished in time for scheduled departures. This area is evaluated only when a fleet service exists and supports launching mobility sorties.

A7.1.3.4.5. Convoy Operations. Evaluate the unit's ability to deploy under convoy operations IAW Chapter 24 of AFMAN 24-306, *Manual for the Wheeled Vehicle Driver.*

A7.1.3.5. **Departure Timing:** Departure timing will be evaluated based on one of two scenarios, either simulated airlift or actual airlift/organic, which are defined below. The departure timing grade is based on the percentage of on-time takeoffs using the standards shown in **Table 2.3 On Time Takeoff standards for Departure Timing Grade**

A7.1.3.5.1. On-Time Takeoff departures will be determined using the following criteria:

A7.1.3.5.1.1. Simulated Airlift: For simulated airlift, the following items must be available for the inspector's review at cargo load start time IAW the unit's DSOE:

A7.1.3.5.1.1.1. All cargo/equipment sequenced IAW the aircraft load plan (load plan must have actual weights, except for baggage/PAX totals), load team (to include required Material Handling Equipment (MHE), and all required documentation (e.g., DD Forms 1387-2, *Special Handling Data/Certification* (if used), DD Form 2133, *Joint Airlift Inspection Record*, cargo waivers, etc.). A planned PAX count will be used to compute the aircraft center of balance station.

A7.1.3.5.1.1.2. All PAX and actual baggage weights must be available at PAX load start time with final copies of the PAX manifest and the aircraft load plan.

A7.1.3.5.1.2. Actual Airlift/Organic: For actual airlift movements or organic movements, the following items must be available for aircraft commander's/inspector's review prior to loading the aircraft:

A7.1.3.5.1.2.1. All cargo/equipment identified from the aircraft load plan (load plan must have actual weights, except for baggage/PAX totals).

A7.1.3.5.1.2.2. All required documentation (e.g., DD Forms 1387-2, DD Form 2133, etc.). A planned PAX count will be used to compute the aircraft center of balance. Documentation errors identified during this review should not preclude cargo from being accepted for loading, unless these errors jeopardize load safety or alter aircraft cargo load sequencing. Documentation errors must be corrected prior to aircraft departure. Adjustments to aircraft load plans after load start will not adversely affect the rating for departure timing, provided the inspector determines that the changes would not affect aircraft departure time for a simulated load, or changes do not impact actual departure times of real world support airlift or organic movements.

A7.1.3.5.1.2.3. Actual Mission Departures: Timing is dictated by unit DOC statements or applicable OPLAN instructions.

A7.1.3.6. **Grading.** The IG will use suitability for movement and departure timing criteria to evaluate deployment. Overall suitability for movement will constitute 50 percent of the overall rating for deployment. Departure timing will constitute the remaining 50 percent.

A7.1.3.6.1. Suitability of Movement (Personnel). Evaluation of personnel suitability is based on AFI 36-3208 *Personnel Readiness Operations*. All required personnel actions must be completed prior to the passenger (PAX) load start time indicated on the DSOE, whether an actual or simulated departure. Consider the ability of a unit to insure ITV by passing personnel movement data to the GTN.

A7.1.3.6.2. Suitability of Movement (Cargo). Evaluation of cargo suitability is based on the following preparatory elements:

A7.1.3.6.2.1. Correct identification and availability of equipment to fill the logistics detail requirements of the UTC.

A7.1.3.6.2.2. Proper identification, packing, marking, and documenting of all general, hazardous, sensitive, and classified cargo IAW Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 4500.32, *Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures* (MILSTAMP), and international requirements.

A7.1.3.6.2.3. Accurate increment identification markings as specified in HHQ and local guidance. For actual departures or simulated departures, all required cargo processing must be completed prior to the cargo load start time indicated on the DSOE. Consider the ability of a unit to insure ITV by passing cargo movement data to the GTN.

A7.1.3.7. **Inspected units may:**

A7.1.3.7.1. Adjust UTC if authorized in the tasking directive or approved by the controlling headquarters and the IG. Deployed resources will not exceed tasked resources unless approved by the controlling agency and the IG.

A7.1.3.7.2. Change mission numbers of unit organic support chalks in coordination with the controlling headquarters and the IG. Advise C2 prior to execution.

A7.2. Employing the Force.

A7.2.1. **Command and Control (C2).**

A7.2.1.1. Evaluate the mission impact resulting from the commander's management decisions and actions.

A7.2.1.2. Evaluate the mission support element's ability to meet mission objectives.

A7.2.1.3. Evaluate coordination and flow of information up and down the chain of command, both internal and external to AFSOC forces. Evaluate coordination across functional boundaries, as well as with users, hosts, and other external agencies, for scope and adequacy. Ensure Operational Reporting is accurate and timely.

A7.2.1.4. Evaluate the establishment, integration, and control of functional control centers to include the effective use of series G orders (i.e., air operations center, job control, vehicle dispatch, etc.).

A7.2.1.5. Evaluate unit's command center's ability to provide timely/accurate aircraft flight following IAW AFSOCI 10-202, Vol. 3, *Mission Monitoring User's Guide*.

A7.2.2. **Information Operations (IO).**

A7.2.2.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of all areas of IO planning and employment.

A7.2.2.2. Evaluate Wing or Group-level Intel's ability to provide employed situation awareness and threat status, to include potential adversary IO threats, and target status to IO planners.

A7.2.2.3. Influence Operations (IFO). Evaluate, where appropriate, the effectiveness of Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, counterpropaganda operations, counterintelligence operations, OPSEC and MILDEC integration, coordination and special areas as a part of IO (when not already graded under Employment - Operations for individual weapon systems or programs).

A7.2.2.3.1. MILDEC. Evaluate unit ability to:

A7.2.2.3.1.1. Execute the MILDEC plan IAW AFI 10-704, exercise directives, and the scenario.

A7.2.2.3.1.2. Evaluate whether the MILDEC planning process is occurring in a timely manner and integrated with other IO activities.

A7.2.2.3.1.3. Evaluate tactics conducted under military deception plans IAW AFI 10-704, Military Deception Program. Evaluate effectiveness of counter deception plans and operations, where applicable.

A7.2.2.3.2. OPSEC. Evaluate unit ability to:

A7.2.2.3.2.1. Execute the OPSEC plan IAW AFI 10-701, exercise directives, and the scenario.

A7.2.2.3.2.2. Evaluate whether the OPSEC planning process is occurring in a timely manner and integrated with other IO activities.

A7.2.2.3.2.3. Evaluate tactics conducted under OPSEC plans IAW AFI 10-701, *Operations Security Program*. Evaluate effectiveness of OPSEC countermeasures and deception tactics to protect critical information and operations, where applicable.

A7.2.2.3.2.4. Evaluate the application and effectiveness of the unit's efforts to protect critical information with respect to OPSEC, IA, COMSEC,COMPUSEC, IP procedures through the use of applicable security programs, units and methods to include the AF's ESSA program, 57th Information Aggressor Squadron and red teaming tactics, techniques and procedures.

A7.2.2.3.2.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of Physical Security, Force Protection and AntiTerrorism efforts as they relate to OPSEC.

A7.2.2.3.3. Public Affairs (PA) Operations. Intra-theater public affairs operations should support the deployed unit and joint/combined theater commander. Evaluate unit ability to:

A7.2.2.3.3.1. Ensure deployed public affairs activities encompass media, internal and community relations programs in support of Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) and direction from theater commanders. Broadcast and band operations will be supported as directed when those UTCs are at the deployed location.

A7.2.2.3.3.2. Typical internal information products should include but are not limited to, hardcopy or electronic newsletters, fact sheets, biographies and public service announcements. Internal products should be disseminated to achieve maximum distribution.

A7.2.2.3.3.3. Ensure deployed public affairs activities follow special-operations-specific OPSEC and PAG guidelines.

A7.2.2.3.3.4. Ensure PA makes use of any available community relations advisors or linguists to help facilitate two-way civil/military interaction and information exchange.

A7.2.2.3.3.5. PA should set up deployed workstation in the operations center in order to share and receive up-to-the-minute information with commanders and military members.

A7.2.2.3.3.6. PA imagery and internal products should be fed in a timely manner to HHQ and CONUS PA offices for AF and DOD-wide distribution.

A7.2.2.3.3.7. PA media operations should encompass but are not limited to timely news releases, media training, and press conferences. Media activities should be coordinated with the Combined/Joint Press Information Center (CPIC) or Information Bureau (CJIB) and be consistent with standing special-operations-specific OPSEC and PAG guidelines.

A7.2.2.3.3.8. PA may need to prepare a media center to provide media with an appropriate location for interviews and filing stories. A translator or community relations specialist may be needed.

A7.2.2.3.3.9. Ensure PA is aware of individual media requirements and deadlines. If requirements and/or deadlines cannot be met for operational reasons, ensure PAO explains why the information is not available or when it will be available.

A7.2.2.3.3.10. Evaluate whether the PA planning process is occurring in a timely manner and integrated with other IO and defense support to public diplomacy activities.

A7.2.2.3.3.11. Evaluate the effectiveness of PAs as it relates to OPSEC, Force Protection and AntiTerrorism efforts.

A7.2.2.3.3.12. Ensure PA develops and maintains an appropriate internal information program and provides trusted council to leaders to enhance morale and readiness.

A7.2.2.3.3.13. Ensure deployed commander uses PA to get necessary information to deployed troops.

A7.2.2.3.3.14. Ensure PA escorts media at all times while on a military

installation.

A7.2.2.3.3.15. Ensure PA works with media so that casualty information inadvertently obtained by the media is not confirmed or released until the initial release of names of all categories of deceased and missing to personnel is made by Office of Assistance Secretary of Defense/PA and only after all required Next of Kin (NOK) notification by the appropriate service casualty office has been confirmed and the minimum NOK grieving period has elapsed.

A7.2.2.3.3.16. Ensure PA works with all functionals to ensure that information released publicly is timely, accurate, unclassified, and properly cleared.

A7.2.2.3.3.17. Ensure PAO knows how to contact the MAJCOM PA, Theater PA, and SAF/PA oncall person when events have national news interest or the potential for adverse public reaction.

A7.2.2.3.3.18. Ensure there are written plans and skeletal news releases to handle emergency situations such as a major incident or aircraft crash.

A7.2.2.3.3.19. Ensure PAO or a designated representative attends appropriate information operations working group meetings to become aware of all appropriate IO activities. PA's influence operations and defense support to public diplomacy should support IO and strategic communications activities but should never mislead or misguide the public or media.

A7.2.2.3.3.20. PA should work to counter all enemy propaganda and misinformation campaigns.

A7.2.2.4. Network Warfare Operations (NW Ops):   Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Systems Operations (C4I).   Network defense and support IO elements will be evaluated during all phases of the inspection.

A7.2.2.4.1. Network Attack (NetA). Evaluate the unit's ability to request, coordinate and deconflict cyberspace domain support for ongoing operations.

A7.2.2.4.2. Network Defense (NetD) – Evaluate defense of networks from physical, environmental, or malicious attacks IAW AFPD 33-2; AFI 33-115, Volumes 1; AFI 33-129; AFI 33-138; AFI 33-201, Volumes 1 and 2; AFI 33-203; AFI 33-204; and other instructions as appropriate.

A7.2.2.4.3. Network Warfare Support (NS) – Normally conducted at theater level or by NS center. Evaluate the inspected unit's support to collection and production of network related data for immediate decisions involving NW Ops. Evaluate the unit's ability to request and utilize NS such as: profiling, event analysis, open source review, pattern analysis, countermeasure development, nodal and system analysis, and full spectrum planning and deconfliction.

A7.2.2.4.3.1. Evaluate the ability of Intel and OSI CI to provide current and valued intelligence that supports NW Ops.

A7.2.2.5. Electronic Warfare Operations (EW Ops):

A7.2.2.5.1. Electronic Attack (EA): Not an AFSOC mission area. AFSOC units employed in C2 of AF or joint forces will be prepared to request and employ

appropriate EA assets, to include coordinating for their use, planning their employment, and C3 actions associated with EA employment.

A7.2.2.5.2. Electronic Protection (EP)

A7.2.2.5.2.1. Use guidelines in CJCSM 3212.02; AFTTP 3-1, Volumes 2, 31, 32, 33, and 34; and AFI 10-703.

A7.2.2.5.2.2. Units equipped with electronic warfare systems must identify ME systems and ensure they are installed and operational. If the ME system is not operational, then the aircrew must explain how they will negate threats.

A7.2.2.5.2.3. Actual or simulated airborne or ground threats will be used to develop the mission scenario and plan. The IG may observe crew response and planning against such scenario-driven threats or initiated threats to evaluate self-defense capability. The rating in the area is a function of observed tactical awareness and the employment of appropriate countermeasures.

A7.2.2.5.2.4. Electronic Warfare Support (ES): AFSOC units employed in C2 of AF or joint forces will be prepared to request and employ appropriate ES assets, to include coordinating for their use, planning their employment, and C3 actions associated with ES employment.

A7.2.2.5.2.5. Evaluate the ability of Intel and OSI CI to provide current and valued intelligence that supports EW Ops.

A7.2.3. **Intelligence.**

A7.2.3.1. Evaluate the effectiveness of integrating intelligence augmentees.

A7.2.3.2. Pre-deployment. Evaluate the ability to provide the commander, staff, mission planners, and the CAT with timely and accurate, all-source intelligence information.

A7.2.3.2.1. Evaluate the ability to provide current situation and threat reporting throughout the pre-deployment phase.

A7.2.3.2.2. Evaluate the security practices used to support intelligence activities.

A7.2.3.2.3. Evaluate the ability to mobilize equipment and personnel.

A7.2.3.2.4. Evaluate the coordination of activities with theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs) and/or HHQ regarding support arrangements, reporting instructions, and procedures for requests for information and imagery.

A7.2.3.2.5. Evaluate knowledge and application of theater tactics, techniques, and procedures.

A7.2.3.2.6. Evaluate the ability to support employment mission planning prior to deployment.

A7.2.3.2.7. Evaluate the ability to support the threat working group on force protection issues.

A7.2.3.2.8. Evaluate the ability to provide intelligence supporting unit planning of mobility events. Consider this area successful when all critical intelligence is obtained and provided to decision makers and planners in a timely manner.

A7.2.3.3. Briefings.

A7.2.3.3.1. Evaluate the analysis of pertinent information and how the information is tailored to specific users.

A7.2.3.3.2. Evaluate the accuracy of briefing information and coordination of briefing support with other staff functions (planners, operations aircrews, and team members).

A7.2.3.3.3. Evaluate knowledge and use of established briefing formats and guidelines, to include the use of briefing aids, when necessary, to convey critical information (e.g., Portable Flight Planning System (PFPS) products, imagery, large-scale maps, route annotations on charts, and radar shadow graphs). Consider this area successful when all pertinent information has been clearly and accurately conveyed to the recipient. Consider this area unsuccessful when inaccurate information is briefed or information is omitted which would pose a threat to successful mission accomplishment.

A7.2.3.4. Debriefing and Reporting.

A7.2.3.4.1. Evaluate ability to thoroughly debrief ground and/or aircrew, to include attached Air Intelligence Agency (AIA) personnel and other sources capable of providing intelligence information.

A7.2.3.4.2. Evaluate accuracy, timeliness, and comprehensiveness of reports.

A7.2.3.4.3. Evaluate the ability to transmit and disseminate information in a timely manner to HHQ, theater, and appropriate agencies, IAW exercise, theater, or ORI directives. Consider this area successful when the information is debriefed and reported in a timely and accurate manner. Consider this area to be unsuccessful when critical information of use to decision makers or follow-on missions is not debriefed or submitted on time.

A7.2.3.4.4. Evaluate ability to satisfy all required areas of interest for debriefing and reporting procedures as listed in USSOCOM Directive 11-1, *Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System-SODARS.*

A7.2.3.5. Mission Planning Support.

A7.2.3.5.1. Evaluate coordination between intelligence personnel, mission planners, C2 activities, weapons and tactics, and weapon systems planners.

A7.2.3.5.2. Evaluate knowledge of unit mission requirements and the mission planning cycle.

A7.2.3.5.3. Evaluate ability to provide mission planners with current, timely, and accurately analyzed survival, evasion and recovery, and threat data. Additionally, evaluate ability to assist mission planners during threat penetration analysis.

A7.2.3.5.4. Evaluate ability to conduct research, validate requirements for submission of requests for information (RFI) and prepare and forward RFI to appropriate agencies.

A7.2.3.5.5. Evaluate ability to effectively use intelligence support systems (PFPS, Improved-Many-on-Many (IMOM), Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), Tactical Related Applications (TRAP), Tactical Information Broadcast System (TIBS), and theater systems) to obtain and analyze all-source intelligence data.

A7.2.3.5.6. Evaluate ability to assist mission planners with threat identification for consideration and submission as targets for Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD). Additionally, evaluate ability to provide timely and accurate updates during the mission planning cycle on SEAD actions and or status of threat related to SEAD request.

A7.2.3.5.7. Evaluate ability to provide real/near-real-time threat updates to on-going missions.

A7.2.3.5.8. Evaluate use of TIBS, mission debriefs, in-flight reports, and theater-specific reporting systems.

A7.2.3.5.9. Evaluate ability to effectively use AIA analysts and intelligence systems to satisfy intelligence information requirements during mission planning and execution.

A7.2.3.6. Evaluate ability to support the threat working group for force protection issues.

A7.2.3.7. Evaluate security practices used to support intelligence activities. Additionally, evaluate the procedures for establishment and operation of a temporary sensitive compartmented information facility.

A7.2.3.8. Evaluate the following Air Force Intelligence Prioritized Tasks:

A7.2.3.8.1. Provide situation awareness, threat status, to include potential adversary Information Operations (IO) threats, and target status.

A7.2.3.8.2. Participate in development of air operations tasking order/space tasking order.

A7.2.3.8.3. Consolidate, prioritize, and validate collection requirements.

A7.2.3.8.4. Assess the timely transmission of intelligence information from mission debriefing and reporting (flying units).

A7.2.3.8.5. Consolidate and report battle damage assessments.

A7.2.3.8.6. Define requirements and manage inventory for targeting and Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S).

A7.2.3.8.7. Evaluate how national, theater, force, and unit level intelligence is coordinated and integrated into unit mission planning, execution, and mission effectiveness assessments.

A7.2.3.8.8. Evaluate threat assessment analysis for both air and ground forces.

A7.2.3.8.9. Evaluate support to Threat/Force Protection Working Groups and Tactical Deception Planning.

A7.2.3.8.10. Evaluate support and participation in Mission Planning, Threat Penetration and Target Engagement Processes.

A7.2.4. **Maintenance.**

A7.2.4.1. Departure Reliability. Evaluate the maintenance complex on its ability to prepare the aircraft for deployment or mission tasking to include required inspections, servicing, and the completion of necessary maintenance actions to allow the aircraft to complete the mission. Evaluate helicopter buildup after closure.

A7.2.4.2. Maintenance Management. Evaluate all levels of maintenance management on the overall management of maintenance resources, the ability to respond to rapidly changing events, and resourcefulness used to solve unique problems.

A7.2.4.3. Evaluate the coordination of effort and dissemination of information.

A7.2.4.3.1. Evaluate communications concerning aircraft status, job progress, personnel availability, and work requirements for accuracy, appropriateness, and timeliness. Evaluate application and effectiveness of procedures.

A7.2.4.3.2. Evaluate the identification and elevation for resolution of local LIMFACs. Check whether unit exhausts all possible LIMFAC workarounds.

A7.2.4.3.3. Evaluate the accurate identification and proper processing of material management requests.

A7.2.4.3.4. Evaluate established work schedules for their effectiveness in achieving maximum capability with assigned personnel.

A7.2.4.3.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to cross-utilize skills in handling surges and priority requirements.

A7.2.4.3.6. Evaluate the adequacy of supervision and assignment of personnel tasks commensurate with skill level and training.

A7.2.4.3.7. Evaluate the serviceability, accountability, availability, and, in the case of Precision Measurement Equipment (PME), proper calibration of support equipment, to include deployed powered Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE), non-powered AGE, PME, tool kits, and special tools (e.g., engine change kits), as well as the support equipment furnished by the host at the deployed operating location.

A7.2.4.3.8. Evaluate the accurate control and documentation of cannibalization actions.

A7.2.4.4. Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR)/Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). ORI tasked units with organic ABDR capability are evaluated on the effectiveness of the ABDR program. As a minimum, the IG will review the following areas: readiness of ABDR kits to deploy and availability of the ABDR trained technicians and assessors.

A7.2.4.4.1. Effective Use of ABDR on Damaged Aircraft. Evaluate serviceability of deployed ABDR kits, and effectiveness of personnel to properly assess and repair damaged aircraft using ABDR techniques. Assessment should include all facets, which aid in determining aircraft status, estimated repair times, and mission

degradation. ABDR repairs will only be accomplished on designated ABDR training aircraft or hulks.

A7.2.4.4.2. Units Without Organic ABDR Capability. Those units without organic ABDR programs will at a minimum perform initial BDA. Assessment will include the ability to effectively save a suspected or actual battle damaged aircraft for potentially unexploded ordinance as well as provide initial information required to request Combat Logistic Support Squadron (CLSS) repair team support IAW T.O. 0025107. **Note:** Ratings for management deficiencies will be determined by the mission impact of the specific deficiency in each category. For example, minor deviations in radio discipline may have little or no impact on the mission. However, poor radio discipline or OPSEC/COMSEC procedures that adversely impact the unit's ability to generate and launch aircraft may have a major effect on the mission.

A7.2.4.5. Munitions Storage and Handling:

A7.2.4.5.1. Evaluate unit ability to properly store and handle munitions in a dynamic environment. Evaluate unit ability to properly secure and safeguard stored assets.

A7.2.4.5.2. Munitions handling. Evaluate unit munitions control functions, munitions accountability, munitions inspections, personnel training, and delivery procedures to ensure compliance with applicable directives.

A7.2.4.5.3. Munitions control. Evaluate security of munitions assets. Evaluate control of key, lock and access inventories. Evaluate emergency action procedures.

A7.2.4.5.4. Munitions accountability. Evaluate asset balance, condition and code shelf/service life of on hand assets. Evaluate issue, receipt, and document transactions of inventories.

A7.2.5. **Operations.** Mission sorties are graded in four areas: Command and control (unit level), Mission Planning, Mission Employment and Mission Results.

A7.2.5.1. Mission Planning. Evaluate proper analysis/application of capabilities, mission requirements, and threats. Units should plan for realistic and appropriate route lengths, but in no case will the route be shorter than 5 minutes prior to the first in-flight warning. Do not plan excessive delays for timing purposes. Examples of excessive delays include unrealistic alternate timing legs, holding for time control purposes (unless approved by the IG), and slower than normal airspeeds.

A7.2.5.1.1. Units will fly low level navigation routes at altitudes specified in their applicable Air Force or AFSOC Instructions, minimum published low level route altitudes, or altitudes commensurate with the scenario threat, whichever is highest.

A7.2.5.1.2. Weather minimums are IAW applicable Air Force Instructions. Minimums and conditions may be simulated for ORI purposes. These will be briefed by the IG prior to the event or be specified in the exercise ground rules.

A7.2.5.1.3. Units will provide the IG inspector copies of the complete aircrew folder, including flight orders, computer flight plans, charts with route of flight, threats, and target descriptions, prior to the mission back-brief/briefing for each employment event.

A7.2.5.1.4. Airdrop events will utilize actual loads and personnel whenever possible. If drop zone (DZ) or other conditions preclude their use, the IG Team Chief may approve the use of standard airdrop training bundles (SATB).

A7.2.5.2. **Mission Employment.**

A7.2.5.2.1. Low Level. Aircrew will fly (if applicable) a preplanned low level profile IAW their associated 11-series instructions. In-flight, aircrew may modify the preplanned flight path when required for time control, weather, Air Traffic Control, or simulated threats and associated threat maneuvers.

A7.2.5.2.2. Formation. Evaluate IAW AFI 11-2MDS, Volume 3, T.O. 11C120, *Flight Crew Air Refueling Procedures*, and 1-1C-1-29, *Flight Crew Air Refueling Procedures with KC-135 and KC-10*.

A7.2.5.2.3. Electronic Warfare/Self-Defense Capability (EW/SDC). Use guidelines in CJCSM 3212.02 and AFTTP 3-1, Volumes 2, 31, 32, 33, and 34.

A7.2.5.2.4. Units equipped with electronic warfare systems must identify mission essential (ME) systems and ensure they are installed and operational. If the ME system is not operational, then the aircrew must explain how they will negate threats.

A7.2.5.2.5. Actual or simulated airborne or ground threats will be used to develop the mission scenario and plan. The IG may observe crew response and planning against such scenario-driven threats or initiated threats to evaluate self-defense capability. The rating in the area is a function of observed tactical awareness and the employment of appropriate countermeasures.

A7.2.5.2.6. **Mission Results.**

A7.2.5.2.6.1. Airdrop. Airdrops will be evaluated. The majority of instrument meteorological condition (IMC) or simulated-IMC (electronic) drops will be to unmarked DZs.

A7.2.5.2.6.2. DZ Size. IAW AFI 13-217, *Drop Zone and Landing Zone Operations*, minimum DZ size will be mutually agreed upon by the Air Force and the using unit commander having control of the operation/exercise. DZ size will vary and should be based on mission requirements, aircraft/aircrew capabilities, and items to be airdropped.

A7.2.5.2.6.3. Scoring. For successful airdrop event credit, the equipment or lead jumper of a stick must land within a 300 meter radius of the agreed upon point of impact or within the surveyed boundaries of the drop zone, whichever is less; 90% of personnel and equipment must land on the surveyed drop zone for credit as a successful airdrop. IG personnel will attempt to determine the cause of each unsuccessful drop. If an unsuccessful drop is the result of an aircrew error (crew coordination, incorrect release point or coordinates, etc.) or is caused by other functions of the evaluated unit (incorrect load rigging, C2, etc.), the event will be scored as unreliable. If an unsuccessful drop is caused by an equipment or load malfunction, or for a reason that cannot be determined, the event will not be scored.

A7.2.5.2.6.4. Time over target (TOT). Score TOT as successful if within plus or

minus 30 seconds. A TOT of 31 seconds or more is considered unsuccessful.

A7.2.5.2.6.5. Leaflet Drops PSYOP (MC-130). Normally, one leaflet drop is tasked for each leaflet capable unit operating MC-130 aircraft. Evaluate either actual or simulated leaflet drops, and specifically evaluate aircraft preparation and crew duties (at altitude) for leaflet dissemination. Consider the employment successful if aircrew performance results in a leaflet drop meeting mission requirements.

A7.2.5.2.6.6. Infiltration and Exfiltration (infil/exfil). Success is determined based on accomplishment of the mission objective according to mission tasking and the following criteria:

A7.2.5.2.6.7. The approach, hover/landing, infil/exfil, and departure are graded as one event. If a Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) event is conducted, it will be graded separately from the infil/exfil.

A7.2.5.2.6.8. Time of Arrival (TOA). Score TOA as successful if within plus or minus 30 seconds. A TOA of 31 seconds or more is unsuccessful.

A7.2.5.2.6.9. For fixed wing aircraft, record TOA based on the time during the initial approach that the aircraft passes abeam/over the touchdown zone in a position to safely land.

A7.2.5.2.6.10. For rotary wing aircraft, record TOA based on the time the aircraft is in a position to land.

A7.2.5.2.6.11. Overt Airland Events (fixed wing). Runway criteria are IAW AFI 11-2MC/HC-130 specific, Vol. 3. Consider an event successful if:

A7.2.5.2.6.11.1. For Airfield Marking Pattern 1 (AMP 1) or Airfield Marking Pattern 2 (AMP 2) marked landing zones, touchdown is in the AMP 1 or AMP 2 touchdown zone and the aircraft slows to taxi speed within the available runway.

A7.2.5.2.6.12. **Covert Airland Events (fixed wing).** Runway criteria are IAW AFI 11-2MC/HC-130, Vol. 3. Consider an event successful if:

A7.2.5.2.6.12.1. For Night Vision Goggle (NVG) landings to either marked or unmarked runways, the aircraft is able to safely turn off at the appropriate taxiway, or stop abeam the planned onload/offload point.

A7.2.5.2.6.13. Airland or Hover (rotary wing). Conduct landing/hovers on properly surveyed landing zones (LZ) IAW applicable AFIs. Hover at the minimum safe altitude to accomplish the mission. Crews may initiate go around prior to or after touchdown. Score any touchdown prior to the touchdown zone as unreliable. Do not score goarounds due to factors beyond the control of the aircrew (personnel or equipment on the landing zone, etc.)

A7.2.5.2.6.14. **FARP. (Units qualified in FARP operations).** The IG will task a tanker for a minimum of two receivers using covert lighting and radio silence. The primary success criteria for hot refueling operations are a safe and successful fuel transfer. Immediately discontinue fuel transfer for any leaks or other

potentially dangerous situations. Procedures outlined in AFI 11-235, *Forward Area Refueling Point (FARP) Operations*, AFI 23-201, *Fuels Management*, T.O. 00-25-172, *Ground Servicing Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding*, AFI 11-2MDS specific, Volume 3, and aircraft technical orders will be followed when conducting hot refueling/FARP operations. A FARP operation (tanker) may be considered successful if no fuel transfer occurs due to reasons beyond the control of the tanker aircrew (e.g., receiver aircraft fail to show). In this case, the tanker aircrew must meet the remaining criteria listed below to consider the event successful. If a leaking hose can be safely and efficiently removed/repaired/shut-off, refueling operations may continue. An additional 10 minutes is allowed to replace/repair a leaking hose or piece of equipment. For grading, consider a FARP operation reliable if the tanker:

A7.2.5.2.6.14.1. Briefs and is aware of emergency procedures, escape routes, and crew rendezvous areas.

A7.2.5.2.6.14.2. Taxis to the briefed location and follows marshaller signals (if available) to properly position for the refueling operation (if one is established).

A7.2.5.2.6.14.3. Properly deploys the required equipment (properly checked and tested) in the appropriate pattern for the number of receivers.

A7.2.5.2.6.14.4. Conducts refueling under NVG conditions and is ready to accept a receiver within 20 minutes from setting the aircraft brakes.

A7.2.5.2.6.14.5. Safely transfers the pre-briefed/required fuel to the receivers using proper procedures.

A7.2.5.2.6.14.6. Properly removes residual fuel from hoses and equipment and stows equipment aboard the tanker aircraft within 30 minutes from disconnect from the last receiver.

A7.2.5.2.6.15. **FARP (helicopter).** In addition to the criteria specified in paragraph A7.2.5.2.6.14., evaluate helicopter FARP operations using the following guidance:

A7.2.5.2.6.15.1. Receivers arrive at the FARP location plus or minus two minutes from scheduled arrival time.

A7.2.5.2.6.15.2. Receivers taxi to proper refueling location following marshaller signals (if available).

A7.2.5.2.6.15.3. During FARP operations, personnel display proper procedures for manning refueling nozzles and hoses, bonding and transfer of fuel.

A7.2.5.2.6.15.4. Fire Protection plan: Provide the Senior IG Fire Inspector a copy of the site specific Fire Prevention/Fire Protection plan and any applicable ORM's.

A7.2.5.2.6.16. **Air to Air Refueling (AAR), Helicopter Air to Air Refueling (HAAR), and Tilt-Rotor Air to Air Refueling (TAAR).**

A7.2.5.2.6.16.1. Fixed wing receiver. Task appropriate units to demonstrate air to air refueling capability. The primary inspection criteria are a safe and successful transfer of fuel. For a single aircraft or the lead aircraft in a formation to be successful, that aircraft must:

A7.2.5.2.6.16.1.1. Accomplish a successful rendezvous.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.1.2. Transfer the pre-planned fuel load, updated fuel requirement, or limit the transfer to not exceed maximum gross weight.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.1.3. The pre-briefed or required fuel load is transferred to all aircraft prior to the end point.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.1.4. Score TOA at the rendezvous initial point (RVIP) or rendezvous control point (RVCP) as appropriate for the type rendezvous. TOAs may change in-flight. Use the coordinated new TOA agreed to by the tanker, receiver, and C2 plus or minus one minute, as appropriate.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.2. Fixed wing tanker/helicopter or tilt-rotor receiver. Evaluate IAW AFI 11-2MDS specific, Volume 3, aircraft flight manuals, and ATP-56(B). Evaluate air refueling capability as an employment event. The primary requirement is a safe and successful fuel transfer to support helicopter requirements.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.2.1. SOF TOA scoring will be based on event aircraft arriving at or abeam the ARCP at the air refueling control time (ARCT). Tanker TOA will be on time to one minute late. Receiver TOA will be one minute early to on time. TOA may change in-flight. Use the coordinated TOA agreed to by tanker, receiver, and C2 plus or minus one minute, as appropriate. CSAR tanker TOA will be on time to two minutes late. Receiver TOA will be two minutes early to on time.

A7.2.5.2.6.16.2.2. External factors beyond the control of the tanker or receiver will not impact the event rating. For example, receiver malfunctions or other associated events beyond the control of the tanker will not impact on the event rating of the tanker. Similarly, tanker malfunctions will not reflect on the event rating of the receiver.

A7.2.5.2.6.17. **Weapons Employment, Live/Dry Fire.** Weapons employment should support the framework of the exercise scenario. Each sortie evaluated must properly identify the target and select weapons and munitions appropriate for target destruction.

A7.2.5.2.6.17.1. Record TOT based on the time the aircraft first enters the area, range, or other specified point approved by the IG.

A7.2.5.2.6.17.2. The primary consideration for weapons employment is target destruction and timely mission accomplishment. This is a subjective evaluation based on effectiveness of fire.

A7.2.5.2.6.18. AC-130 Call for Fire. No TOT should be used. AC-130 call for fire is an offensive maneuver with primary considerations being adherence to the call-for-fire briefing, team identification, target identification, and target

engagement.

A7.2.5.2.6.19. **Psychological Operations EC-130 Weapons Systems.** This paragraph outlines specific ORI employment criteria for special operations EC-130 units. Rate subareas IAW basic regulation except where specified otherwise.

A7.2.5.2.6.19.1. Mission Planning. Evaluate effective use of the mission planning cycle.

A7.2.5.2.6.19.2. Mission Flight Profile. Aircrews must demonstrate adequate navigation to meet on-station requirements. Evaluate aircrew effectiveness against the assigned tactical electronic combat mission.

A7.2.5.2.6.19.3. PSYOP Effectiveness. Evaluate on-station time based upon the time actually supporting the tasked mission versus the scheduled transmission time. On-station time includes the period while crews may be characterizing and analyzing the signal environment or conducting Electronic Countermeasures (ECM). Evaluate safe and effective transmitter usage and operation. Transmissions may be radiated on an approved or assigned frequency, or transmitted into "dummy load" if no frequency is available. If the aircraft is not in its assigned orbit, but is in a position from which the aircrew can effectively perform its electronic combat mission, count this time as effective on-station time. The flight profile may involve an orbit, track, or penetration route.

A7.2.5.3. **Special Tactics.**

A7.2.5.3.1. Evaluate performance in the joint/combined arena in support of a task force commander's scheme of maneuver. The ORI will evaluate areas from the unit Mission Essential Task (MET) listing, which is based on the DOC statement, and OPLAN force listings. Sub-tasks associated with each MET area will be evaluated IAW conditions and standards. The 720 Special Tactics Group (STG) will publish METs and Tasks, Conditions, and Standards (TCS).

A7.2.5.3.1.1. In addition to the criteria in this section, evaluate combat weather units utilizing the criteria in Sections A7.2.5.7.

A7.2.5.3.1.2. Units should be rated on their ability to execute realistic mission scenarios consistent with the most probable contingencies for their theater of operations. Unit commanders are responsible to ensure planners integrate as many MET related events as possible into the exercise scenario. **Note:** There is no minimum number of events required during an inspection; however, an inspection that does not include multiple events covering a wide array of a unit's capabilities may be extended or continued at IG discretion.

A7.2.5.3.1.3. A successful inspection will assess the unit's ability to plan, coordinate, and execute tasked missions with joint air/ground forces. Employment should include scenarios involving terminal control, reconnaissance (to include tactical weather operations and assault zone survey/ assessment), and personal recovery operations specific to the AFSC composition and mission tasking of the unit.

A7.2.5.3.1.4. The operation/exercise and mission scenarios should drive realistic mission tasking to effectively evaluate the unit's ability to conduct a cross-section of METs. Completion of all tasks is not required for a successful inspection.

A7.2.5.3.2. **Grading.**

A7.2.5.3.2.1. Mission employment grading is based on the planning and preparation, execution, debriefing, and reporting phases of executed missions.

A7.2.5.3.2.2. Grades are based on unit ability to execute METs IAW TCS as applied to mission tasking. Weighted values for tasks and METs will be assigned by 720 STG and distributed to subordinate units.

A7.2.5.3.2.2.1. Individual conditions and standards are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall task grade.

A7.2.5.3.2.2.2. Individual task grades are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall MET grade.

A7.2.5.3.2.2.3. Individual MET grades are weighted, graded, totaled, and averaged to obtain the overall employment grade.

A7.2.5.3.2.3. Safety violations will affect the final grade IAW paragraph 4.2.1.

A7.2.5.3.3. Additional Information.

A7.2.5.3.3.1. Special Tactics units will provide IG inspectors operational equipment they require to tactically participate with the inspection unit. The IG inspector will provide a list to the unit point of contact no later than 30 days prior to arrival. IG inspectors are responsible for all equipment signed over to them. Units should plan for two inspectors to participate per event (i.e. positions in jump stick, on helicopter, overland formation, etc.).

A7.2.5.3.3.2. Units are responsible to coordinate for administrative/safety requirements for all events to include medical coverage, safety boats, assault zone coverage, etc.

A7.2.5.4. **Personnel Recovery (PR)**. Normally the IG will task a minimum of one air event and one ground event to assess the proper utilization of appropriate and available assets in the planning and execution of PR operations. Consider the event successful if the five critical phases of PR (Report, Locate, Identify, Support, and Return) are accomplished within the scope of unit and HHQ governing documents and mission requirements.

A7.2.5.4.1. Report. Ensure applicable information-gathering assets are utilized for reporting pertinent information and channeling to applicable C2. Ensure appropriate units are alerted to begin the planning process.

A7.2.5.4.2. Locate. Employ applicable assets to ensure successful, timely, and positive location of isolated personnel. Ensure appropriate C2 nodes are notified IAW the PR section of the theater or exercise Special Instructions (SPINs).

A7.2.5.4.3. Identify. Ensure positive identification is confirmed prior to execution.

A7.2.5.4.4. Support. Ensure all pre-deployment training and contingency planning, covering all phases of recovery, is accomplished prior to employment.

A7.2.5.4.5. Return. Once isolated personnel are successfully returned to friendly forces, ensure the seamless processing into the three phases of the Yellow Ribbon repatriation program IAW DOD Instruction 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel.* Unit responsibilities will be to ensure their personnel recovery checklists outline the correct procedures and identify the appropriate points of contact for transition into, and through, the process.

A7.2.5.4.6. Within unit and HHQ Concept of Operations (CONOPS), ensure appropriate planning takes place, with representation from supporting units, to structure the proper task organization, employ the appropriate air and/or ground assets and, based on mission requirements, affect the successful recovery of personnel in denied or hostile environment.

A7.2.5.4.7. Execution will encompass a full mission profile based on a given downed aircrew scenario, to include ground recovery team(s), airborne infil/exfil, and applicable C2, IAW unit and HHQ directives.

A7.2.5.4.8. Evaluate evaders on their familiarity with basic PR and Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) related equipment, as well as their ability to evade and affect recovery IAW applicable PR CONOPS in a simulated hostile environment.

A7.2.5.4.9. The ground team must accomplish overland movement IAW special tactics mission objectives, unit, and HHQ directives. Pararescue team leaders will be evaluated on team leader duties, mission-related briefings, and utilization of team members and their core skills. For safety purposes, downed aircrew members (evaders) must be escorted by a Pararescueman or SERE Instructor during the field training exercise.

A7.2.5.4.10. Airborne PR and CSAR operations will be evaluated IAW proper and safe AIE employment techniques, crew coordination, employment briefings, equipment packages and loading, and handoff of casualties.

A7.2.5.4.11. C2 nodes must comply with appropriate PR checklists responses IAW established SPINs.

A7.2.5.4.12. Operational Support. Operational support to personnel recovery must include full-spectrum support to overall mission area objectives. Specifically, operational support activities include intelligence, SERE, and space subject matter expertise.

A7.2.5.4.13. SERE. Specific mission essential tasks will include the conduct of theater SERE indoctrination briefings addressing environmental factors, scenario-specific conduct after capture, and applicable PR CONOPS/SPINs information to facilitate successful evasion and recovery. Provide evasion planning support to all high-risk-of-capture personnel.

A7.2.5.5. **Airfield Operations.**

A7.2.5.5.1. Evaluate the ability of air traffic control to provide safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of aircraft during wartime/contingency taskings while adhering to United States Air Force (USAF), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Defense (DOD), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) procedures.

A7.2.5.5.2. Evaluate the ability of airfield management to ensure adequate airfield facilities (pavements, signs, markings, etc.) during wartime/contingency taskings.

A7.2.5.5.3. Evaluate Airfield Operations emergency actions procedures and checklists.

A7.2.5.6. **Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE).**

A7.2.5.6.1. Evaluate the life support function on its capability to provide AFE and chemical defense equipment and related support to flying personnel within the constraints of applicable directives. All deployed aircrews will have their equipment combat configured prior to the first employment mission and will be tasked to fly simulated combat missions using this equipment. During employment, only those personnel and equipment/supplies specifically designated for mobility will be authorized for use.

A7.2.5.6.2. Rating Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE). Any safety of flight discrepancy is considered a major safety violation. A safety of flight discrepancy is defined as a violation of existing inspection or maintenance procedures resulting in personnel injuries or loss of life. The following rating descriptions are guidelines; inspection grades will be determined by the HQ AFSOC/IG.

A7.2.5.6.2.1. OUTSTANDING. All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions lost because of life support/Chemical Biological Warfare Defense Ensemble (CBWDE) related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must far exceed mission requirements and be carried out in a superior manner.

A7.2.5.6.2.2. EXCELLENT. All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions lost because of life support/CBWDE related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must exceed mission requirements and be carried out in a superior manner. Few discrepancies exist.

A7.2.5.6.2.3. SATISFACTORY. All life support equipment must be combat configured. No combat missions lost because of life support/CBWDE related problems. All programs, procedures, and activities must meet mission requirements.

A7.2.5.6.2.4. MARGINAL. Two sub items less than SATISFACTORY.

A7.2.5.6.2.5. UNSATISFACTORY. Three sub items less than SATISFACTORY.

A7.2.5.6.3. Initial Response: Units will demonstrate the ability to provide adequate amounts of protective, survival, and rescue equipment and supplies to meet specific UTC taskings.

A7.2.5.6.4. Deployment packages will be self-sustaining and capable of supporting all known contingencies for a minimum of 60 days of surge flying. Both equipment support capabilities and personnel requirements and availability will be evaluated. Requirements for unit AFE personnel and equipment will meet specific UTC taskings. The following items will be evaluated:

A7.2.5.6.4.1. Equipment, supplies, and support capabilities.

A7.2.5.6.4.2. Personnel requirements and availability.

A7.2.5.6.5. Evaluate the effectiveness of aircrew and technician training programs.

A7.2.5.6.6. Aircrew Equipment Serviceability and Configuration.   AFE and Chemical Defense Equipment (ACDE) will be available for immediate issue to flying personnel and maintained in serviceable condition, as required by applicable equipment Technical Orders (T.O.).   Equipment will be properly configured for combat operations support specific UTC requirements. Aircrews will be individually fitted, as required by applicable equipment T.O.s. Equipment will be stored and controlled to prevent damage, loss or misuse. The following items will be evaluated:

A7.2.5.6.6.1. Equipment maintenance.

A7.2.5.6.6.2. Serviceability.

A7.2.5.6.6.3. Configuration.

A7.2.5.6.6.4. Fitting.

A7.2.5.6.6.5. Storage and Control.

A7.2.5.6.7. Combat Operations Support. All aircraft flown during the employment phase of the ORI and the aircrews involved will receive total support from the unit's deployed package and War Readiness Materiel (WRM) assets. Procedures will be established for reporting personnel casualties and reconstitution of destroyed/damaged life support equipment. Plans will be developed for equipment dispersal/protection and rapid evacuation of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Evacuation of sufficient equipment and supplies may be performed by any personnel directed by unit commander. Aircrew weapons issue, storage, and control procedures may be evaluated (if applicable). The following will be evaluated:

A7.2.5.6.7.1. Personnel casualty reporting and equipment re-supply procedures.

A7.2.5.6.7.2. Equipment dispersal/protection.

A7.2.5.6.7.3. Evacuation plan.

A7.2.5.6.7.4. Evacuation capability.

A7.2.5.6.7.5. Aircrew weapons (if applicable).

A7.2.5.6.8. Aircrew Chemical Defense Operations. Units will establish an area for life support operations providing adequate protection from contamination for personnel and equipment. Facilities will be designed and equipped to support Aircrew Contamination Control Area (ACCA) processing and equipment decontamination operations IAW applicable directives.   Cross-contamination

avoidance, spot detection, spot contamination control, liquid run-off, and contamination collection issues will be addressed. Personnel will demonstrate the ability to properly maintain and decontaminate aircrew flight equipment and chemical defense equipment. Personnel will demonstrate their efficiency and knowledge of ACCA processing procedures. The unit may be tasked to demonstrate the capability to rotate aircrews in and out of a simulated toxic environment. In order to effectively evaluate chemical biological warfare defense procedures, the IG may task units to demonstrate full aircrew chemical warfare defense ensemble/Aircrew Eye Respiratory Protection (AERP) wear/suit-up procedures and/or flying operations in AERP. ACCA management will provide for continuous operations in a chemical environment. The following items will be evaluated:

A7.2.5.6.8.1. Facilities and processing equipment.

A7.2.5.6.8.2. Contamination control.

A7.2.5.6.8.3. ACCA management and processing.

A7.2.5.6.8.4. Equipment decontamination.

A7.2.5.7. **Weather.** Evaluate ability to provide weather support to combat operations IAW AFMAN 15-125, *Weather Station Operations*, and AFSOCI 15-102, *Weather Operations*. The weather team will deploy with sufficient Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TSOP), Tactical Analysis and Forecast Program (TAFP), and Area of Operations (AO) familiarization packages to accomplish their support mission. Also, product verification and quality control will be evaluated to ensure observers and forecasters are continually improving future weather support and product quality.

A7.2.5.7.1. Initial Response. Evaluate ability to transition from peacetime to wartime posture. Evaluate the preparation of personnel and equipment for deployment. Evaluate support to the customer as the unit prepares and departs for the deployed site. Initial response is successful if:

A7.2.5.7.1.1. Deployed personnel and equipment are sufficient to meet mission needs. Personnel and equipment must be processed and ready to meet mobility processing timelines.

A7.2.5.7.1.2. Deploying personnel use guidance in the form of a deployment binder, TSOPs, TAFP, and AO familiarization packages to accomplish pre-deployment tasks, meet processing timelines, and provide required weather support.

A7.2.5.7.2. Mission Planning Support. Mission planning support is successful if:

A7.2.5.7.2.1. Weather personnel adequately plan for and request support assistance in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) prior to deployment (i.e., Special Support Operations Branch (SSOB), Air Force Combat Climatology Center (AFCCC), Weather Support Center (WSC), etc.) with updates, as required.

A7.2.5.7.2.2. Internal coordination and interface with intelligence, CAT, mission planners, and C2 activities keep unit personnel knowledgeable of mission requirements and schedules. Unit personnel have adequate knowledge of deployed customer mission requirements and schedules. Adequate and timely

coordination with aircrews, planners, CAT/CP, Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODAs) in isolation, etc., to ensure forecasters stay abreast of changing mission requirements and respond to requests for information.

A7.2.5.7.2.3. Weather personnel provide timely, accurate, and relevant weather information. This includes current/forecast weather, climatology, oceanographic, and solar/lunar data. Weather personnel supporting Army Special Operations Forces will provide this information to personnel in isolation prior to deployment if required.

A7.2.5.7.3. Briefings and Debriefings. Briefings/Debriefings are successful if:

A7.2.5.7.3.1. Briefings are timely, tailored, accurate, and relevant to meet specific mission requirements. Briefings must also contain all required information. Forecasters must use standardized preparation, content, and presentation procedures IAW Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)/TSOPs, AFMAN 15-125, and AFSOCI 15-102.

A7.2.5.7.3.2. Debriefings are performed and relevant meteorological information is applied to follow on missions and forecast products. Feedback obtained via debriefings should also be provided to local customers and distant users for inclusion in centrally produced products whenever possible.

A7.2.5.7.4. Observing. Observing support is successful if:

A7.2.5.7.4.1. Weather observations are taken, encoded, recorded, and disseminated IAW AFMAN 15-111, *Surface Weather Observations*, and local procedures.

A7.2.5.7.4.2. Tactical observing site selection and operation is IAW AFMAN 15-111.

A7.2.5.7.4.3. Frequency of observations meets customer requirements.

A7.2.5.7.4.4. Deployed observers are able to setup, operate, and tear down deployed equipment.

A7.2.5.7.5. Forecasting. Forecasting support is successful if:

A7.2.5.7.5.1. All forecasters can set up, operate, and tear down deployed weather and weather communications equipment as required. Forecasters must plan for and gain access to adequate meteorological data to ensure sound forecast products and decision assistance are provided to the warfighter.

A7.2.5.7.5.2. Timely, accurate, and relevant information is provided to key decision makers. Forecasters must use every available means, including but not limited to briefings, face-to-face contact, and display boards, to ensure current and forecast conditions, to include warnings, watches and advisories, are available.

A7.2.5.7.5.3. Forecasters use adequate tools (TAFP and AO Familiarization Binder) to form sound meteorological reasoning and a standardized approach to weather forecasting that is focused on deployed mission requirements.

A7.2.5.7.5.4. Weather Warning, Watch, and Advisory criteria/support are

reviewed and updated as necessary once arriving at a deployed location to meet the deployed customer's needs. Forecasters conduct meteorological watch (METWATCH) to ensure timely issuance of forecast amendments, weather warnings/advisories/watches, and timely updates to aircrews, the deployed commander, and his/her staff. Home station, alternate airfields, DZs, AR tracks, ODA team infiltration routes and operational areas, etc. must be constantly monitored to ensure quick recognition of unexpected change and to ensure timely notification to the customer of updated conditions.

A7.2.5.7.6. Evaluation of Special Tactics Combat Weather will include all elements in paragraph 4.5.6., Weather and the criteria in paragraph A7.2.5.3., Special Tactics.

A7.3. Sustaining the Force.

A7.3.1. **Communications and Information Systems Operations.**

A7.3.1.1. During an ORI, the following areas may be evaluated: leadership, ability to organize, train, and equip forces, and preparation and support of deploying forces. Each squadron/group/wing echelon of command is responsible for its internal IM requirements (people, proficiency training, equipment, handling of their information resources) whether ingarrison or deployed.

A7.3.1.2. Functional Area IM. Evaluate the functional area manager's ability to organize equipment, material, and personnel for deployment.

A7.3.1.2.1. Evaluate ability to palletize and mobilize their equipment.

A7.3.1.2.2. Evaluate proficiency on AFSOC-standard software.

A7.3.1.2.3. Ensure procedures have been established to coordinate with theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs) regarding requests for information and postal support at deployed locations.

A7.3.1.3. Base Communications, Message Center, Telephones, and Automation support.

A7.3.1.3.1. Evaluate local base communications and computer systems support including Land Mobile Radio (LMR) networks, message processing, telephone switch, and automation support to deployed forces.

A7.3.1.4. Functional IM Support. Base-level functional IM support will only be evaluated in conjunction with the communications squadron.

A7.3.1.4.1. Ensure procedures have been established to inform customers of the level and scope of support that can and will be provided (i.e., bulletin, destruction facility, records storage, etc.).

A7.3.1.4.2. Administrative Communications. Ensure procedures have been established to process and distribute incoming and outgoing official, personal, and accountable mail.

A7.3.1.4.2.1. Ensure personnel can demonstrate proper mail bomb procedures.

A7.3.1.4.2.2. Ensure personnel can demonstrate proper contaminated mail procedures.

A7.3.1.4.2.3. Ensure procedures have been established for handling mail for casualties.

A7.3.1.4.2.4. Ensure procedures have been established for maintaining and administering the base locator.

A7.3.1.4.2.5. Ensure procedures have been established to ensure commercial postage meters or postage stamps are available for the Base Information Transfer Center (BITC) to place postage on official mail.

A7.3.1.4.2.6. Ensure procedures are established to process and distribute official mail received from the military post office.

A7.3.1.4.2.7. Ensure procedures are established to process and distribute personal mail through a postal service center or unit mailroom concept of delivery.

A7.3.1.4.2.8. Records Management. Ensure procedures have been developed for maintaining, protecting, and destroying records (hard copy and electronic; classified and unclassified).

A7.3.1.4.2.9. Ensure personnel can demonstrate proper procedures for protecting and destroying classified documents and sensitive records.

A7.3.1.4.2.10. Ensure procedures have been established for processing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

A7.3.1.4.2.11. Ensure a Privacy Act Officer (should be the Records Manager) has been appointed to answer and brief Privacy Act issues.

A7.3.1.4.2.12. Publishing. Ensure procedures have been established to replenish forms and publications stocks.

A7.3.1.4.2.13. Ensure sufficient security measures have been established to safeguard sensitive publications and forms.

A7.3.1.4.2.14. Ensure arrangements have been made to obtain, on a continuing basis, new and updated electronic versions of publications and forms.

A7.3.1.4.2.15. Ensure personnel can demonstrate proper procedures for filling requisitions/ requirements for publications/forms to customer account representatives.

A7.3.1.5. Automation Support.

A7.3.1.5.1. Ensure procedures have been established outlining responsibilities for automation support at deployed location.

A7.3.1.6. Command and Supervision: Evaluate the ability of the officer in charge (OIC) and staff to provide proper leadership and guidance to ensure efficient and effective preparation of communications equipment and personnel for air transport, monitor unit readiness status, keep deployment actions on schedule, and resolve problem areas.

A7.3.1.7. Evaluate OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC procedures IAW paragraph 4.5.2.

A7.3.1.8. COMSEC. Evaluate IAW Air Force directives.

A7.3.1.9. Deployment Planning. Evaluate unit knowledge of specific mission tasks in exercise/contingency plans, and their ability to identify specific tasks and communications mission requirements from the tasked OPLAN or OPORD.

A7.3.1.10. Equipment preparation. Evaluate ability to properly prepare UTC resources for cargo handling IAW applicable safety and cargo handling requirements.

A7.3.1.11. Employment: Employment evaluation areas consist of: UTC employment and circuit activation, communications operations, and logistics.

A7.3.1.11.1. UTC employment and circuit activation is graded on the ability of the unit to meet mission requirements, as determined by the deployed supported commander. For initial activation, one lightweight multi-band satellite system, one Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and one High Frequency (HF) network are normally established. Depending on mission support profile, air-to-ground networks may also be established to support close in aircraft. All equipment should be set up IAW applicable TOs and Air Force Occupational Safety and Health (AFOSH) safety directives.

A7.3.1.11.2. Super High Frequency (SHF) SATCOM/Networks. Either the theater SOC or AFSOC communications units will provide the SHF satellite communications system and deployed networks. When the AFSOC communications unit establishes the SHF connectivity and/or provides the network access, HQ AFSOC/IG will inspect the setup. Network planning, HHQ coordination, circuit priorities and access times will all be evaluated in accordance with Joint Publications, CJCS Instructions/Directives, AFIs, and AFSOC policies. These systems must be established in a timely manner to support the flying operations and, if activated, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) planning cell.

A7.3.1.11.3. UHF SATCOM. The system, if deployed, is usually the first system to be set up. The system is considered activated when the terminal is loaded with the appropriate COMSEC, frequencies, and terminal ID, if applicable and contact is made either by voice or data with another station. If no other stations are available, setting up a second system and performing an operational check verify activation.

A7.3.1.11.4. HF System. The clock to measure HF system set up time begins upon successful installation and activation of UHF SATCOM or as determined by the communications functional inspector and the communications team chief. The system is considered activated when the terminal is loaded with the appropriate COMSEC and frequencies and contact is made either by voice or data with another station.

A7.3.1.11.5. Overall Communications Systems Activation. This category covers all other communications systems required during the deployment, to include voice, data, and fax. Safety factors and specific site impediments will be given consideration. The unit may choose to activate these systems after initial tri-band SATCOM, UHF SATCOM and HF circuits are established, or activate them concurrently. The communications team chief and inspector will coordinate the start time.

A7.3.1.11.6. Reliability.   Evaluate the reliability of communications systems supporting the customer. Verification of reliability will be as required or requested.

A7.3.1.11.7. Communications Operations.   Evaluate operator efficiency in performing the following tasks:

A7.3.1.11.7.1. OPSEC. Evaluate IAW paragraph A7.1.2.4.2.2.

A7.3.1.11.7.2. Radio Operations.   Ensure traffic handling and log-keeping procedures are conducted IAW applicable instructions.

A7.3.1.11.7.3. General Operations. Personnel should:

A7.3.1.11.7.3.1. Maintain a log of significant events affecting unit operations.

A7.3.1.11.7.3.2. Review and revise OI to meet local requirements.

A7.3.1.11.7.3.3. Comply with COMSEC procedures.

A7.3.1.11.7.3.4. Prepare, update, modify, and execute emergency plans, including destruction plans.

A7.3.1.11.7.3.5. Be proficient in lost communications and execution checklist over-due call procedures.

A7.3.1.11.7.3.6. Demonstrate the ability to accomplish Over-The-Air-Rekey (OTAR) with distant ground or airborne terminals, including the ability to re-key aircraft en route.

A7.3.1.11.8. Logistics. The logistics function is evaluated on its ability to effectively and accurately control and coordinate the overall maintenance effort IAW Technical Order 00-33A-1001, *General Communications Activities, Management Procedures and Practice Requirements*, other applicable technical orders, and AFOSH standards. Evaluated areas are maintenance control, production work center management, and resource management.

A7.3.1.11.8.1. Maintenance Control.   The following areas will be evaluated: control of resources, enforcement of safety directives, status reporting, and maintenance action tracking/ scheduling (where applicable or practical).

A7.3.1.11.8.2. Production Work Center Management.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.1. Evaluate the ability to provide required serviceable equipment to accomplish the mission.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.2. Evaluate the performance of quality maintenance while complying with technical directives.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.3. Evaluate compliance with safety directives.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.4. Evaluate reporting, response, and actions taken on equipment serviceability.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.5. Evaluate ability to perform damage repair as required ensuring equipment serviceability.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.6. Evaluate overall equipment condition.

A7.3.1.11.8.2.7. Evaluate availability, use, and control of technical data, tools, and test equipment.

A7.3.1.11.8.3. Resources.

A7.3.1.11.8.3.1. Evaluate procedures for home station resupply of deployed UTCs.

A7.3.1.11.8.3.2. Evaluate procedures for reporting equipment status and open job status in place for deployed teams.

A7.3.1.12. Communications Planning: Evaluate planning by either dedicated personnel (air or ground) or as an additional function in the field in all of the following areas:

A7.3.1.12.1. Ability to produce required communications products.

A7.3.1.12.2. Ability to brief communications requirements to appropriate aircrew and ground personnel. Briefings may be tailored to meet mission requirements.

A7.3.1.12.3. Availability of "operator aids" designed to designate net members, call signs, HF azimuths, etc.

A7.3.1.12.4. Evaluate circuit restorable priorities, (i.e. are they followed?)

A7.3.1.12.5. Evaluate ability to coordinate with SOC/J6 or appropriate communications representative to resolve issues (e.g. SATCOM access, phone/circuits, or additional frequency requests).

A7.3.1.13. Survivability.   This area evaluates the ability to provide continuous communications support during simulated combat situations. Depending on the scenario and scope of the inspection, this area may be scored as the overall response of the parent wing/group as opposed to just the communications unit. Exercise scenarios may include, but are not limited to, the following events:

A7.3.1.13.1. Relocate or reestablish required communications support in the event of a bomb threat, power outage, natural disaster, loss of satellite access, spectrum interference resolution, etc.

A7.3.1.13.2. Precautionary and total destruction of classified material and equipment, cryptographic insecurity, and computer security exercises.

A7.3.1.13.3. Fire awareness and protection procedures.

A7.3.1.13.4. Physical security exercise.

A7.3.1.13.5. Ability to file proper reports resulting from any of the above.

A7.3.1.14. Airborne Communications Support: Personnel performing communications duties on organic aircraft or specific airborne C2 consoles are operationally evaluated under these criteria. The inspection team will evaluate each platform operators' ability to effectively use communications practices and systems to meet their specific missions. Each platform has specific communications characteristics and systems that must be taken into consideration by the inspectors. During an ORI, any or all of the following areas may be evaluated: awareness of OPSEC requirements and guidance, brevity for

voice and log procedures, ability to receive OTAR en route or on the ground, and proficiency in lost communications procedures.

A7.3.2. **Personnel.**

A7.3.2.1. Casualty Reporting. Evaluate IAW AFI 36-3002.

A7.3.2.2. Strength Accountability. Evaluate procedures IAW AFI 36-3208. Ensure timeliness and accuracy of reports.

A7.3.2.3. Deliberate Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES). Ensure all updates are accomplished IAW AFI 10-215.

A7.3.2.3.1. Ensure adequate primary and backup operating locations are set up. Ensure alternate means of communications have been set up and are effective.

A7.3.3. **Manpower.**

A7.3.3.1. Evaluate the Manpower function's ability to properly receive, process, validate, and distribute the DCAPES-generated levy flow and/or their ability to react to a request for forces force list and generate the necessary DRMD.

A7.3.3.2. Evaluate the Manpower function's support to the IDO, DCC, and PDF under the IDP. Specifically, their participation in the PDF processes and their effectiveness in resolving disconnects between the deployment requirement taskings and actual personnel movements.

A7.3.3.3. Evaluate ability to acquire and maintain an accurate DRMD for the supported location within DCAPES.

A7.3.3.4. Evaluate the ability to respond to internal and external requests for changes to the assigned force structure, requests for data within DCAPES, and the ability to perform analytical reviews and develop logical approaches to resolve manpower and force structure issues.

A7.3.4. **Services.**

A7.3.4.1. Services Initial Response Activities.

A7.3.4.1.1. Home Station Services Management. Evaluate how well personnel manage resources, their ability to respond to rapidly changing events, and resourcefulness used to solve problems.

A7.3.4.1.1.1. Communications. Consider the timeliness and accuracy of reporting information to C2 agencies and squadron work centers, including Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA). Consider ability of reporting personnel accountability, facility hours of operation and status, and capabilities.

A7.3.4.1.1.2. Work Schedules. Consider management actions to adequately man facilities to accommodate the needs of the base population during periods of increased readiness and crisis responses. Consider management's ability to determine needs of reserve personnel, contract contingency clauses, and civilian overtime options to ensure the highest levels of service are maintained.

A7.3.4.1.1.3. Equipment/Material Management.   Consider management's accountability, location and availability of serviceable equipment and supplies required to support applicable disaster response, contingency, and mobility plans.

A7.3.4.1.1.4. Mortuary Response Forces. Consider overall management of the Mortuary Affairs Program IAW applicable directives. Consider development and implementation of plans for mortuary response for search and recovery operations, ability to recall search and recovery teams, conduct recovery operations with available team kits, and death reporting in applicable timelines.

A7.3.4.1.1.5. Pre-deployment Planning.   Evaluate home station training documentation and accuracy of SORTS. Evaluate written plans for home station training for completeness and realism.

A7.3.4.1.1.6. Review unit's written procedures for alerting, recalling, briefing, and processing of personnel and equipment.

A7.3.4.2. Services Employment Activities.

A7.3.4.2.1. Evaluate ability to determine requirements and execute the Readiness in Base Services (Prime RIBS) wartime theater support mission in the following areas:

A7.3.4.2.2. Unit Control Center (UCC). Evaluate ability to establish a deployed UCC in a timely manner. Review checklists, lines of communication, ability to communicate and interface with in-place command and other support agencies, delegation of authority, maintaining current status of personnel and capabilities, and maintaining OPSEC/COMSEC/COMPUSEC.

A7.3.4.2.3. Food Service.   Consider procedures for requisitioning, inventory controls, storage controls, site set-up and layout, menu planning utilizing "A" and "B" Rations and Meals Ready to Eat, meal preparation procedures, customer service, control of sanitation and hygiene, maintain control of personnel, maintain safe operations, proficiently operate and maintain field equipment (including fuel fired equipment), and effective utilization of available resources.

A7.3.4.2.4. Field Lodging. Evaluate ability to determine bed-down requirements and availability of bed spaces, site selection, bed-down planning, assignment procedures, maintaining personnel accountability and locator information, coordination with PERSCO for accuracy of locator data, maintaining safety and hygiene, and maintaining status and availability of bed spaces.

A7.3.4.2.5. Field Exchange. Evaluate capability to establish and operate a deployed retail operation as applicable to UTC requirements.

A7.3.4.2.6. Mortuary Operations. Evaluate ability to set up and operate a Mortuary Collection Point, process remains to preserve identification media, effectively communicate with applicable agencies, practice sanitation and hygiene, coordinate shipment (simulated) of remains, maintain accurate status and documentation, and effectively utilize available resources.

A7.3.4.2.7. Fitness and Recreation.   Determine ability to set up, operate, and maintain fitness and recreation programs within UTC capabilities. Include planning

of group activities and selfdirected type activities, ability to utilize, account for and maintain status of available resources, and ability to communicate effectively.

A7.3.4.2.8. Laundry Service. Evaluate ability to establish, operate and/or maintain laundry services, demonstrate knowledge of accountability procedures, effectively utilize available resources, and/ or set up selfhelp operations within UTC requirements

A7.3.5. **Civil Engineering (CE).**

A7.3.5.1. Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF).

A7.3.5.1.1. Deployment Planning. Evaluate unit ability to manage the recall and deployment of personnel and equipment in accordance with the base deployment plan, including alert recall procedures, unit assembly procedures, personnel and equipment processing.

A7.3.5.1.2. Home Station CE Support. Evaluate ability to plan, sustain, and transition from normal operations to deployment of forces. Evaluate ability to successfully conduct emergency operations to include fire and emergency services, IED mitigation and major accident response scenarios.

A7.3.5.2. CE Operations: CE units will be evaluated on their ability to provide support and sustainability to deployed force in accordance with AFPAM 10-219, Volumes 1-5.

A7.3.5.2.1. Item-Force Beddown. All units will be given a hypothetical beddown problem to use in developing a beddown plan and briefing for presentation to the IG Team. The briefing should consider the sub-items listed below where CE interface for planning, materials or labor will be required. Sub-items should be coordinated with subject matter experts throughout the Wing:

A7.3.5.2.2. Air Rapid Response Kit (ARRK) Evaluate ability to deploy and employ ARRK assets, ARRK PlayBook Options (PBO) and ARRK Civil Engineer Support (J-Teams) as tasked.

A7.3.5.2.2.1. Evaluate whether ARRK assets were employed and used IAW MISCAP statements, CONOPS, and other directives.

A7.3.5.2.2.2. Evaluate whether J-team personnel sufficiently and safely used ARRK assets to produce, potable water, established an armory, deployed sufficient fuel using the fuel PBO, and employed the C2 PBO as required.

Table A7.1. Academic Beddown Considerations.

Command and Control.
Communications and Information Support.
Aircraft Parking Plan.
Facilities.
Aircraft Maintenance and Security.
Material management Support.
Transportation.
POL Support.
Munitions.

Force Support.
Limiting Factors.

Table A7.2. Additional Sub-Items When Tasked with Cantonment Area Setup.

Additionally, when tasked with cantonment area setup, the sub-items listed below will be evaluated:
Erection of tents for living/working based on threat/local area conditions.
Proper assessment of facilities.
Requirements and materials.
Layout of facilities.
Tent city construction.
Construction timeliness.
Cargo preparation and convoy movement.

A7.3.5.2.3. Item-Field Operations. This item deals with deployed units operating under field conditions. The following sub-items will be evaluated:

A7.3.5.2.3.1. Sub-item--Mission Management. Establishment of a central point of control (UCC and alternate UCC); effectiveness of shift changes; establishment of effective line of internal and external communications; accounting, control and location of deployed force members, equipment and vehicles; identification of work requirements, assignment of responsibilities, work and security parties development and control; expedient design and construction methods.

A7.3.5.2.3.2. Sub-item--Survivability. Convoy movement including cargo preparation, vehicle inspections, driver briefings, safety equipment, and actual convoy movement; security of work party, resources, and cantonment area; care, handling, and security of weapons and ammunition; coordination with local ground defense forces; hasty defensive and protective positions and vehicle/equipment/facility hardening; adequacy of initial quantities of supplies and the resupply system; field safety and hazard identification and correction; ability to plan and prepare for base denial including identification of mobile assets, priority list of non-mobile assets to destroy, and knowledge of both facility/utility and airfield denial methods.

A7.3.5.2.4. Item--Power Support. Emergency generators will be tested to evaluate the base's ability to operate during an extended commercial power outage. All actions to transfer facilities from commercial to generator power and to ensure generators remain on-line for the required time will be evaluated. Selected base facilities will be visited and emergency generators will be tested individually with the assistance of a power production specialist. Where automatic-start generators are installed, the power production specialist will open the facility's circuit breaker and the operation and transfer of power from the generator will be evaluated. Where manual start generators are installed, using agency personnel will demonstrate their capability to start the generator and transfer power to the facility. Certification of the operators will also be verified. The generators will supply power to the facility until the IG states commercial power can be restored. During the interim, generators which fail or which the IG states have failed will be replaced. The following sub-

items will be evaluated: **Note:** Generator logs will be maintained at the generator for the duration of the ORI. Generators that do not have all necessary facility loads and require a full or partial return to commercial power will be counted against the unit.

A7.3.5.2.4.1. Sub-item--Generator Management. The following elements will be evaluated:

A7.3.5.2.4.1.1. Emergency power units must be identified and listed by priority sequence for supporting essential functions or facilities.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.2. Using agencies must identify personnel (and civil engineers must train these personnel) to start generators and transfer power to the applicable load. In addition, civil engineers should establish written agreements with using agencies which clearly specify user and civil engineer responsibilities pertaining to generator monitoring, especially annotation of AF Form 487.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.3. The users must notify the EOC or UCC when their generators are on-line and CE will ensure generators are properly monitored IAW the written agreement between CE and the user.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.4. Generators which fail must be repaired or replaced in priority order.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.5. Emergency generators in the contingency support set must be capable of sustaining a load, and providing continuous reliable power for an extended period of time.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.6. Emergency backup generators required for mission critical facilities must be revetted or dispersed during contingencies.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.7. There must be a comprehensive refueling plan to quickly serve all generators. The plan will include at least one backup refueling method in the event the primary method can't be used.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.8. Connection cable must be available for quick installation.

A7.3.5.2.4.1.9. Each permanently installed generator must include single-line diagrams and operating instructions describing connection and operation.

A7.3.5.2.4.2. Sub-item--Generator Reliability. The generators must start and transfer power properly, sustain operations for the required time, and be properly maintained IAW applicable technical orders.

A7.3.5.2.5. Item--Damage Assessment and Recovery. Evaluation will be made of the ability to identify and assess airfield, facility and utility damage and repair requirements and to coordinate the recovery operation. Actions will be evaluated using the guidance contained in applicable directives. In general, the following sub-items will be evaluated:

A7.3.5.2.5.1. UCC and an alternate UCC. Contingency plans, checklists, and visual aids should be available and current to properly track the status of repairs and to manage personnel, materials and equipment.

A7.3.5.2.5.2. Command and control of facility damage assessment and recovery teams. The UCC must monitor and coordinate the CE recovery actions involved in damage assessments contamination control, and damage recovery and repair. The locations and status of personnel, materials and equipment should be known at all times.

A7.3.5.2.5.3. Damage Assessment and Repair Teams (DARTS) must accurately identify, estimate and report damages. DARTS must also be trained and equipped to locate and isolate utilities. In addition, airfield damage assessment teams must accurately report the location and size of craters, location and description of unexploded ordnance, and the number of scabs/spalls in a field on aircraft operating surfaces. Airfield status repair quality criteria and minimum operating strip candidates must be briefed to the senior operational commander based on damage repair capability, aircraft arresting system, navigational aids and access routes within 30 minutes of last damage input.

A7.3.5.2.5.4. Expedient Methods/Engineering involves the immediate or timely installation, construction or repair of a facility to keep it operational and includes the installation of the mobile aircraft arresting system and contingency airfield lighting system when available.

A7.3.5.2.6. Runway Repair. CE Organizations will demonstrate their ability to repair runway damage. They will be evaluated according to AFP 10-219, Vol. 4. In general, the following sub-items will be evaluated:

A7.3.5.2.6.1. Capability of the unit to recall personnel and marshal equipment.

A7.3.5.2.6.2. Capability of crater repair, laying AM-2 or fiberglass mat, anchoring, sweeping and airfield striping.

A7.3.5.2.6.3. Knowledge and proficiency of assigned personnel on ADR construction equipment and vehicles.

A7.3.5.2.6.4. Support provided to the ADR teams as included in the base recovery plan.

A7.3.5.3. Security. Evaluate ability to effectively communicate, accomplishment of security planning, to include work party security, personal weapons familiarity and handling, protection of resources and personnel, and response to chemical and/or biological warfare (active food preparation will continue during simulated chemical and/or biological scenarios).

A7.3.5.4. Fire Fighters. Evaluate fire prevention planning and fire fighter proficiency in crash, rescue, hazardous materials incident, confined space rescue, and structural fire suppression procedures. Area includes prioritization of responses, control and suppression actions, and rescue/casualty actions. Units will use the USAF/ILE Fire Protection Flight Assessment Program checklist which is located on the following web site: **https://wwwmil.afcesa.af.mil/Directorate/CEX/Fire/fpfap.html**.

A7.3.5.5. Explosive Ordnance Disposal. A unit's ability to demonstrate its EOD function in a wartime/contingency environment will be evaluated.

A7.3.5.5.1. Command and Control. Evaluate planning and preparation of integration into base recovery, the capability to provide accurate and timely advice on ordnance hazards and assignment of incident category and MOS selection. Communications and team tasking procedures will be evaluated for prioritization, situational awareness of ordnance and chemical hazards. Maps, status boards, charts, checklists, communications, and alternate control centers must be adequate to manage EOD operations. The unit will be evaluated on its ability to initiate required reports and their accuracy; to perform initial UXO recon and channel information; and to identify, render safe, and remove UXOs from prioritized areas as required for resumption of operations to include off installation and force protection requirements.

A7.3.5.5.2. Technical Operations. In general, EOD Technicians will be evaluated on their knowledge of US and foreign ordnance, proficiency with EOD specialized tools, base recovery procedures, techniques for defeating terrorist, sabotage, and improvised explosive devices, wartime chemical operations, and EOD procedures on aircraft and associated weapons systems and general demolition procedures. Technicians will be asked to demonstrate their ability to cope with the scenarios and properly evaluate the threat and take appropriate action to neutralize or mitigate hazard. They will be evaluated on their ability to use technical data, and perform technical intelligence gathering.

A7.3.5.5.3. Support Operations. Evaluate ability to conduct tactical movement (individual/convoy), standard operating procedures, integration with security forces and use proper use of UTC equipment.

A7.3.5.6. Item--Bomb Removal Team. Units will be evaluated on the capability to extricate and remove safed ordnance to a predetermined holding/disposal sites.

A7.3.5.6.1. Sub-item--Transportation. Safe removal and transport of UXOs to the proper holding area. This includes the ability to use assigned equipment to extricate, remove, and safely transport ordnance; knowledge and use of routes; and availability of expediently hardened vehicle.

A7.3.5.6.2. Sub-item--Markings. Ability to recognize UXO markings, and follow specialized instructions for UXOs.

A7.3.6. **Security Forces.**

A7.3.6.1. **Positioning the force.**

A7.3.6.1.1. Check individual and team proficiency to tactically employ assigned weapons, vehicles, communications, and equipment.

A7.3.6.1.2. Provide Training and Maintenance of Small Arms and Crew served Weapons.

A7.3.6.1.2.1. Evaluate ability to provide weapons training to deploying AF personnel in order to effectively execute their assigned duties.

A7.3.6.1.2.2. Evaluate ability to inspect and service installation/wing/unit's assigned weapons in order to support local contingency operations and war-time mission.

A7.3.6.1.2.3. The tasks described in A7.3.6.1.1. through A7.3.6.1.2.2. above are derived from Security Forces METS AFTA 3.6.3. AFI 36-2225, AFI 36-2226, AFI 31-207, AFMAN 31-229

A7.3.6.2. **Sustaining the Force.**

A7.3.6.2.1. Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, & Noncombatants.

A7.3.6.2.1.1. Evaluate ability to conduct Risk, Vulnerability and Criticality Assessments IAW applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.1.2. Evaluate ability to develop an Integrated Defense plan IAW applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.1.3. Evaluate ability to protect operationally critical facilities, assets and systems IAW applicable directives and approved Integrated Defense Plan.

A7.3.6.2.1.4. Evaluate ability to deter or react to local incidents thereby allowing the base/wing to continue its primary mission IAW applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.1.5. Evaluate ability to plan and demonstrate redundant capability utilizing all available communications enabling effective command and control (C2) despite loss of SF C2 nodes (CDOC, BDOC, sector command post etc).

A7.3.6.2.1.6. Evaluate ability to attain required posting and physical security features to protect AF infrastructures, activities, resources, personnel and information IAW Integrated Defense Plan and applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.1.7. Evaluate ability to identify/occupy key terrains (e.g., SAM footprints) in order to deny enemy tactical advantage within the Base Security Zone.

A7.3.6.2.1.8. Evaluate ability to maintain worldwide deployable personnel to meet unit's Designed Operational Capability statement IAW applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.1.9. Evaluate ability to conduct convoy security as required by mission.

A7.3.6.2.1.10. The tasks described in A7.3.6.2.1. through A7.3.6.1.2.9. above are derived from Security Forces METS AFTA 3.6.1. Including these references: AFPD 31-1, AFI 31-101, AFI 10-245, AFI 31-301, AFH 31-302, AFI 31-304, AFJI 31-102, JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.5, 3-07, 3-08V1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-04, DODI 5200.08, DOD 5200.08-R, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05.

A7.3.6.2.2. **Conduct Air Provost Operations.**

A7.3.6.2.2.1. Evaluate ability to provide access control services for the installation IAW applicable directives.

A7.3.6.2.2.2. Evaluate ability to respond to major incidents/accidents IAW applicable directives. Establish Incident Command (IC), relinquish IC to senior fire official during CBRN event, and retain IC for incident involving air provost operations until released by proper authority.

A7.3.6.2.2.3. Assess police services and resource protection activities and

responses (within scope of responsibility).

A7.3.6.2.2.4. The tasks described in A7.3.6.2.2. through A7.3.6.2.2.3. above are derived from Security Forces METS AFTA 3.6.2. The specific authorities for Air Provost Operations may depend upon jurisdictional status of the installation which must be considered in planning. (AFI 31-201, AFI 31-202, AFI 31-204, AFI 31-206, AFI 31-207, AFPD 31-2, JP 3-0, 3-10, 3-11, 3-57, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)

A7.3.6.2.3. **Deployed Security Forces Support (SOFenablers).**

A7.3.6.2.3.1. Evaluate ability to identify security requirements, based on wing/group deployment tasks.

A7.3.6.2.3.2. Evaluate ability to analyze increased FPCONs and implement appropriate force protection initiatives.

A7.3.6.2.3.3. Evaluate ability to continually and expeditiously inform the security force of available intelligence information.

A7.3.6.2.3.4. Evaluate ability to organize, train, equip, and deploy AFSOC security teams, and conduct base defense when tasked.

A7.3.6.2.3.5. Assess effectiveness of AFSOC security teams in protecting special operations assets.

A7.3.6.2.3.6. Evaluate ability to properly issue, clean, secure, and transport weapons and munitions throughout the deployment process.

A7.3.6.2.3.7. Evaluate the Security Advisor as the principal security advisor to the mission commander for force protection, physical security, resource protection and information security according to DOD, Air Force, and AFSOC standards.

A7.3.6.2.3.8. SOF Fly-Away Security Teams: Evaluate ability to advise the mission commander on FP measures; conduct FP surveys; provide close-in security; and assist with SOF led protective service ops. Ensures adequate FP for AFSOC/SOF resources by assessing and interfacing with in-place host nation and other base defense forces.

A7.3.7. **Logistics.**

A7.3.7.1. **Fuels.** Evaluate fuels support in the following areas:

A7.3.7.1.1. Fuel support of aircraft. Observe aircraft refueling operations supporting the ORI for timeliness and fuel safety observance. Ratings will be based on timely dispatch of operators and equipment, observance of all fuels servicing operation safety procedures, qualification of operators, use of designated T.O.s and checklists, and the ability to control/monitor fuels servicing operations in a wartime environment. Rating period begins when fuel-servicing request is received at the Fuels Resource Control Center and will end upon fuels personnel and equipment leaving the fill stand (if required). Equipment malfunctions and non-operator related discrepancies will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

A7.3.7.1.2. Failure to use the proper checklists is a minor discrepancy. A safety violation, which may potentially result in injury to personnel or damage to aircraft, equipment, or facilities, is a major discrepancy.

A7.3.7.1.3. Timely fuel servicing response is defined as the time period specified in a Memorandum of Agreement/Understanding between Fuels Management and Maintenance or an Operating Instruction.

A7.3.7.1.4. Fuel support of ORI aircraft is not staged or simulated for grading purposes. Units are not scored if ORI aircraft have departed home station before inspectors are available.

A7.3.7.2. FARP operations will be evaluated on the ability to support hot refueling operations IAW all applicable T.O.s and checklists and as outlined in paragraph A7.2.5.2.6.14.

A7.3.7.2.1. Failure to maintain and inspect FARP servicing equipment IAW *Forward Area Manifold Manual*, is a minor discrepancy. Failure to perform a proper test (annual hydrostatic test, hose, and Ohm test) is a safety violation, which is a major discrepancy.

A7.3.7.2.2. Ensure procedures have been established for FARP team recall within DOC response time. Ensure FARP equipment is maintained in a mission ready posture. Ensure FARP team members possess all support/personal equipment necessary for immediate response at mission load time.

A7.3.7.3. Petroleum Damage and Deficiency Reporting (REPOL) (Not Applicable to ANG). Evaluate knowledge of fuels operations damage reporting. Rate timely notification of disaster response agencies and submission of a complete and accurate REPOL within prescribed time frames. Rate the submission/transmission procedures of REPOL report.

A7.3.7.4. **Material Management.** A.7.3.7.4.1. Mobility Readiness Spares Package (MRSP)/Mission Support Kit (MSK) (Material management and/or owning organizations). Evaluate IAW paragraph A7.1.2.5.14.1., and following deployed guidelines. Ensure proper accountability, replenishment, and control are maintained over deployed readiness spares package assets. The following will be evaluated:

A7.3.7.4.1.1. Security must be maintained at all times.

A7.3.7.4.1.2. Accountability for assets must be maintained at all times and transactions must be properly documented.

A7.3.7.4.1.3. Personnel must be able to convert part numbers to stock numbers, locate property, issue assets, record transactions, manage dated items (shelf life), and take aggressive action to obtain assets not immediately available.

A7.3.7.4.1.4. Personnel must accomplish proper warehouse practices (e.g. containers are serviceable, asset properly tagged and located, functional checks accomplished, etc.).

A7.3.7.4.1.5. Personnel must be able to demonstrate the ability to transfer Readiness Spare Package (RSP) records to the theater Regional Supply Support

(RSS).

A7.3.7.4.1.6. Demonstrate the ability to use the DMAS to prioritize maintenance cannibalizations.

A7.3.7.4.1.7. Ensure list of personnel authorized to receive classified is up to date and available.

A7.3.7.4.2. MRSP Ability to Survive and Operate. The following elements are evaluated:

A7.3.7.4.2.1. Disperse MRSP/MSK for survivability.

A7.3.7.4.2.2. Demonstrate ability to prioritize requirements and reconstitute/replenish MRSP/MSK damaged/lost due to fire, battle damage, etc., using the DMAS.

A7.3.7.4.2.3. Critical Spares identified prior to MRSP destruction using DMAS.

A7.3.7.4.2.4. Destroyed MRSP/MSK message transmitted (simulated).

A7.3.7.4.2.5. Demonstrate ability to adjust Standard Base Supply System (SBSS) records.

A7.3.7.4.2.6. Demonstrate the ability to manage/locate deployed mobility bag assets using the MAITS or MICAS.

A7.3.7.4.2.7. Demonstrate the capability to deny access to classified information and equipment to hostile forces (Base Denial Plan).

A7.3.7.5. **Command and Control.** Ensure the Supply Readiness Control Center (SRCC) maintains positive control and efficient management of all material management resources. The following will be evaluated:

A7.3.7.5.1. Ensure assigned SRCC personnel, to include augmentees, are qualified and trained to perform all aspects of SRCC operations.

A7.3.7.5.2. Monitor recall status (if applicable).

A7.3.7.5.3. Prepare and distribute processing schedules for material management.

A7.3.7.5.4. Direct/coordinate the movement of personnel and equipment to the processing area to include MOBAGS, RSP, and weapons.

A7.3.7.5.5. Act as the central point of contact for all material management related questions and/or problems.

A7.3.7.5.6. Report any shortfalls/LIMFACs to HHQ.

A7.3.7.5.7. Ensure all military personnel subject to deployment or identified to deploy have received appropriate deployment training.

A7.3.7.5.8. Ensure passive defense measures are in-place and sufficient training has been provided.

A7.3.7.5.9. Communication/power outage procedures must be effective.

A7.3.7.5.10. Expeditiously and efficiently transition unit control/work center to an alternate location without significant degradation of C2 or mission support.

A7.3.7.6. **Spares Support.** Ensure unit continues to maintain efficient and prompt material management support to home station and deployed unit tasking. The following will be evaluated:

A7.3.7.6.1. Demonstrate the ability to effectively process priority material management requirements in a wartime environment.

A7.3.7.6.2. Process partial/not mission capable material management requirements.

A7.3.7.6.3. Units must demonstrate the ability to process intratheater/CONUS lateral support requests.

A7.3.7.6.4. Reparable assets must be tracked through the repair cycle.

A7.3.7.6.5. Two Level Maintenance (2LM)/Lean Logistics (LL). Ensure 2LM/LL reparables are evacuated within one day.

A7.3.7.6.6. Ensure Not Repairable This Station 1 items are shipped to appropriate repair facility.

A7.3.7.6.7. Ensure all other eligible assets are shipped to home station.

A7.3.7.7. **Transportation.**

A7.3.7.7.1. Command and Control. Evaluate C2 of transportation functions. Evaluate currency and unit compliance with base/unit checklists, recall/standby rosters, and applicable emergency response publications. Evaluate the practice of resource security as outlined in base deployment plans and installation security plans. Evaluate management of work center personnel to meet mission requirements, (e.g., total numbers, qualifications of transporters and augmentees). Ensure unit possesses adequate equipment and supplies to support mission requirements, or has feasible alternative methods to obtain such equipment and supplies.

A7.3.7.7.2. Vehicle Operations Flight.

A7.3.7.7.3. Vehicle Maintenance.

A7.3.7.7.4. Traffic Management Flight.

A7.3.7.7.4.1. Evaluate ability to return retrograde assets within time frames established in AFI 24-201, Attachment 5.

A7.3.7.8. **Vehicle Operations Flight.**

A7.3.7.8.1. Evaluate ability to expeditiously develop or utilize Priority Recall/Minimum Essential listings to support vehicle requirements IAW applicable base deployment plans/installation security plans, or approved user defined requirements to support mission.

A7.3.7.8.2. Evaluate ability to ensure sufficient numbers of vehicles and trained operators are available to support mission and deployment requirements.

A7.3.7.8.3. Evaluate ability to maintain accountability of assigned vehicles.

A7.3.7.8.4. Evaluate ability to establish and publicize shuttle bus services to support base activities while ensuring vehicles are available to support critical mission requirements.

A7.3.7.8.5. Evaluate dispatch personnel on training and familiarity with applicable deployed plans, checklists, rosters and emergency response publications.

A7.3.7.8.6. Evaluate operators on the use of 10- and 33- Series codes to increase COMSEC and eliminate unnecessary use of radio frequencies.

A7.3.7.8.7. Evaluate vehicle dispersal plans.

A7.3.7.9. **Vehicle Management.** Evaluate pre-deployment preparations IAW AFI 23-302, *Vehicle Management*, Chapter 2.

A7.3.7.9.1. Assess ability to prepare, process, and track vehicles scheduled for deployment within the deployment schedule.

A7.3.7.9.2. Assess safety and serviceability of assigned vehicles to include those prepared for deployment.

A7.3.7.9.3. Review Vehicle Authorization Listings (VAL) and CA/CRL to ensure mobility and WRM vehicles are properly coded and identified.

A7.3.7.10. Air Transportation. Evaluate ability to prepare and provide serviceable cargo loading equipment to meet deployment requirements, including sufficient quantities and properly accounted for 463L pallets, nets, straps, etc.

A7.3.7.11. **Traffic Management Flight**.

A7.3.7.11.1. Evaluate ability to process priority cargo shipments within Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority (UMMIPS) time frames established in DOD 4500.32R, Volume 1, Chapter 2, and AFI 24-201, *Cargo Movement*.

A7.3.7.11.2. Evaluate ability to prepare cargo for shipment, including preparation of the Transportation Control and Movements Document IAW DOD 4500.32R, Volume 1, Chapter 2, and AFI 24-201.

A7.3.7.11.3. Evaluate ability to pack and process hazardous cargo shipments for airlift IAW AFJMAN 24-204, *Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipment*. Evaluate packing and processing procedures for classified shipments IAW DOD 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*, and AFI 24-201.

A7.3.7.11.4. Evaluate procedures for clearing shipments through the Airlift Clearance Authority (ACA), IAW 4500.32R, Volume 1, Chapter 2.

A7.3.8. **Medical/Health Services.**

A7.3.8.1. Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC)/Transload Operations. Evaluate emergency medical care rendered by pararescue and medical technicians from the objective area (OA) to the main/forward operating base on AFSOC or opportune aircraft, including transload (hand-off) operations between pararescue and medical personnel. Where applicable, assess processes relevant to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) detection and monitoring at forward CASEVAC staging areas. Emphasize safe and efficient rendering of on-board/in-flight medical care.

A7.3.8.2. Casualty Collection Point(s). Evaluate effectiveness of the transition of casualties from line "first response" and Self-Aid/Buddy Care (SA/BC) to the formal medical system. Emphasize triage, emergency medical treatment, C2, and prompt evacuation to next level of care.

A7.3.8.3. Casualty Decontamination. Evaluate casualty decontamination procedures for both ambulatory and litter patients. Consider adequacy of decontamination techniques and procedures to prevent contamination of medical treatment personnel or medical treatment areas. Procedures will include expedient decontamination performed by pararescue personnel. Additional details are provided in the AFSOC MERIT plan.

A7.3.8.4. Medical Aid Station/Medical Treatment Unit. Evaluate effectiveness of the medical team and designated medical treatment area in providing medical support to the deployed unit and/or deployment site. Emphasize primary care support, medical response to CBRNE events, CBRNE detection and monitoring (as applicable), triage, patient assessment, advanced trauma life support (ATLS) capability, patient stabilization, patient holding area processes, C2, medical reporting, and patient evacuation.

A7.3.8.5. Medical Logistics. Evaluate medical logistics processes, with particular emphasis on medical War Reserve Material (WRM) projects of the deploying unit. Inspect and inventory selected WRM projects to ensure they are assembled IAW HQ AFSOC/SG approved packing lists and contain the items authorized in approved Allowance Standards. Ensure authorized WRM items are properly managed and accounted for and those expired WRM project items are handled IAW current WRM program policies. Ensure medical logistics personnel establish and implement plans and procedures to prepare and marshal medical WRM projects.

A7.3.8.6. **Medical activities evaluated IAW AFSOCI 90-250, CL 111,** *Medical Inspection Checklists***.**

A7.3.8.6.1. Evaluate pre and post deployment medical screening IAW current pre and post deployment Air Force directives, support to the personnel deployment functions, preventive medicine briefings, immunizations IAW AFJI 48-110, *Immunization and Chemoprophylaxis*, and AFSOCI 48-101, *Special Operations Aerospace Medicine Operations*, medical intelligence processing, threat assessment, and medical logistics processes IAW AFI 41-209, *Medical Logistics Support*.

A7.3.8.6.2. Evaluate the medical representative's briefing on administration of antidotes and pretreatment chemoprophylaxis, and preventative medicine guidance for the deployed location IAW AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution*. This briefing must include procedures for storage, use, and disposal of Decontamination kits such as the RSDL and all other Class VIII medical items. Ensure current theater-specific guidance is provided to deploying personnel.

A7.3.9. **Judge Advocate (JA).**

A7.3.9.1. Evaluate unit ROE/RUF understanding, implementation, development, dissemination, and training.

A7.3.9.2. Evaluate adequacy of legal support for wartime and contingency operations.

A7.3.9.3. Evaluate the availability of legal assistance for deploying and deployed personnel.

A7.3.10. **Financial Management (FM) and Comptroller Support.**

A7.3.10.1. Evaluate adequacy of comptroller support for wartime and contingency operations.

A7.3.10.2. Evaluate availability and adequacy of comptroller assistance to deploying and deployed personnel.

A7.3.10.3. Finance Activities. Evaluate the Finance Station at the Mobility Processing Unit, ensuring financial responsiveness and accuracy during contingency operations and the accuracy of published orders prior to deployment to include: meal availability, use of Government Travel card, and mode of transportation.

A7.3.10.3.1. Evaluate briefing effectiveness, to include: authorized daily per diem amounts, meals provided/not provided; billeting arrangements/costs; availability of ATMs/finance/cashier; check cashing authorizations and maximum amount; currency conversion; changes in military pay; and additional entitlements (Hostile Fire Pay, Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, Family Separation Allowance, etc.) and amounts, if possible.

A7.3.11. **Contracting.**

A7.3.11.1. Evaluate the responsiveness and adequacy of contracting support in preparation for and during contingency operations.

A7.3.12. **Safety.**

A7.3.12.1. Flight Safety**.** Evaluate flight safety officer involvement to ensure flight safety concerns are addressed, including pre-deployment briefings, risk management applications, development of deployed aircraft parking and taxi plans, and safe deployment and employment of aircraft.

A7.3.12.2. Ground Safety. Evaluate ground safety personnel involvement to ensure all ground safety concerns are addressed, including pre-deployment briefings, risk management applications, maintenance concerns, participation in advanced echelon (ADVON) visits to deployed location, and employment operations.

A7.3.12.3. Explosives Safety. Evaluate explosives safety personnel involvement, including compliance with explosives safety standards; transportation marshalling of explosive cargo, operations and storage/handling procedures for explosives; predeployment site surveys, and activities at the deployed location.

A7.3.13. Chaplain.

A7.3.13.1. Pre-deployment/Deployment Planning. Evaluate ability to effectively carry out the ministries outlined in the Chapel Contingency Support Operations Instructions. Evaluate peacetime planning and transition into wartime posture including the Chaplain's C2 procedures within the Chapel Control Center (CCC). Evaluate procedures and directives for the Chaplain Service concept. Ensure all Chaplain Service personnel have completed mandatory Phase 2 Chaplin Service Training as outlined in AFI 52-104,

Attachment 2. Ensure members prepare for deployment IAW AFI 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution*, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2.

A7.3.13.2. Evaluate the Chaplain Station at the Mobility Processing Unit, ensuring adequate supplies of interfaith religious materials, availability of a private counseling room, and procedures are established for providing adequate cultural briefings. Ensure Chaplain Service Support personnel take an active role in the Chaplain Service team concept, and the Chaplain Service team follows C2 procedures during processing.

A7.3.13.3. Deploying Religious Support Teams must process with all necessary equipment to meet mission requirements. Chaplain Service teams should begin active ministry during processing.

A7.3.13.4. Evaluate Religious Support Team ministry plan, development and provision of inclusive religious programming for the command to all deployed personnel, to include worship, rites and liturgies, visitation program, counseling, and Commander's Crisis Action Team Duties. Ensure location, times, and types of services for deployed personnel are adequately and prominently advertised.

A7.3.14. **Public Affairs (PA).**

A7.3.14.1. Ensure PA develops and maintains an appropriate internal information program and provides trusted council to leaders to enhance morale and readiness.

A7.3.14.2. Ensure deployed commander uses PA to get necessary information to deployed troops.

A7.3.14.3. Ensure PA attends the commander's or battlestaff meeting to impart and gather pertinent information.

A7.3.14.4. Ensure PA escorts media at all times while on a military installation.

A7.3.14.5. Ensure PA works with media so that casualty information inadvertently obtained by the media is not confirmed or released until the initial release of names of all categories of deceased and missing personnel is made by OASD/PA and only after all required next of kin (NOK) notification by the appropriate service casualty office has been confirmed and the minimum NOK grieving period has elapsed.

A7.3.14.6. Ensure PA works with all functionals to ensure that information released publicly is timely, accurate, unclassified, and properly cleared.

A7.3.14.7. Ensure PAO knows how to contact the MAJCOM PA, Theater PA, and SAF/PA on-call person when events have national news interest or the potential for adverse public reaction.

A7.3.14.8. Ensure there are written plans and skeletal news releases to handle emergency situations such as a major incident or aircraft crash.

A7.3.14.9. Ensure PAO or a designated representative attends appropriate information operations working group meetings to become aware of all appropriate IO activities. PA influence operations and defense support to public diplomacy should support IO and strategic communications activities but should never mislead or misguide the public or media.

A7.3.14.10. PA should work to counter all enemy propaganda and misinformation campaigns.

A7.3.14.11. Evaluate virtual information (VI) manager's ability to organize equipment, material, and personnel for deployment.

A7.3.14.12. Evaluate ability to palletize and mobilize equipment.

A7.4. Ability To Survive And Operate (ATSO).

A7.4.1. **Command and Control (C2).**

A7.4.1.1. Evaluate Crisis Action Team (CAT) decisions to mitigate the detrimental effects of enemy attack, state/nonstate use of CBRN weapons, major accidents, natural disasters, or HAZMAT incidents. Evaluate how effectively the wing/wing leadership uses ORM techniques balancing protection of critical assets against necessary operational requirements using all available decision aid tools and staff expertise.

A7.4.1.2. Evaluate the Installation Control Center (ICC) (or applicable agency) ability to communicate and coordinate changes in alarm conditions, MOPP levels, and FPCON to higher echelons, subordinate units and functional areas.

A7.4.1.3. Evaluate C2 for timely reporting of damage and threats to operations, including reports of CBRN contamination, UXO, suspected intruders or attacks, damage (facility and equipment), and casualties (injuries and fatalities).

A7.4.1.4. Evaluate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) direction, coordination, and integration to ensure base survival before, during, and after an attack (if the unit requires an EOC). Evaluate ability to organize damage inputs, prioritize and control damage assessment and recovery teams, and disburse information to appropriate organizations to minimize the adverse effects of hostile actions or effect on operations.

A7.4.1.5. Determine if EOC ensured base populace was aware of critical information such as contaminated areas, MOPP transition locations, chemical access codes and hydration standards.

A7.4.1.6. Determine if post-attack actions are identified prior to onset of hostilities. Evaluate if Joint or Foreign Service support requirements and considerations have been coordinated. Evaluate if personnel are pre-identified to perform post-attack recovery operations. Evaluate if damage assessment/reconnaissance teams are assigned survey responsibility for predetermined sectors/zones or along pre-designated routes.

A7.4.1.7. Determine if C2 center grid maps identify priority facilities and areas. Determine if maps show shelter/bunker locations, mass casualty collection points, alarm/alerting system locations, contamination control areas, security and chemical sectors, contaminated waste accumulation points and other mission essential information critical to ATSO. Determine if the EOC established airbase zones and/or sectors.

A7.4.1.8. Warning Systems**.** Evaluate the ability of the installation alarm/alerting system to provide total geographic coverage of unit populated areas. Evaluate if the system is capable of notifying all personnel of any change in status or attack within one minute. Determine if alarm notifications are consistently made through redundant systems.

A7.4.2. **Prepare.**

A7.4.2.1. Determine if installation plans (Base Support Plan [BSP], Expeditionary Site Plans, Host Nation plans, Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan) adequately address physical threats, determine responsibilities of assigned units and personnel, and integrate tasks.

A7.4.2.2. Determine whether base/unit emergency action procedures are comprehensive and responsive to taskings. Support planning must include emergency response, CBRN operations, strategic mission support and critical Continental United States (CONUS)/Outside Continental United States (OCONUS)-sustaining missions.

A7.4.2.3. Ensure alarm signals, MOPP declarations, and split MOPP operations are coordinated with host nation and sister service agencies, as appropriate.

A7.4.2.4. Determine if the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) and CBRN cell have developed standard operating procedures for CBRN detection, warning, and reporting outside the airbase perimeter and within the airbase tactical area of responsibility, IAW AFMAN 10-2602, if applicable.

A7.4.2.5. Determine if the installation commander has ensured a thorough threat assessment is conducted and the information is taken into consideration while preparing the installation for CBRN attacks. Assess if alarm signals, FPCON, and MOPP level declarations are consistent with those specified by the host theater.

A7.4.2.6. Evaluate appropriate placement and employment of detection and warning equipment. Ensure their locations are identified on local grid maps. Assess proper and regular checks of automated chemical detectors in the area by CBRN forces and reporting of alarms to Unit Control Centers. Determine if dispersal of M8/M9 detection paper ensures that an accurate chemical footprint can be ascertained. Evaluate facility and vehicle blackout procedures.

A7.4.2.7. Assess unit coordination with security forces and EOD on specific actions and procedures for constructing holding areas for handling protective equipment, personal weapons, ammunition, and munitions. Ensure incident response priorities have been established and approved. Evaluate CBRN Cell effectiveness in using automated plotting programs.

A7.4.2.8. Determine if communications are established and tested between EOC, CBRN, and Alternate EOC, CBRN, Shelters, Contamination Control Areas (CCAs) and toxic free areas (TFA), and reconnaissance teams.

A7.4.2.9. Determine if critical functions have an alternate/backup location or capability. Determine if they can reconstitute critical mission activities within a reasonable time.

A7.4.2.10. Ensure personnel are released in a timely manner after an attack, and that the mission is evaluated against risk to personnel.

A7.4.2.11. Assess if status boards, charts, logs, and other tools are used adequately and effectively to display status of critical resources, priority of activities, and reports. Determine if there are standardized checklists to guide the unit through pre-/trans-/and post-attack actions. Determine if the status of contamination from all sources is tracked in the EOC.

A7.4.3. **Protection.**

A7.4.3.1. Evaluate serviceability of Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) to include serviceability of protective masks using the Joint Service Mask Leak Tester (JSMLT). Ensure personnel are able to properly don/wear IPE, and are able to fill canteens /containers with water and safely drink in a contaminated environment. Ensure personnel have been briefed, trained in the use of, and issued the appropriate chemical and biological pre-treatment medicines and post exposure antidotes for the identified threat, and they are readily available for use. Ensure personnel have been briefed on the proper use of Class VIII medical items - Decontamination Kits such as the Residual Skin Decon Lotion (RSDL) and other decontamination kits.

A7.4.3.2. Evaluate the integrated use of hardening, dispersal, and contamination avoidance, as appropriate to the threat and IAW local plans. Ensure hardening actions are implemented IAW the installation/expeditionary site hardening plan. Assess whether dispersal of personnel and equipment is implemented within six hours of unit closure. Evaluate if aircraft, vehicles, and critical equipment are dispersed to enhance survival. Evaluate if dispersal locations have nonoverlapping access routes. Determine if the unit effectively implements maximum use of existing sheltering for unprotected mission essential equipment and materiel within six hours. Ensure critical assets are protected from CBRN contaminants by overhead cover or expedient protective cover.

A7.4.3.3. Determine if remote sites have fixed or expedient shelters and bunkers for people, munitions, and the transport vehicles.

A7.4.3.4. Determine if the base has sufficient personnel and supplies to process 30 personnel per hour through each Ground Crew CCA that is established.

A7.4.4. **Contamination Avoidance and Control.**

A7.4.4.1. Determine if Readiness & Emergency Management (CEX) and Bioenvironmental personnel provide the installation commander proper and timely recommendations to minimize mission degradation from the effects of CBRN hazards (e.g., recommendations to reduce MOPP level or authorize use of MOPP variations based upon heat stress, chemically contaminated locations, agent(s) determined present, contaminated surfaces, and time after agent release). Evaluate if the status of contamination and recommendations for sectoring are appropriate for each sector/work site and the threat agents present in each.

A7.4.4.2. Assess CBRN Cell use of available information and determination of contamination plumes. Determine if personnel properly relay contamination status of equipment to UCC. Evaluate ability to detect, document, identify, mark and track suspected contamination of fuel/cryogenics products and/or equipment.

A7.4.4.3. Ensure CBRN Control Center personnel are proficient with CBRN plotting and reporting procedures to include the use of warning, reporting, and plume modeling automated systems (Joint Warning and Reporting Network, Joint Effects Modeling); manual plotting procedures; and contamination deposition plotting.

A7.4.4.4. Evaluate if CBRN reconnaissance teams perform runs of their routes, conduct operational tests and periodic checks of their equipment, and report status to the CBRN Control Center.

A7.4.4.5. Determine if Post-Attack Reconnaissance teams are appropriately equipped, dispatched, and directed. Assess whether these teams provide initial identification of chemical agent presence, using M8/M9 paper, within 60 minutes from start of reconnaissance efforts.

A7.4.4.6. Determine if personnel accurately identify, mark, report, control, and use contaminated equipment, vehicles, and materiel (as appropriate). Determine if decontamination is performed only where necessary and if only mission critical personnel are released during the chemical deposition phase.

A7.4.4.7. Evaluate if the base populace demonstrates appropriate CBRN contamination avoidance techniques such as quick and appropriate use of M291 and M295 Decontamination Kits, bleach and rinse containers or shuffle boxes for gloves and boots, avoiding vegetation and low lying areas, controlling contaminated waste disposal, and properly replacing contaminated sheeting, tarps, and other coverings.

A7.4.4.8. Ensure proper operational decontamination is conducted on contaminated assets before using them.

A7.4.4.9. Determine whether remote site personnel possess a decontamination capability for themselves, their munitions assets and vehicles.

A7.4.4.10. Evaluate preparations to ensure the minimum essential number of critical vehicles are afforded the most contamination avoidance protection (e.g., determine if assembled weapons loaded onto munitions trailers are provided overhead cover as quickly as possible, determine if munitions personnel protect all assets with overhead cover, dispersal, and/or expedient hardening and only use those that are necessary at any given time, etc.). Ensure personnel can demonstrate proper equipment/asset contaminated sheeting removal and disposal actions.

A7.4.4.11. Determine if CEX properly monitors contamination control operations. Evaluate the ability of unit personnel to decontaminate their weapons. Evaluate unit's ability to perform expedient localized vehicle decontamination. Determine if munitions assets such as trailers are scheduled for full use (as opposed to half loads) to the maximum extent possible.

A7.4.4.12. Ensure unit has developed a contaminated waste collection and disposal process/plan, to include identifying sites.

A7.4.4.13. Ensure transition points are identified and marked with zone number, MOPP level, alarm signal, and minimum actions at each point. Ensure unit personnel use transition points and proper procedures when transitioning from one sector to another.

A7.4.4.14. Determine if the fire department has procedures to ensure adequate C2, rescue, extinguishments, and containment actions based on conditions present during a Hazardous Materials Incident. Determine if weapons crews accomplish loading actions in MOPP 4 when using contaminated munitions. Evaluate the cargo movement section to assess how effectively it manages the movement of contaminated and clean cargo in a chemical environment.

A7.4.5. **Respond.**

A7.4.5.1. Determine if the base populace recognizes and responds appropriately to alarm signals, MOPP declarations, FPCONs, and other force protection announcements. Determine if personnel disperse to shelters/bunkers or seek immediate overhead cover, when directed or alerted, accomplishing necessary protective actions, including contamination avoidance/control measures, in the event of attack.

A7.4.5.2. Determine if personnel are able to perform wartime duties while in MOPP 4 for an extended period of time (IAW C-CW CONOPS Hazard Duration Tables) and determine if supervisors implement work-rest cycles.

A7.4.5.3. Ensure all personnel are able to recognize mark, and report chemical and biological contamination, UXOs, damage and conduct SABC as soon as practical after cessation of attack.

A7.4.5.3.1. Evaluate the ability of the base populace to identify chemical contamination utilizing M8/M9 paper and automated detection systems, cordon the affected area (if possible), and report findings thru their respective UCC

A7.4.5.3.2. Evaluate if the base populace performs limited identification and properly marks unexploded ordnance.

A7.4.5.3.3. Assess how well the Damage Assessment Teams (DAT) classify, record, and mark UXO locations.

A7.4.5.3.4. Assess how effectively the base populace administers SABC. Determine if casualties are expeditiously transported to appropriate casualty collection points and/or medical facilities.

A7.4.5.4. Evaluate S-A-L-U-T-E (size-activity-location-uniform-time-equipment) format reporting of enemy activity and support to Security Forces, where possible.

A7.4.5.5. Determine if control centers ensure unit personnel are monitoring CBRN detection systems and elevating critical information to C2 personnel. Assess whether CEX in the EOC/CBRN Control Center ensures accountability of the reconnaissance teams and other functions under their control. Evaluate if unit personnel effectively report post-attack reconnaissance results to the appropriate control center.

A7.4.5.6. Determine if Military Working Dog (MWD) teams go to the closest collective protection (if available) facility during alarm yellow and alarm red. Ascertain whether the Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Holding Area properly protects occupants (established on concrete/asphalt, and has adequate overhead cover and blast protection).

A7.4.5.7. Determine if the senior fire official allocates fire-fighting resources to respond to prioritized post-attack emergencies as determined by the EOC and the ICC.

A7.4.5.8. Evaluate the ability of EOD UXO teams to render safe/dispose of UXO, and conduct other bomb removal operations. Assess how well the senior EOD representative coordinates the render safe/disposal of unexploded munitions.

A7.4.6. **Mission Continuation/Restoration and Sustainment.**

A7.4.6.1. Evaluate the ability of CEF, CEX, and BEE personnel to conduct all hazard response operations under a single incident commander.

A7.4.6.2. Evaluate the ability of the base populace to replace M8 paper after an attack (if contaminated), perform operational decontamination, and utilize contaminated equipment safely.

A7.4.6.3. Evaluate the ability of the unit to effectively accomplish CCA personnel processing for both aircrew and ground crew.

A7.4.6.3.1. Determine if the CCA/ToxicFree Area (TFA) operations address resource aeration, mask refurbishment, and waste disposal.

A7.4.6.3.2. Determine if the CCA/TFA operation determined resupply levels to include decontamination agents and equipment, fuel, and lighting.

Attachment 8

AFSOC FORM 19, INSPECTION COMMUNICATIONS

This form is used during operational readiness inspections to track communications between the inspector general and the inspected unit.

Prepare form as follows:

Instructions.

A. Communication: Check appropriate box (either UNIT TO IG or IG TO UNIT)

FROM: Enter the inspected unit office symbol or AFSOC/IG (example: 27 SOW or AFSOC/IG)

1. CONTROL NUMBER (Assigned by the originator for tracking) (example: 27 SOW-ORI10-001).

Enter a narrative description of the issue from UNIT TO IG or IG TO UNIT.

2. DRAFTER (Name/Grade/Office Symbol/Phone Number) (example) (John Doe/Lt Col/

27 SOW/IG/681-1817)

3. SIGNATURE: (Enter your signature or if electronically submitting the request enter: //signed,

JAD, 22 Apr 10//)

4. DATE TIME: Enter the current date and time (example: 22 Apr10/1020)
B. RESPONSE FROM: Check appropriate box (either IG TO UNIT or UNIT TO IG) and the IG will mark: APPROVED; DIAPPROVED; APPROVED (EXCEPT AS NOTED BELOW); OR ACKNOWLEDGED.

5. NAME/GRADE/TITLE (self explanatory) (ANDERS/LT COL/Chief of Inspections)

6. SIGNATURE (Enter your signature or if electronically submitting the request enter: //signed, JAD, 22 Apr 10//)

7. DATE TIME: Enter the current date and time (example: 22 Apr10/1020)